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3Abstract;
This practice-based PhD critically investigates the aesthetic and spatial conditions that 
have turned the Mediterranean into a military-humanitarian border zone, dissecting the 
political anatomy of violence inflicted at and through the sea. It understands the maritime 
borders of the EU as a paradigmatic conflict zone in which new assemblages of power, 
legal arrangements and uneven patterns of mobility have emerged in relation to a vast, and 
yet patchy, surveillance apparatus. Contrary to the popular representation of the maritime 
territory as a homogeneous and empty expanse, the sea appears here as a technologically 
mediated space thick with events and complex relations between people, environments, 
and data. Recasting the notion of structural violence in aesthetic terms (i.e., as violence 
hidden in plain sight), this thesis further investigates documentary, humanitarian and 
cartographic practices that operate across this contested frontier and their role both in 
governmental practices of control and in migrants’ infrastructures of mobility. Part 1 
(Genealogies) locates the current migration regime at sea within a longer genealogy of 
bordering technologies and aesthetic practices operating at sea. Part 2 (Liquid Traces) 
builds upon “Forensic Oceanography”, a project that I co-initiated in 2011 and which 
has mobilised geographic and media technologies (remote sensing, drift modelling, GIS, 
vessel tracking and others) to document the violence perpetrated against migrants in the 
Mediterranean. Here I read the maps, videos, visualisations and human right reports that 
I have co-produced during this project and that have been used as evidence in actual legal 
proceedings as attempts to challenge the regime of (in-)visibility imposed on this contested 
area. This thesis offers a new “cognitive mapping” of migration at sea by following my own 
situated encounters with the practices, policies, discourses and geographies that constitute 
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The former train station of Barca (Cyrenaica, Libya) built during the Italian colonisation of Libya. 
In 2009, at the time in which I took this picture, it was the seat of a “Sudanese social and cultural 
network”, as indicated by the signs and flags hanging on the façade.
14th August 2009. Barca, Libya
In the summer of 2009, I travelled to Libya with the intention of analysing the role played 
by the demolition, reuse and subversion of examples of spatial infrastructure that had 
been built during the period of Italian colonisation. This fieldwork, undertaken as part of 
my MA degree, was conducted at a time when the (post-)colonial relation between Italy 
and Libya was changing rapidly. About a year earlier, on 30 August 2008, Italy had signed a 
“Treaty of friendship, partnership and cooperation” with Libya that paved the way for a $5 
billion investment in Libyan public infrastructure as a way of finally “settling past disputes 
and legal arguments”.1 Appearing in front of the media, Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi presented the treaty as long-awaited reparation for the misdeeds committed in 
the past and as a way of offering redress to the Libyan people for the sufferings they had 
had to endure.2 
 The vision that underpinned this agreement was one of rediscovered harmony, of a 
perfect “symmetry” of interests between former colonisers and former colonised. However, 
as I realised during my visits to the former colonial buildings, there was an inconvenient 
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presence troubling this idyllic narrative. I found that it had become impossible not to notice 
the high numbers of so-called “transit migrants” from Sub-Saharan Africa, Bangladesh 
and elsewhere who were in Libya at the time.3 Statistics suggested that there were at least 
two million in a country that had a total native population of around five million. Often 
living in precarious conditions on the edges of urban areas, many of them were, according 
to the “myth of invasion”, ready to take a boat and enter Europe.4
 In response to this situation, and in exchange for the infrastructure projects 
promised by Italy, Libya implemented a series of measures aiming at controlling “illegal 
migration” through its territory. These provisions were presented by the Italian government 
as the “solution” to the increasing number of people coming ashore on the Italian coasts. 
Libya’s coast, approximately 2000 km in length, the treaty established, was to be patrolled 
by Italian and Libyan crews on patrol boats provided by Italy, while satellite detection 
systems jointly financed by Italy and the EU were to be provided to monitor unauthorised 
entries at the land borders in the south of Libya. After the opening on Libyan territory, a 
few years earlier, of detention camps co-financed by Italy and the EU, in which migrants 
had been detained for months in appalling conditions, the signing of this treaty marked 
the start of the infamous pushback policy through which, in violation to the principle of 
non-refoulement, migrants intercepted at sea were collectively send back to Libya without 
being given the opportunity of asking for asylum. Libya had become the new border of 
Europe.
Interview with a group of Bangladeshis who had crossed the Mediterranean during summer 2011 
fieldtrip in Southern Italy
10 August 2011. Piana degli Albanesi (Palermo), Italy
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 Only two years later everything had changed. This time I was on the other side 
of the Mediterranean but it was not only my position that was different. While for some 
time the pushbacks, as well as the transnational cooperation between Tunisia, Libya, Italy, 
Malta and the EU, had managed to curb temporarily the number of people reaching the 
southern coasts of Italy without authorisation, the “spatial upheavals” brought about by 
the so-called Arab Spring ushered in a new political and military situation that completely 
upset the plans of the Italian and Libyan governments.5 In Libya, an entrenched civil war 
and the ensuing NATO-led military intervention had induced many to leave the country. 
This situation was exacerbated by the active role of Gaddafi’s regime in using “transit 
migrants” as a “weapon of war”, threatening to turn Europe “black” by forcing many of 
them onto boats.6 As a result, in 2011 almost 26,000 people left Libya by boat (in fact, this 
was a tiny fraction of those who left the country, the great majority of whom fled by land to 
neighbouring countries) and reached the southern shores of Italy. In Tunisia, over 28,000 
people took the chance offered by the fall of the Ben Alì regime to cross the sea to Italy 
during that same year. 
 According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) over 1,822 recorded deaths occurred in the central Mediterranean in this period, 
making 2011 the “deadliest year” in the Mediterranean until last year’s new peak.7 While 
between 1988 and March 2012 there were 13,417 documented deaths along the maritime 
borders of the EU,8 the deaths of 2011 occurred at a time when the militarisation of the 
EU’s maritime frontier in the context of the daily low-intensity “war on migration” had 
taken on an entirely new dimension, with a large number of Western warships and patrol 
aircraft deployed off the Libyan coast as part of the international military intervention. This 
particularly dramatic situation, however, also offered an opportunity to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and activist groups to contest anew, and with new instruments and 
arguments, the deadly militarisation of the sea. In June, the migrants’ rights organisation 
Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés (GISTI) announced that it would file a 
legal case against the EU, Frontex and NATO for non-assistance to migrants at sea, arguing 
that given the heightened surveillance of the central Mediterranean during the military 
campaign, it was impossible for military and border control personnel to have failed to 
witness the distress of migrants at sea.9 However, while smuggled videos from Libya showed 
the departure of migrants10 and while those of them who managed to reach Lampedusa 
were met by the spotlights of camera crews providing images of the “ongoing invasion” 
(this time in the opposite direction of the Italian colonialists), what was happening at 
sea, in-between these two spaces, had remained until that moment largely opaque. Those 
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who never made it were of no concern to the border regime, which only cared about 
“arrivals”, never about departures.11 Nor activists seemed equipped to do anything more 
than keeping track of the shipwrecks that came to be known through the news. 
 It was in this context that my interests gradually but steadily shifted towards 
the ocean. Together with Charles Heller, a friend and fellow doctoral candidate at the 
Centre for Research Architecture, we started thinking about how we could contribute 
to the campaign launched by GISTI. The ideas for our contribution were framed by two 
elements: on the one hand, our previous engagement as critical scholars and visual/spatial 
practitioners in the politics of migration; and, on the other, a new sensibility towards the 
use of aesthetic objects (video images, satellite imagery, architectural plans and models, 
maps, audio recordings, etc.) as evidence of human rights violations that we, together with 
several other colleagues at the Centre for Research Architecture, were starting to explore 
within the framework of the Forensic Architecture project.12 With these two elements in 
the back of our minds, in the first half of August 2011 we set off to southern Italy (Apulia, 
mainland Sicily and Lampedusa) to interview migrants who had recently fled Libya and 
Tunisia, as well as key actors in the central Mediterranean (Coast Guard and Border 
Police officials, the personnel of humanitarian organisations – Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 
Protezione Civile and International Red Cross (IRC) – and a migration lawyer) in order 
to find out if and how the alleged violations of legal norms imposing the duty to rescue 
people in distress at sea could be documented. To those who were in charge of monitoring 
the sea (especially the Coast Guard and Border Police) we asked how surveillance was 
operating at sea – its means, spatial layout and purposes – as well as the general patterns of 
the crossing. The questions to migrants focused instead on minute and, at times, seemingly 
irrelevant details of the trip: “How many hours did you spend travelling? On what kind of 
boat? Did any of the passengers die during the crossing? How many ships or aircrafts did 
you spot? Did any of those fail to assist them? Do you remember any identifying trait of 
those? The colour of the hull, the presence of flags, the language spoken by the crew? Was 
it day or night when that happened?” People who had travelled on the same boat gathered 
together and gave us something like a collective narrative of the crossing. 
 Our interviews proved fundamental in establishing a general understanding of the 
structural violence that made possible the death of so many people. And yet, the possibility 
of going beyond previously established practices, such as counting the deaths, hinged on 
the capacity to document with precision episodes of direct responsibility by specific actors 
and tactically mobilise them to challenge the overall government of mobility. For this 
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reason, a few weeks later we started to work on the case that would become the fulcrum 
of our research: the “left-to-die boat” case. This was the story of how 63 migrants had lost 
their lives while drifting for 15 days in the central Mediterranean, despite having informed 
rescue agencies of their position and their distress, and despite having been spotted by 
at least a surveillance aircraft, two military helicopters and several ships. Because of the 
complex legal structure of the Mediterranean and the high number of actors operating 
there during the time of the event, creating a coherent spatial picture was critical for 
determining the degree of involvement of each of these parties. In collaboration with a 
wide network of contributors, we used imaging, mapping and modelling technologies to 
provide a spatio-temporal reconstruction of what happened to this boat, retracing for the 
first time its deadly drift across different areas of maritime jurisdictions and within the 
detection range of the powerful surveillance means deployed in the area.13 Challenging 
the common assumption that spatial analysis does not apply to the liquid territory of 
the sea, we interrogated the ocean as a digital archive, a sensorium mediated by a vast 
remote sensing apparatus composed of optical and thermal cameras, radars, tracking and 
satellite imaging technologies.14 Based on this information, we produced maps, videos, 
visualisations, human right reports, articles, exhibitions and websites that became the 
basis for legal action in several countries and other political initiatives. 
 In doing so, we opened up new ways of critically investigating the militarised 
border regime in the Mediterranean and challenging the regime of visibility imposed by 
surveillance means on this contested area. This was the start of the Forensic Oceanography 
project that continues to this day.
INTRODUCTION
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“It is not strange that attention has been focused more on personal than on 
structural violence. Personal violence shows. […] Personal violence represents 
change and dynamism – not only ripples on waves, but waves on otherwise 
tranquil waters. Structural violence is silent, it does not show – it is essentially 
static, it is the tranquil waters.”16
- Johan Galtung
“Day after day we keep receiving updates on that uncanny war which is ongoing in the 
Mediterranean.”16 While for many years mainstream news outlets have dedicated scant 
attention to the ongoing death of migrants17 at sea, information on how many migrants 
have died, how many have been rescued and how many are feared missing has increasingly 
had, at least since late 2013, a daily presence across the media. Short reports indicate the 
approximate location of shipwrecks, the nationality of the migrants and the identity of the 
rescuing ship in the dry but merciful language of a war bulletin. 
 In the last months, and particularly after the tragedy that took place on 3 October 
2013, in which more than 365 people died less than one kilometre away from the coast 
of Lampedusa,18 there has been an extraordinary increase in public attention towards 
the death of migrants in the Mediterranean. Several journalistic initiatives,19 reports by 
major human rights NGOs (including those which did not have, until recently, a specific 
focus on migrants’ deaths, such as Amnesty International),20 and countless political and 
cultural initiatives by activists and various other groups have managed to make migration 
at sea and its so-called “human cost” an item of public debate. Even major international 
organisations that are part of the very apparatus that attempts to govern human mobility, 
such as IOM, have released worried reports about migrants’ “fatal journeys” around the 
world, pointing to the global scale of the phenomenon.21
 To be sure, this clamour is not an absolute novelty. In past years public attention 
to tragedies involving migrants in the Mediterranean has been a recurring occurrence 
across the European media landscape. Yet the enduring persistence that has characterised 
THE SEA AS FRONTIER: 
DOCUMENTING INFRA-STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
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the recent debate on deaths at sea is, in several respects, unprecedented, as are the 
transformations that took place across the Mediterranean between 2011 and 2014, the 
years on which this thesis focuses. What is particularly significant is that during this time 
the deaths of migrants have entered the public debate not only as a news story, but mainly 
as a “problem” in need of an urgent solution. Whether the response to this “problem” 
is formulated in the overtly racist language of “keeping them in their place” or in the 
seemingly more benign, humanitarian tone of calls for increased surveillance and the 
dismantling of trafficking networks, proposed solutions to the ongoing tragedies in the 
Mediterranean have abounded. Never as in past years has the Mediterranean been so 
consistently portrayed as an “unsafe space”22 of humanitarian concern and never has death 
at sea occupied such a significant position in political debates.
 This situation can at least partly be understood in relation to the increasing scale 
of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean in the last few years.23 While the more than 1,500 
deaths highlighted by the UNHCR in 2011 seemed at the time to have hit a staggering 
new height,24 these numbers now pale in comparison to those that have been recorded 
since October 2013. With over 207,000 migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean 
and at least 3,419 of them perishing along the way, in 2014 the central Mediterranean was 
proclaimed the deadliest crossing in the world,25 the epicentre of those “landscapes of 
deaths” that characterise global borders.26 But it also, more specifically, speaks to the way 
in which the border itself is now being reinvented as a space of humanitarian government27 
and, more generally, a certain humanitarian discourse has come to occupy centre stage in 
the management of economies of violence.28
 The ubiquitous “focus on saving lives”29 that has characterised the present debate, 
however, has not really led to the questioning of the very migration regime that, arguably, 
has caused these deaths in the first place. While many activists and scholars, including 
me, have highlighted for several years the close tie that exists between the tightening EU 
border regime and the increasing numbers of migrant deaths,30 the policies, practices and 
actors that have shaped the current government of mobility have never really come under 
scrutiny. On the contrary, every “tragedy” is usually followed by urgent calls for more 
surveillance, more controls and more militarisation, precisely some of the mechanisms 
that, according to the analyses mentioned above, have caused death in the first place. The 
official responses to the outcry that followed the tragedy of 3 October 2013 in Lampedusa 
(mentioned above) were in this sense emblematic. The EU President, José Manuel Barroso, 
used his visit to the Italian island to announce the final implementation of the EU-wide 
Eurosur surveillance system and the reinforcement of Frontex, the EU border control 
14Introduction
agency.31 As for the Italian government, it deployed five military ships off the coasts of 
Libya, as well as helicopters, aircrafts and drones over a period of one year, launching the 
most spectacular rescue and border control mission to date, the military-humanitarian 
operation “Mare Nostrum”. While revealing and highlighting the death of migrants at sea 
has been for years one of the principal ways in which criticism of the border regime has 
been articulated,32 “a crucial element in the system of checks and balances that keep power 
at bay”, it has now become increasingly “internal to the exercise of power” and is being 
used to underpin and justify that very regime.33
 Similarly to way in which, according to Nicholas De Genova,34 the spectacle of 
border enforcement ends up reifying and naturalising the border and the condition of 
illegality it creates, the spectacular “visibilisation” of deaths has managed to make the very 
practices and policies of border control vanish from critical analysis. The larger social, 
legal, political and economic context in which border deaths happen has thus remained 
outside the analytical frame of many observers. “Through a myriad of policies and 
bureaucratic structures, governments [have] been able to distance themselves from deaths 
at the border,” thus untying the link that exists between border deaths and border controls. 
35 Blame for the deaths is shifted onto the migrants themselves – “who are depicted […] as 
subjects who are at fault by putting themselves in danger”36 – or the “ruthless” smuggling 
networks that organise the crossings, and whose increasing presence is, in fact, as has been 
widely argued, just a consequence of the increasing militarisation of borders.37 Instead, the 
deaths of migrants are often presented as a sort of tragic but inevitable – almost “natural” 
– catastrophe, for which no clear responsibility can be attributed. As Stephanie Grant 
has argued, quoting official statements by border officials, “migrant frontier deaths and 
violations of migrants’ rights at frontiers have tended to be seen as a ‘tragic by-product’ 
and as ‘unintended side effects’ of state action to control national borders”.38
 As a consequence, while massive death at the maritime frontier of the EU is 
increasingly registered and exposed, impunity is ever-present. Even in those cases in which 
migrant deaths and violations of migrant rights have been documented in detail, and even 
when dead bodies have been found and harrowing stories told by survivors, attributing 
responsibility for them has remained extremely challenging, if not impossible. Among 
the many examples that could be mentioned, the “left-to-die case” that I have contributed 
to documenting is particularly telling. In the two years that have passed since the release 
of our report, no elements of our detailed reconstruction has been disproved, nor even 
challenged. Not one of the actors involved has proved us wrong on any of the spatial or 
temporal elements of the chain of events that we contributed to assembling. And yet, the 
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public prosecutors of all the European countries to which the case has been brought have, 
in the best scenario, not initiated a legal proceeding, or, in the worse, dismissed the case, 
taking national armies’ “denials [and] referrals back to NATO and/or the member states” 
as proof of non-involvement and hence, implicitly, passing the buck of responsibility to 
the other actors that were present at sea at the time of the events. What is perhaps most 
painfully ironic is that the very precision of our reconstruction has been used by a French 
judge as the reason for dismissing the case, on the grounds that since our investigation had 
been “exhaustive”, it could not prove the involvement of French assets – denied also by the 
French military (i.e., the accused) – and that this was reason enough to close the case. While 
appeals have been successfully lodged by the legal team that represents the survivors, this 
behaviour is paradigmatic of the unwillingness to attribute responsibility for this case, or, 
as in the case of the regret expressed by NATO for the “missed opportunity” to intervene, 
to reduce this and other similar events to malfunctions in an otherwise respectable system. 
As Charles Heller and I have written, “while fully visible to the public, the collective crime 
of which the passengers have been the victims has remained invisible to the law. […] 
The indifference which led to their being abandoned to the winds and currents continues 
to plague the demand for justice of the survivors, perpetuating their drift even on firm 
land.”39 
/
In order to make sense of this peculiar relation between violence, visibility and 
accountability in the context of borders and migration, some authors have mobilised the 
notion of “structural violence”.40 This concept, which in recent years has enjoyed a certain 
revival,41 describes episodes of indirect violence, violence that is not committed by any 
identifiable author(s) but that is rather the “the outgrowth of the seemingly acceptable, 
institutionalized practices of organizations deemed as legitimate.”42 It does not refers to 
acts of violence but rather to how certain practices and policies create the conditions in 
which violence can thrive unchallenged.
 While this notion has a long and complex genealogy,43 the Norwegian peace scholar 
Johan Galtung is largely credited with having provided its first thorough formulation at 
the end of the 1960s, in the context of growing theorising on dependency, world systems 
and imperialism.44 More recently, several anthropologists45 have used it to describe the 
“suffering [caused by] historically given (and often economically driven) processes and 
forces that conspire – whether through routine, ritual, or, as is more commonly the 
case, the hard surfaces of life – to constrain agency”.46 In all these instances, “structural 
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violence” has proved to be a powerful instrument to expand the understating of violence 
and to account for those powerful forces that, embedded as they are in complex patterns 
of causation, are difficult to detect. 
 Its mobilisation in relation to border deaths is much more recent but seems equally 
fruitful. Joseph Nevins first used it in relation to the deaths happening at the Mexico-US 
border in order to contrast what he perceived as “an outgrowth of a narrow conceptualization 
of violence, one that impoverishes an understanding of the social actors and complex 
processes that contribute to the harming of people” by focusing only on direct, personal 
violence and leaving “the creation and reproduction of social conditions that inevitably 
result in deaths” unaddressed.47 As a consequence of this narrow conceptualisation, “the 
violence embodied by the growing number of deaths of unauthorized migrants, as well as 
other manifestations of violence against migrants, has resulted in so little public scrutiny”.48 
This does not mean, Nevins explains, that there is no debate around these deaths but that 
“the basic assumptions underlying immigration and boundary enforcement remain largely 
unchallenged.”49 The practices of border enforcement as well as the legal and administrative 
policies that sustain them are naturalised. A more expansive understanding of violence, 
instead, has the merit of turning this state upside down and of critiquing “the limits of 
conventional approaches to accountability”.50
 Beyond a general utility of this concept in the analysis of border violence, however, 
what I find of particular interest is its operational potential in rethinking practices of 
documentation. At the core of structural violence lies, in fact, an aesthetic problem – if 
by aesthetics we mean, with Rancière, the politics of “framing and re-framing the visible 
and the invisible”.51 For many of the authors that have employed this notion, what is at 
stake is a distinctive relationship that is instituted between violence and visibility, one by 
which violence is concealed in plain view. As Nevins notices, “structural violence is not 
hidden simply because it occurred ‘behind the scenes’ […] but because powerful actors 
reproduce its hidden nature and/or construct it as something legitimate or other than 
violence through various representations.” Therefore, he continues, while direct violence 
tends to receive attention “because it is visible as action”, structural violence becomes “part 
of the social fabric, of the status quo” and tends to seem “normal” and thus “not only 
goes unnoticed, but also […] not challenged”.52 Structural violence addresses a form of 
invisibility that does not (only) operate by removing knowledge, by keeping violence in 
the dark so as to allow its repetition and reproduction. While visible, migrants’ deaths are 
not understood as violence. In other words, what structural violence does is to expose the 
gap that exists between what is “visible” and what is “articulable”, between the “visibility” 
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of certain events – in this case the death of migrants – and their “sayability” in terms of 
violence – the possibility of producing statements that would be able to link these deaths 
with violence and seek accountability for it.53
 This situation clearly poses important challenges to a project like mine that emerged 
precisely as an attempt to document the violence perpetrated against migrants at sea, as 
well as to all other image and mapping practices operating in this field. Since “it is not 
invisibility that allows violence to be repeated and reproduced but [rather] repetition and 
reproduction [that] make violence invisible,”54 documentation cannot be understood as a 
“simple” act of unveiling. “To read this violence is not to draw open a theatrical curtain or a 
veil behind which violence is lurking.”55 The question then arises of what kind of aesthetic 
and political response would be required by “structural violence”.56 If “historically”, as 
Maria Lind and Hito Steyerl write, “the documentary is a form that emerges in a state of 
crisis”, what kind of documentary form does the current situation in the Mediterranean 
require?57 Under what conditions can visual and spatial documents expand our political 
imagination so as to confront the complex structures of causation that this concept allows 
us to grasp? What aesthetic means do we have to deploy in order to challenge a form of 
violence that operates by “omission” rather than by “commission”?58
/
This thesis can be read as an attempt to give an answer to these questions and to rethink 
how documentary practices, understood in a very broad sense, might look like in the face 
of the structural violence produced at the maritime borders of the EU.
 In retrospect, I can say that my personal attempt to deal with those questions has 
articulated itself along at least three interconnected lines.
THRESHOLDS
On the one hand, as already mentioned, it constituted itself as a practice of image production 
and mapping that has aimed at challenging the current regime of (in-)visibility of the 
maritime border. If, as it has been written, “the border as social relationship mediated 
by images is a key site […] in which contestation and struggle among a diverse range 
of actors produce particular forms of representational drift,” intervening at the level of 
images becomes a crucial endeavour.59
 Usually the conditions of (in-)visibility of the Mediterranean border are presented 
in rather simplistic terms, as a dichotomy between “clandestine” – etymologically, 
“hidden” – migrants and border controllers who instead want to shed light on practices 
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of border crossing. In reality, this is much a more complex and muddled field. The 
selective “spectacularisation” of border enforcement, for instance, is intimately tied 
with the deliberate concealment of the violence against migrants. Conversely, migrants’ 
“clandestine” tactics are always weighted against the risk of dying unnoticed at sea. 
Visibility and invisibility do not designate here two discrete and autonomous realms, but 
rather a topological continuum.
 This consideration has important consequences. While an important part of 
Forensic Oceanography’s work has certainly been concerned with finding new ways to 
shed light on episodes of violence against migrants that have not been brought to the 
attention of a larger public or have been deliberately kept hidden from it, this has not 
happened as a process of “absolute” unveiling. Rather, acknowledging that in the context 
of structural violence visibility and invisibility constitute two already intertwined realms, 
documenting the violence perpetrated against migrants at sea has often meant intervening 
within and against the already established “field of perceptible reality” that determines 
“whether and how we respond to the suffering of others [and] how we articulate political 
analyses”.60
 In his book on Foucault, Deleuze explains how “visible” and “articulable” are 
interdependent but not isomorphic terms. They exist in constant tension with each other. 
Their dialectical relationship, at any given historical moment, establishes epistemological 
thresholds that define the limits of what we can know. These thresholds of perceptibility are 
not only the thresholds of discourse, as a “vulgar” poststructuralist interpretation might 
believe. Rather, the very “discursive limits of intelligibility”61 are themselves encoded 
in medial forms and bound up with the techno-political and material assemblages 
that constitute the Mediterranean scopic regime.62 They are the very “thresholds of 
detectability”63 which, for instance, regulate the resolution of images and which, in their 
turn, determine a specific “partition of the sensible”.64 These thresholds are, of course, not 
ontologically determined but embedded in a range of techno-scientific calculations and 
political disputes. Often they are “maintained by epistemic and military violence, by the 
fog of war, by political twilight, by class privilege, nationalism, media monopolies, and 
persistent indifference. [Their] resolution is managed by legal, political, and technological 
paradigms.”65 A striking example of this has been the extremely elusive responses provided 
by states in response to the various legal proceedings initiated on behalf of the survivors of 




Top: Map provided by the French Ministry of Defence on the 23 October 2012 with the aim of 
demonstrating that French naval assets were not present at the time and in the area where the 
events occurred. Nevertheless, the map does not consider the presence of French surveillance 
aircraft (like the one that took a picture of the “left-to-die” boat), nor the detection capabilities of 
the French naval assets, which might have detected the presence of the drifting boat even if they 
were not physically present in the area.
Bottom: Response by the Canadian government to the Freedom of Information procedure filed in 
relation to the case. All relevant information has been blanked out.
In our investigation into the “left-to-die boat”, we could not rely on the certitude of a 
revelatory image to corroborate the witnesses’ testimonies, but had to work with the “weak 
signals” that underpin truth production practices in the field that Thomas Keenan, after 
Allan Sekula, has called “counter-forensics”.66 These were mainly the data provided by the 
vast and yet patchy apparatus of sensing devices that has transformed the contemporary 
ocean into a technologically mediated space: vessel-tracking technologies, satellites, 
radars, drifters, meteorological and oceanographic stations, etc. 
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Synthetic Aperture Radar image depicting a portion of the central Mediterranean at three 
different zoom levels. The image was taken by the Envisat satellite on 28 March 2011, at the 
time of the international military intervention against Libya. When examined carefully, different 
textures and features start to emerge. The darker area that crosses the whole image diagonally 
(A) represents an area of calmer sea, while the sharply defined dark feature in the mid-left side 
of the image (B) is probably an oil spill or some other phenomenon decreasing the amount of 
microwaves scattered back from the sea surface to the satellite. Just below that, a striping pattern 
(C) appears, an artefact in all likelihood introduced by the sensor’s response. What does not 
appear in this image, however, is the “left-to-die boat” itself nor any other migrant boat that 
might be present in the image’s frame, as their small size would remain below the threshold of 
detectability. By combining this image with a drift model that maps the trajectory of the “left-to-
die boat” after it ran out of fuel, thus providing its approximate location, we were able to establish 
that the bright pixels that are to be seen mainly in the upper-right quarter of the image (such as 
point D) represent large ships that were located in the vicinity of the migrants’ boat and could 
have easily rescued them but chose not to intervene. For a more detailed explanation of how this 
image was used in our investigation, see figures 21 to 25 in the report annexed to this thesis.
This sensorium, emerging at the intersection of electromagnetic and physical waves, 
proved to be a valuable witness, revealing a space thick with events and complex relations 
between people, environments and data. The information it provided, however, was often 
incomplete or fuzzy, both because it was deliberately kept secret but also because the 
promise of full-spectrum visibility symbolised by the technological apparatus of border 
surveillance constantly runs up against the limits of swath and resolution. Yet, through 
a process of “trawling through, looking at, and looking again, interpreting, verifying, 
decoding and amplifying messages and broadcasting them further”,67 we managed to 
assemble a coherent narrative that provided important elements of evidence for the crime 






to border control, we needed to position ourselves strategically in relation to their usual 
application by border agencies. We sought, as I shall explain in more detail in chapter 
3, not to replicate the technological eye of policing, but to exercise a “disobedient gaze”, 
redirecting the gaze of the surveillance apparatus towards the act itself of policing the sea. 
While reading the same images and data that are normally used to enforce the maritime 
border, we contested the practices of “inscription” and “visualisation” that transform 
those images into evidence of illegal trespassing,68 paying particular attention to the way 
in which this spatial and visual information becomes the object of intense scrutiny and 
conflicting interpretation as they circulate across different forums.69 In chapter 2, I further 
analyse a plurality of image practices that in the context of humanitarian interventions at 
sea have been contesting the (sovereign) monopoly of seeing. I shall argue that it is in their 
circulation across different forums – rather than simply in what they represent – that these 
images still hold an emancipatory potential.
INFRA-STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
The second axis along which this thesis moves is the spatial dimension of the maritime 
border. Here, the attempt is to challenge the “terracentric bias” that has characterised most 
thinking about space and politics until very recently.70 Against a prevalent (mis-)conception 
of the maritime territory as a homogeneous and empty expanse, sitting outside history and 
beyond the reach of society, this thesis takes the sea as a central space of politics. Renewed 
attention to maritime zones is not, it should be said at the outset, a lonely enterprise 
anymore. Since the late 1990s, the ocean has gained a prominent position in several areas 
of research that share an interest in spatial politics; a growing body of work has decentred 
the focus of scholarly analysis away from continental landmasses.71 For historians, who 
have hailed oceans as “the supreme arena of the events that constitute global history”,72 
focusing on ocean regions has offered the possibility of overcoming the limits imposed by 
national historiographies and area studies.73 Geographers have used oceans as a privileged 
site to analyse “hybrid formations that emerge through interaction and movement”.74 For 
anthropology, cultural studies and critical theory, finally, the ocean has often become a 
“theory machine”,75 “an ideal medium for rethinking modernist notions of identity and 
subjectivity and the ways in which these are reproduced through land-centred divisions 
and representations of space”.76 
 For many of these scholars, oceans have thus represented the ideal scale on which 
to understand new global phenomena. It is not a coincidence that this raft of scholarship 
on the ocean emerged precisely in the late 1990s, at the time when the concept of 
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Drift model that simulates the path of the “left-to-die boat” after it started floating without use 
of its motor. Richard Limeburner of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution reconstructed 
the drift trajectory by analysing data on winds and currents collected by buoys in the Sicily 
Channel. Over time, the margin of error in the drifting vessel’s track linearly decreases as it is 
constrained by the known position of landing. For a more detailed explanation of how this map 
was produced, see figures 16 to 18 in the report annexed to this thesis. 
globalisation came to the fore. Oceans came to be regarded as the quintessential metaphors 
for globalisation, which, according to anthropologist Stephan Helmreich, should indeed 
be called “oceanisation”.77 “If area studies offered a vision of the world that reflected the 
political, military, and economic concerns of the cold war era, as many critics have charged, 
studies that revolve around maritime regions and emphasize processes of exchange no doubt 
mirror an era of globalization.”78 This literature, however, has also often suffered from the 
very same flaws that have marked mainstream analyses of globalisation. The “fluvial nature 
of the ocean” has been “used to signal a world of mobilities, betweeness, instabilities, and 
becomings”.79 Watery metaphors of flow, circulation and fluidity have been increasingly 
mobilised in an effort to describe the perceived increase in movements of capital, people 
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idea of the ocean as a backdrop for movement informs a narrative of globalisation as a story 
of increased interconnectedness”,80 which has left largely unquestioned the conflicting and 
often violent processes of “segmentation, hierarchisation, and logistical coordination” that 
are at stake in the production of the sea as frontier.81 
 Refusing the politically dubious image of the ocean as a space of unhindered 
flow and cohabitation, this thesis takes a radically different approach and seeks to 
reconceptualise the sea as a material field of struggle. It looks at the Mediterranean from 
the perspective of mobility and control, analysing the processes that have turned it into 
the southern border of the EU. It places at the centre of this process the violent reality 
of bordering, which acquires here a distinctly spatial dimension. At sea, the moment of 
border crossing is expanded into a process that can last several days and extends across 
an uneven and heterogeneous territory that sits outside the exclusive reach of any single 
polity. The spatial imaginary of the border as a line without thickness dividing isomorphic 
territorial states is here stretched into a deep zone, “in which the gaps and discrepancies 
between legal borders become uncertain and contested”.82 As soon as a migrants’ boat 
starts navigating, it passes through the various jurisdictional regimes that crisscross the 
Mediterranean (from the various areas defined in the UN Convention on the Laws of the 
Sea to Search and Rescue regions, from ecological and archaeological protection zones 
to areas of maritime surveillance). At the same time, it is caught between a multiplicity 
of legal regimes that depend on the juridical status applied to those onboard (refugees, 
migrants, etc.), on the rationale of the operations that involve them (rescue, interception, 
etc.) and on many other factors. These overlaps, conflicts of delimitation, and differing 
interpretations, as I shall argue, are not a malfunctions but rather a structural characteristic 
of the maritime border that has been often mobilised to produce violence and escape 
responsibility for it. It has allowed, for instance, different actors at sea to carry out unlawful 
pushbacks or to refrain from engaging in rescue operations. Here, it is not the absence of 
law, but rather the proliferation and spatial entanglement of different legal regimes that 
produces violence on a large scale. 
 This condition evokes the way in which, throughout modernity, the depiction of 
the ocean as a lawless space of violence lying “beyond the line” of civilisation has been 
functional to the proliferation and expansion of violence of European colonial states. Being 
“beyond the line”, in fact, didn’t mean to be in a legal void. Rather it implied being in a 
“zone of conflicting laws” where colonialists “were free to engage in forms of violence that 
were unacceptable (whether in Britain proper or in Europe’s law- bound state system)” and 
yet essential to European colonial expansion.83 This examples shows how maritime zones 
24Introduction
should not be understood as an exceptional space that sit outside of state-like territoriality, 
but rather as paradigmatic of some of its legal and political spatial formations. While the 
sea has been largely side-lined in mainstream accounts of modern and contemporary 
territoriality, it is one of the claims of this thesis that in order to understand the political 
spaces in which we live, and, in particular, the contemporary borderscapes that crisscross 
global space, one should start from the sea.
 It is in the early modern period, when control of the world’s oceans became “a 
fundamental part of European empire building”84 and the bases for the contemporary 
juridical-political architecture of the sea started to be laid, that the sea became “a 
privileged arena within the global order”.85 Historians of empire have effectively shown 
how “transoceanic trade and colonization created significant new international conflicts 
and constellations of power outside existing arrangements”.86 This situation fostered the 
proliferation of differential zones of variegated sovereignties that were not, however, 
temporary aberrations from an ideal standard of territoriality, soon to be eliminated 
under the overarching jurisdiction of accepted international norms (as, for instance, 
conventional narratives of the maritime origins of international law claim). Rather, these 
zones were “integral to empire”87 and part of their standard formation, which relied –
not only in the maritime context, but primarily in that- on a deep grammar of “gradated 
variations and degree of sovereignty and disenfranchisement”.88 This is what made of the 
sea not a deviation from the sovereign norm, but rather one of its crucial models. As 
Lauren Benton has put it, “international norms take shape not at Westphalia but at the 
edges of the Indian Ocean.”89
 The vision of the sea as a laboratory of modern political spaces continues to have 
enduring relevance for understanding and assessing the production of political space in 
today’s world. This particular vision of imperial territoriality as inhomogeneous and highly 
differentiated has in fact been increasingly mobilized to describe the political spatiality 
of the present. It is by now a widespread assumption that global space is not a smooth, 
increasingly undifferentiated surface as it was imagined by enthusiast of neoliberal 
globalisation at the beginning of the 1990s but is rather characterized by the proliferation 
of “indeterminate and ambiguous spaces” that “appear as anomalous from the point of 
view of the modern state and its legal and political standard”.90 Although world maps 
perpetuate the vision of an isomorphic global space completely filled by contiguous states, 
several scholars have looked at the “multiplication of a broad range of partial, often highly 
specialised, global assemblages of bits of territory, authority, and rights that begin to escape 
the grip of national institutional frames”.91 As I will try to show, the deeply uneven legal
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Chain of events in the “left-to-die boat” case as reconstructed for the Forensic Oceanography 
report. The map shows how the boat entered the Maltese Search and Rescue zone and remained 
for several days within the area closely monitored by NATO as part of the international 
military operation against Libya. For more information on this map, see figures 2, 27 and 28 
in the report annexed to this thesis.
 and political geography of the sea continues to offer a valid model for the study of new 
formations of territory, authority and rights.
 This spatial and legal arrangement of the maritime border, what we might call 
with Keller Easterling its “disposition”, constitutes an “unfolding potential”, an “inherent 
agency” that “makes certain things possible and other things impossible”.92 In the context 
of the contemporary border regime, it creates a field of possibilities in which violence 
can happen. This “undeclared, even hidden, potentially violent dispositions immanent” 
in what Easterling calls “infrastructure space”93 should perhaps lead us to rename the 
violence of the maritime border “infra-structural” violence. From this perspective, the sea 
stops being simply a neutral background on which human action takes place and becomes 
a force field that is shaped by – but also shapes – conflict.94
 It is because of this distinctly spatial dimension of violence at sea that mapping has 
represented such an important aspect of Forensic Oceanography’s work: if violence is 
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WatchTheMed, an online mapping platform seeking to document violations of migrant rights at 
the maritime boundaries of the EU. 
made through space, mapping can help locate the indices where this “infrastructure that 
evades representation” – the structural violence of the maritime border – “nevertheless 
leaves its imprint and creates its own specific forms”.95 On the one hand, mapping has been 
useful to re-inscribe responsibility across the complex legal geography of the sea. In the case 
of the “left-to-die boat”, for instance, plotting the trajectory covered by the boat onto the 
various jurisdictional areas of the Mediterranean was crucial in pointing to the multiplicity 
of agencies that, at different times, had specific responsibility for the rescue operations but 
did not intervene. On the other, by linking events across distant geographical locations 
and different scales, mapping can also reveal patterns of violence beyond individual cases. 
We have pursued this objective by creating, in collaboration with a vast network of NGOs 
and activist groups, an online mapping platform called WatchTheMed. This website seeks 
to enable civil society to exercise its critical right to look at the maritime borders of the EU 
by making available some of the mapping tools and geographical knowledge accumulated 
during the “left-to-die boat” investigation. In this way, it allows a vast network of activists 
and NGOs to map with precision violations of migrants’ rights at sea so as to determine 
which authorities and actors at sea had responsibility for them. Through WatchTheMed, 
several other cases of violence have been documented and plotted over the complex 
geography of the Mediterranean.96
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COGNITIVE MAPPING
The mapping and documentation that has been produced in the framework of Forensic 
Oceanogrpahy has been mobilised tactically in various legal proceedings. From the 
beginning of the project, however, the limits of the model of criminal justice and the 
“figuration” it produces – the extraction of individual victims and perpetrators form the 
“messy physical or political ground in which they were embedded”97 – have been very clear to 
us.98 As Martina Tazzioli writes, “an exclusive focus on the ‘excessive’ violence [of borders], 
consisting in human rights violations, overshadows the violence that is constitutive of the 
very act of tracing borders and instantiating differential rights to mobility.”99 In order to 
bring out the structural violence of borders, it has not been enough to rely on mapping 
practices. We have also needed what might be called, paraphrasing Alberto Toscano’s take 
on Jameson, a different cognitive mapping of migration and borders, one that might help 
us in locating the “levers”, “nerve-centres” or weak links in the political anatomy of the 
contemporary border regime.100
 A number of authors have already attempted to reconnect the death of migrants 
in the Mediterranean with the border policies that have created the very conditions in 
which deaths become inevitable. All these accounts have highlighted how at the root of the 
issue of border deaths there has been a series of policies and practices that have rendered 
legal access to the European territory increasingly difficult for certain categories of people, 
forcing them to resort to dangerous means to reach European territory. These researchers, 
with whom I certainly share vast political and theoretical ground, have been extremely 
useful in de-naturalising the existence of the border and showing how border deaths are in 
fact the result of specific policies, thereby also pointing to the possibility of their demise. 
Many of them, however, focus on a rather narrowly framed historical and geographical 
account, one that starts with the creation of a supposedly free space of circulation inside 
the EU with the Schengen agreement and then follows the subsequent hardening of its 
external borders. 
 In this thesis I attempt to do something different. Following Paul Farmer’s dictum 
that the analysis of structural violence cannot just rely on the most proximal and obvious 
explanations but must be “geographically broad” and “historically deep”,101 I consider a 
wider historical, socio-economic and political matrix.102 While focusing on migration in 
the central Mediterranean between 2011 and 2014, I seek to re-position contemporary 
migration across the Mediterranean within a broader genealogy.103 In chapter 1, I excavate 
the colonial roots of the current mobility regime by looking in particular at the Italian 
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colonisation of Libya and the specific vision of the Mediterranean that it fostered. The 
chapter also sets the politics of human mobility in relation to larger flows of resources, 
information, images and capital.104 Chapter 3 starts from the history of maritime 
governance and then analyses the geopolitical, juridical and technological conditions that 
have turned the Mediterranean into a liquid trap. In chapter 2, finally, I find unexpected 
but significant antecedents to the present humanitarian regime in the Vietnamese “boat-
people crisis” of the late 1970s. In doing so, I seek, on the one hand, to inscribe the control 
and management of migration within a wider set of bordering technologies that have been 
employed in different times and places to modulate the differential mobility of people along 
socio-economic and racial lines, and, on the other, to contest the “rhetoric of newness and 
forgetting” that tends to present modern border control as the overcoming of a previous 
period of unchecked controls, thus fostering a teleological narrative that leads towards the 
progressive stabilisation of territorial sovereignty.105
 While the notion of structural violence provides valuable resources for this 
endeavour, I also depart significantly from its tendency to depict a totalising and 
undifferentiated framework. While I expand the analytical framework of the Mediterranean 
border regime to other histories and geographies of migration, I am not attempting to lead 
this multiplicity of historical periods and geographical contexts back to a unified narrative; 
nor am I claiming to be evenly covering a highly differentiated and rapidly changing field. 
Rather, each one of the following chapters is a probe into the diverse issues with which 
I have been confronted in the course of FO. Each of them cuts across a paradigmatic106 
entanglement of spatial, aesthetic and political issues, constituting a sort of boring that 
fathoms the stratified complexity of politics. Each follows a situated encounter with the 
practices, policies, discourses and geographies that constitute the sea as a frontier and my 
attempt to make sense of them, in an itinerary that has taken me in the past three and a 
half years across and beyond the Mediterranean. 
 These have been encounters with violence at various scales and speeds, whose 
multiplicity cannot be grasped by the essentially “static” connotation of structural 
violence.107 Crucially, while attempting to connect all these experiences across time 
and space, I am not seeking to recompose a structural unity but to tackle the current 
border regime from, so to speak, the middle, i.e. starting from the very practices of 
mobility that challenge it on a daily basis. The enduring capacity of migrants to organise 
and cross borders is certainly a good antidote to the risk of creating a deterministic 
and disempowering cage that lurks behind the notion of structural violence. From this 
perspective, the Mediterranean border regime appears as a political forcefield that is 
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constantly made and re-made not only by violence but also by the enduring practices of 
mobility that, as a “creative force”, traverse it.108 This inextinguishable desire to move, which 
often comes at the cost of people’s lives, shapes new subjectivities and new geographies. 
At best, each of this thesis’ chapters can become a “tactical pointer”109 that wedges its way 
into the gaps opened into the border regime by these multifarious practices of mobility. 
 This “move to the outside”,110 as Foucault would have it, allows me to challenge the 
apparent inevitability of the current border regime and destabilise its internal coherency, 
all the while underlining the productive outcome of the various and often conflicting 
rationalities that are part of it. This standpoint not only opens new perspectives on the role 
of migration in processes of globalisation and capital accumulation, to which this thesis 
only alludes,111 it also sheds a different light on the violence of borders, on the possibility 
and pitfalls in denouncing it and in making the power that provokes it intolerable.112
/
Thesis outline
This thesis is divided in two main parts. Part one (Genealogies) locates the current 
migration regime at sea within a longer genealogy of bordering technologies and aesthetic 
practices operating at sea. It is formed of two chapters. Chapter one puts the emergence 
of the Mediterranean border regime in relation to a wider spectrum of systems of 
mobility and technologies of control that have been redrawing the geography of a vast 
contested area.113 While focusing on the Central Mediterranean and loosely following 
a chronological order (that starts with the 1911 colonial occupation of Libya and ends 
with the 2011 international military operations against this country), it does not offer a 
totalizing nor linear history. It rather highlights the “vacillating” quality of this border, 
following its continuous displacements across multiple geographical scales. In doing 
so, it also shows how its geopolitical history is overdetermined by an entanglement of 
colonial, racial and socio-economic rationales. While chapter one focuses on the spatial 
dimension of the sea as frontier, chapter two deals instead primarily with its aesthetic 
dimension.114 It does that by retracing the history of two humanitarian ships carrying 
the same name, the Cap Anamur. Each of these two vessels figured prominently in two 
episodes – the first one taking place during the Vietnamese boat people crisis of the late 
1970s, the second in the Mediterranean in 2004 – that have profoundly marked the history 
of humanitarianism at sea and of its media aesthetics. Discussing these two episodes in 
relation to more recent developments on the Mediterranean border allows me to explore 
how the latter have transformed under conditions of increased border surveillance and 
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militarisation, to suggest new possibilities that have emerged in an era of proliferating 
image production, and to ask under what conditions these possibilities might be taken 
up. Each of the two chapters composing part one is introduced by what I call an image-
prologue, i.e. a particular image that I have encountered during the course of my research 
and that has been crucial in bringing into focus the questions explored therein. More 
similar to dialectical images, “picture puzzles that shock by way of their enigmatic form 
and thereby set thinking in motion”, than to illustrations of an already formed argument, 
each image-prologue exposes a specific dilemma that forced me to reorganise my thinking 
in order to make sense of what it was that I was seeing.115
 Part two (Liquid Traces) builds upon Forensic Oceanography, a project that 
Charles Heller and I co-initiated in 2011 and which has mobilized geographic and media 
technologies (remote sensing, drift modelling, GIS, vessel tracking and others) to document 
the violence perpetrated against migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. In keeping with the 
practice-based spirit that has animated this research, this section mixes various visual 
and textual material that has been produced in the course of the project. Chapter three 
analyses the processes and practices that have turned the Mediterranean Sea into a liquid 
trap, causing the death of several thousands of migrants.116 It dissects the current regime 
of maritime governance and analyses its modes of operation across the fragmented legal 
architecture of the ocean, paying particular attention to the multiple sensing technologies 
that are used for the purpose of surveillance. After having charted the broader political, 
juridical, and technological conditions through which the sea was made to kill, it then 
explores how, in the frame of the Forensic Oceanography, those very conditions have been 
mobilized against the grain in the task of breaching the impunity of the actors involved. 
Chapter four is centred on the “left-to-die boat” report that I have co-authored in 2012 
and that has since been used as evidence in a series of legal proceedings.117 After an 
introduction that analyses the methodology developed in the course of the investigation 
on the “left-to- die boat” case and presents its main findings, the report itself is followed 
by a text that I have co-written in June 2014 to summarize the events that have followed 
the release of the report and the inconclusive demands for justice it has sought to support. 
Part 2 is closed by two further elements. First, a postscript that interrogates the meaning 
and role of practice-based research in the frame of the struggles against the border regime. 
Secondly, a portfolio of practice provides an overview of the various projects carried out 
in the framework of Forensic Oceanography.
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1911–2011: the past of the present
Rome, 11 June 2009: Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan head of state and Chair of the African Union, lands in 
Rome for his historic first official visit to Italy. The meeting followed the signing, a year earlier, of the infamous 
“Treaty of Friendship” by which Libya pledged to stem migrant departures from the North African coast in 
exchange for a €25bn infrastructural programme. The deal was presented as reparations for the misdeeds of 
Italian colonialism, thus creating a seemingly incongruous link between colonialism and migration control.
 Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian prime minister, welcomes Gaddafi on the tarmac, where they together 
review the troops assembled there before heading to the Italian parliament building for official talks. Pinned 
on the black fabric of Gaddafi’s uniform is a black-and-white photograph carefully placed there in order to be 
easily visible and photographed by the press. It depicts the moment when the leader and hero of the Libyan 
anti-colonial resistance, Omar Al-Mukhtar, was captured by the Italian army after he had waged a strenuous 
guerrilla campaign against them for years. The photograph shows a man in chains, wearing non-Western 
clothing, encircled by his captors, who look proudly at the camera. It is an image constructed according to the 
classic iconography of the (man-)hunt, in which the trophy – be it a lion or a human being – is exposed as 
evidence of success. 
 The old black-and-white picture, however, acquires a completely different meaning when brought 
into this new context on Gaddafi’s body, and from there to the front pages of the major Italian newspapers. 
As in the photo-ops made famous by South American civil rights movements for the disappeared, the act 
of showing is staged as a fundamentally made-for-the-camera event. It mobilises a whole visual economy 
according to which Gaddafi features as the one who remembers the absence of Mukhtar and addresses the 
Italian audience, demanding justice for the crimes that their nation perpetrated. It is this image-within-the-
image that dialectically conflates two spatially and temporally distant scenes and opens up an alternative, 
albeit precarious, field of visibility. By means of its circulation in the media, the colonial memory re-enters 
the Italian public sphere, from which it has been forcibly excluded until that moment, relegated to a haunting 
presence. As a sort of inverted mise en abîme, the historical, political and ideological distance that separates 
the two pictures – instead of being amplified by their succession – is compressed and reveals its contemporary 
relevance, disrupting an otherwise familiar scene of an official state visit.
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BETWEEN MOBILITY AND CONTROL: 
THE MEDITERRANEAN AT THE BORDERS OF EUROPE
Moments of rupture have the ability to offer, in a condensed timeframe, a penetrating 
snapshot of complex situations. The “spatial upheaval” provoked in 2011 by the arrival 
of several thousand migrants on the coasts of Italy in the aftermath of the so-called Arab 
Spring was certainly one of these moments.1 In a few days, the border regime that European 
institutions had put in place – with the complicity and active collaboration of Ben Ali’s 
and Qaddafi’s regimes over twenty years of negotiations, partnerships and agreements 
– seemed to have suddenly vanished, only to reappear shortly afterwards scattered over 
a multitude of other locations across the purportedly borderless Schengen Area.2 In the 
attempt to “stem the tide” of migrants spreading across the continent, border controls 
between Italy and France, as well as between Denmark, Sweden and Germany were swiftly 
restored, targeting those whose racial profile better conformed to the image of the African 
migrant. Meanwhile, the prime ministers of Italy and France sent a joint letter to the 
EU leadership asking for a review of substantial parts of the Schengen agreement, thus 
overtly challenging the principle of free movement within the Schengen Area, perhaps 
for the first time since its integration into European law in 1997. On the other side of the 
Mediterranean, most of those fleeing the civil war that had erupted in Libya sought refuge 
in neighbouring African countries, where refugee camps were created with the purpose of 
“control[ling] the migration flows”.3 
 The Mediterranean, which over recent years had become, according to border 
controllers and activists alike, the edge of an impenetrable fortress, a “closed sea”, was 
suddenly reopened by these migratory movements, whose ripple effects were to be noticed 
across the whole European and North African space.4 Observed from the perspective of 
the government of mobility, this situation clearly represented an aberration from the norm, 
an anomaly that was swiftly amended with the restoration of re-admission agreements 
between Italy and Tunisia and the deployment of new border patrols.5 
 The hypothesis that I want to put forward here, however, is that if we are able 
to move beyond this institutional perspective that makes us “see like a state”, something 
different can be grasped.6 What I want to suggest is that these events provided, at least 
for a fleeting moment, a revealing insight into the deeper nature of the Mediterranean 
border regime. The unruly practices of mobility that upset the apparent stability of this 
border threw into question the very possibility of identifying an inside and outside to 
Europe, exposing instead what Balibar has called the “vacillating” quality of the border. 
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With this expression the French philosopher refers to the fact that borders “are no 
longer at the border, an institutional site that can be materialized on the ground and 
inscribed on the map”.7 The way in which, in reaction to the turmoil provoked by the 
Arab Spring, the Mediterranean border was dislocated and removed to myriad of other 
locations in a desperate attempt by border guards, humanitarian personnel and others 
to track down certain bodies as they moved across the space of Europe and Northern 
Africa clearly illustrates this point. It also shows how the border is no longer the place 
where “the set of functions of sovereignty, administration, cultural control, taxation, and 
so on” are superimposed onto a clear institutional entity but have rather fragmented and 
do not work “in the same way, ‘equally’ for all people, and notably not for those who come 
from different parts of the world”.8 Here, another of the crucial characteristic of borders 
described by Balibar, overdetermination – their being simultaneously geopolitical, racial 
and socio-ecnomic divisions – appears in all clarity.9
 All these elements evoke an image of the border that is very different from the 
“classical” one10 that we have inherited from modernity, where the border represents “a 
continuous structure enclosing a political territory”.11 They invite us to see the border “not 
as a thing (a wall, a fence, or a bridge), but as a social relation mediated by things”.12 In 
order for this different vision of the Mediterranean border to emerge, another genealogy 
needs to be traced, which is precisely what this chapter sets out to do. Its purpose is to 
set the emergence of the Mediterranean border regime in relation to a wider spectrum of 
systems of mobility and technologies of control that have been redrawing the geography of 
the Mediterranean, relating the movement of people to colonial conquest and occupation, 
war, trade patterns, political affiliations and labour regimes. Like any genealogy, this is not, 
it should be said at the outset, “an exhaustive or totalizing history but a very partial one.”13 
While focusing on the central Mediterranean and the relationship between Italy and 
Libya, it follows the transformation of the Mediterranean into a border across multiple 
geographical scales, jumping in a non-linear fashion from the Sahara to Schengen, from 
Italy to Northern Africa. The narrative I propose does loosely follow a chronological order, 
but it does not attempt to define evolutionary stages – it rather seeks to locate “ruptures 
[…] where only evolutionary change had been posited”, as well as “continuities with […] 
where only novelty had been assumed”.14 Charting a wider geography of (im-)mobility does 
not mean equating every form of movement and control, but rather to defamiliarise the 
current cross-Mediterranean migration by re-inscribing it in a longer history of mobility 
in this area. It sets the scene for the narration of the stories in the following chapters.
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MARE NOSTRUM 
The Mediterranean has since long been described – and often celebrated – as a space of 
movement, exchange and interconnection, to the point of having become a generalised 
term for areas linked by intense networks of trade and communication.15 “The whole 
Mediterranean consists of movement in space,” declared Braudel more than sixty years 
ago.16 “Anything entering it – wars, shadows of war, fashions, techniques, epidemics, 
merchandise light or heavy, precious or commonplace – may be caught up in the flow 
of its life blood, ferried over great distances, washed ashore to be taken up again and 
passed on endlessly, maybe even carried beyond its shores.”17 The vast literature on the 
Mediterranean that has recently been produced, however, has often ended up generating 
an image of it as a comforting symbol of benevolent hybridity.18 In this text, instead, I want 
to rethink this space from the point of view of the movements that have connected, and 
at the same time disconnected, different parts of the Mediterranean basin in a constant 
process of spatial reorganisation. Channels for the transit of goods, raw materials, financial 
investments and certain categories of people have been opened, while zones of exclusion 
and confinement have been created, often simultaneously.
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mediterranean patterns of human 
mobility took on a decidedly north–south orientation, which was intensified by the rise 
of colonialism.19 I choose this as the starting point of my narrative because colonialism 
marked, crucially, the introduction of a new paradigm of territorial separation, which is 
still present today. “The European colonial empires”, writes Balibar, “were most certainly 
the condition of emergence, reinforcement and subsistence, within the framework of 
different world economies, of the nation states of […] Europe. As a result, these states’ 
borders with each other were both, indissociably, national borders and imperial borders, 
with other frontiers replicating them into the ‘earth of darkness’, somewhere in Africa and 
Asia”, where “they served to separate different categories of ‘nationals’.”20 What sets the 
colonial frontier apart is that colonialism not only traced new lines over old lines – as for 
instance the prevalent narrative about the 1884 Berlin Conference and the Scramble for 
Africa suggests – but it also instituted a qualitative distinction between European space, in 
which the myth of exclusive territoriality and linear borders emerged, and extra-European 
spaces, which it defined as open to conquest.21 At the same time, however, in practice it also 
constantly attempted to reproduce and amplify difference by fostering the “proliferation 
of juridically and hierarchically differentiated zones, territories, populations and subjects” 
and by trying to regulate the flows between these internally homogeneous, but externally 
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differentiated areas.22 As historian Frederick Cooper notes in connection with Africa as 
a whole, “colonization itself, far from just imposing a high degree of connectivity on an 
isolated continent, at the same time connected and disconnected, created new networks 
and severed ancient bonds.” To study colonisation, he writes, “is to study the reorganization 
of space, the forging and unforging of linkages”.23
 Italy and its former African colonies, especially Libya, have been at the forefront 
of the redefinition of this composite economy of movement, both in recent times and 
during the colonial period. The 2011 revolt and the NATO intervention, in which Italy 
was an active participant, were just one of the most recent chapters in a long history which 
began with the Italian occupation of the Ottoman provinces now known as Libya exactly 
a century before. After a military campaign that lasted over a year, the area now is known 
as Libya was officially ceded to Italy by the Ottoman Empire in 1912. Although military 
outposts were also established in the internal, desert regions, the colonial occupation of 
Libya focused almost exclusively on the control of the cities and villages on the coast and 
in its immediate hinterland, reflecting similar patterns of colonial penetration into the 
countries situated between the Sahara and the sea.24 The establishment of real military 
control was long and difficult, especially in the Eastern region known as Cyrenaica. At 
the time of the first Italian invasion, this region was in fact controlled by the Sanussia, 
an Islamic brotherhood which had had strong roots there since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Sanussia and its charismatic leader, Omar Al-Mukhtar, waged a 
strenuous guerrilla war against the Italian invaders that was crushed by General Graziani 
only in the early 1930s.
 The occupation campaign relied on a combined spatial strategy. On the one hand, 
it constructed new borders and enclosures. Almost half the population of Cyrenaica, 
especially those living on the Jebel Akhdar, a large, heavily forested plateau where guerrilla 
fighters were most pervasive, was forcibly displaced into a vast system of concentration 
camps in deserted areas.25 Hundreds of Libyan anti-colonial leaders were also deported and 
confined for years on many of the prison islands of southern Italy, while those who were 
not displaced physically were marginalised in a subtler way: “when Italy annexed Libya, 
[…] in a simultaneous counter-movement Libyans became the equivalent of migrants to 
another country, rather than inhabitants of their own.”26 On the other hand, to enhance 
political and military control over the areas that had been occupied and to address the 
problems of internal over-population, emigration and poverty, the Italian government 
organised the arrival in Libya of thousands of settlers. State-sponsored “demographic 
colonisation” reached its apex in 1938 with the arrival of twenty thousand farmers – a 
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Images taken from the book I Ventimila (“the twenty thousand”), the photo story of the first wave 
of Italian settlers in Libya in 1938. Right: the arrival of the settlers in the port of Tripoli. The 
original caption reads: “Marching in thick rows, the twenty thousand set out to Piazza Castello 
in Tripoli” / Left: the parade of trucks bringing the settlers to their villages in the centre of Tripoli. 
The banner reads: “Mussolini redeems the land and founds cities.”
number only slightly lower than the number of migrants who reached Italy from Libya in 
2011 – in the so-called villaggi agricoli, a string of agrarian settlements built from 1934 
along the coastal areas of Tripolitiania and Cyrenaica with the intention of “making the 
desert bloom” anew.27
The Mediterranean Sea played an important role in the Italian image of colonisation. The 
invasion of Libya was presented as a way of regaining control over the Mediterranean, the 
sea that the Romans had dubbed mare nostrum.28 Italian leaders presented the conquest 
of Libya as a return to a place that “naturally” belonged to Italy because of the ancient 
Roman presence. Roman traces, fervently sought for by Italian archaeologists, were but a 
confirmation of the indissoluble tie that linked the young nation to its glorious past. Italian 
sailors climbing ashore in Northern Africa were depicted in propaganda as taking up their 
ancestors’ claim to possessions that had since been occupied by uncivilised people. Italian 
colonialism, well before Fascist times, made this imperial trope one of the cornerstones 
of its project of territorial expansion, presenting the move into Northern Africa as the 
reconquest of the “fourth shore”, the missing seaboard of Italian territory. Even if the 
reality on the ground was very different, and Italy was able to exercise effective
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Above: aerial photograph of the Gioda settlement built in 1938 in Tripolitania / Below: map of 
the Italian agrarian settlements in Libya. In violet, those built in 1934; in red, in 1938; in green, 
in 1939.
control over the sea only in limited areas and for short periods of time, the Mediterranean 
was constantly presented as an internal sea connecting once again the shores that had 
been separated after the fall of the Romans. 
THE SEA OF SAND
With decolonisation, patterns of movement in the region took a different orientation. 
The 1960s saw the arrival in North-West Europe of large numbers of Tunisians, Algerians 
and Moroccans, who thus inverted the previously prevalent south-bound direction of 
European settlers.29 While this transborder mobility happened initially in a clandestine 
way, it was swiftly regularised by the so-called “guest worker” programmes, which thus 
attempted to channel and govern these movements through regularisation.30
 In Libya, however, the situation was different. The abrupt end of the Italian 
colonial occupation did not lead to a “privileged” relationship between former colonisers 
and former colonised, while the discovery of large quantities of oil in the late 1950s led 
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Right: cover of an Italian 1942 school report card with the lettering “Mare Nostrum” / Left: 
cover of “The Sphere”, 1911. Italian soldier coming ashore on the coasts of Libya to resume the 
Roman mission of conquest. From: Mia Fuller, Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities and Italian 
Imperialism (London; New York: Routledge, 2007).
the Libyan leadership to focus its attentions on the interior of the country rather than on 
cross-Mediterranean relationships. The penetration into the interior of the country gained 
impetus especially after the 1969 revolution, which ousted the British-backed king and 
brought Gaddafi to power. The Libyan colonel started to build the infrastructures that 
enabled the discovery and exploitation of the oilfields as well as later of huge underground 
aquifer systems located in the internal regions. The “rediscovery” of the Sahara reflected 
larger developments that took place after decolonisation, when the “sea of sand” started to 
re-emerge from a period of latency to which it had been relegated by the opening of trans-
oceanic routes and by the colonial powers.31
 Within this context, the 1973 oil crisis and related political and economic shifts 
marked “the most important post-war migration turning points”.32 While economic 
recession led to the end of most guest worker programmes in Europe, the wealth generated 
in Libya by the rise of oil prices and Gaddafi’s decision to nationalise several foreign oil 
companies attracted many foreign workers, who mainly during this phase arrived from 
other Arab countries.33 Later on, the fall of oil prices in the middle of the 1980s as well 
as the 1992 UN sanctions that marginalised Libya caused an economic crisis to which 
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Gaddafi responded with the progressive privatisation of the Libyan economy.34 This reform 
required the influx of an even larger and cheaper workforce from the beginning of the 
1990s. Demand was met by a large number of Sub-Saharan and South Asians migrants, 
“who were seen as a more reliable and docile workforce compared to Arab workers, who 
were also seen as a political liability” at the time of the first Gulf War.35 Their presence was 
encouraged too by the markedly pan-African orientation that Gaddafi’s foreign policy 
assumed from 1997, and they made up 25 per cent of the working population in 2011.36
 In the 1990s, the rest of the Maghreb region underwent deep socio-economic 
changes that modified its relationship with both Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. While 
the end of guest worker programmes and the introduction of visa requirements closed off 
most ways of entering Europe legally, cross-Mediterranean migration from North Africa 
never really stopped and, in fact, gained new impetus in the 1990s. In the context of “the 
first attempts to flexibilize the labour market along with the persistence of a large informal 
economic sector”, Italy and Spain emerged as the main destinations for North African 
migrants.37 At the same time, however, the Maghreb transformed in this period from an 
area in which migration flows only emerged into a relay of southward movements that 
plunged deeper into Sub-Saharan Africa. The new lines of connection with Europe were 
in fact mirrored by the reactivation of trans-Saharan circulations and by the progressive 
rapprochement of the two “shores” of the desert. The Sahara thus progressively became 
the core of an important migratory system that started to connect Libya, as well as other 
northern African countries, with Sub-Saharan Africa, becoming in a way the mirror to the 
other sea, the Mediterranean.38 The desert, “the spatial archetype of the periphery”, was 
thus transformed into a functional crossroads connecting and disconnecting spaces on an 
intercontinental scale.39 As geographer Ali Bensaâd has written, “it spins out and weaves 
together the threads of a system of mobility that it simultaneously channels and injects 
with its own specificities, thus becoming a space which is both a conduit and a creator 
of globalization.”40 It is in this context that the construction of a European border in the 
Mediterranean basin has started. As new lines of connection have been drawn, new spaces 
of confinement have arisen. 
A “VIRTUAL MARITIME BORDER”
The last chapter in this trajectory moves back to Europe and starts with the signing of the 
Schengen Treaty in 1985. As is well known, this agreement paved the way for the removal 
of internal border checks and the simultaneous consolidation of the EU’s external borders. 
When understood in the frame of the complex socio-economic field of forces sketched 
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above, however, the “glorious” narrative of the creation of an even space of internal 
freedom of movement, in opposition to a clearly defined exterior, immediately reveals its 
limitations.
 In terms of the internal EU space, the process that started with Schengen cannot 
really be understood as one of progressive homogenisation.41 While new institutions 
and surveillance mechanisms operating on a European-wide scale, such as Frontex and 
Eurosur, have been created, the “internal” borders of the EU have not simply disappeared 
but, in the framework of the post-9/11 recoding of migration as a security threat, have 
rather been substituted with what have been termed “networks of control”.42 Operating 
along specific routes that extend across European territory, mobile surveillance teams 
have been carrying out cross-border operations with the aim of apprehending illegal 
migrants and gathering information about their strategies of mobility.43 This work has 
been facilitated – and, in its turn, has facilitated – the creation of databases and systems 
of information exchange (such as the EURODAC fingerprints database) which have 
enhanced the profiling of “risky” subjects so as to identify them within the “normal” flow 
of travellers. Moreover, a hierarchical regime of mobility within the EU has not only not 
disappeared, but has even intensified for specific categories of people, including not only 
asylum seekers subject to the so-called Dublin II regulation but also citizens of “new” 
member states whose mobility is restricted for a number of years after the accession of 
their countries, as well as, more recently, “core” EU citizens moving to north European 
countries.44
 At the same time, the external EU border has not simply hardened along a line 
but has rather extended and multiplied into a vast zone “whose contours are continuously 
negotiated by the movement of people and things, new forms of surveillance technology, 
and new processes of sovereign and supranational government”.45 The EU and individual 
European states have been progressively externalising onto the countries of the Maghreb 
the control and surveillance of migrants, transforming the northern rim of the African 
continent in a sort of “buffer zone” protecting Europe.46 In exchange for financial, military 
or political support, North African leaders have cracked down on “illegal” immigration 
and imposed tighter control on both the boats leaving from their coasts and the Saharan 
land borders, while often using these agreements to quell internal dissent and gain a more 
prominent position in regional politics.47 The externalisation of border controls has thus 
been tightly connected with processes of economic penetration and the liberalisation of 
the economies across North Africa. This transformation of North African countries “from 
a source of emigration, to a transit route, to, finally, a destination for would-be immigrants” 
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highlights the productivity of the European border regime, which has become, beyond 
its stated objectives, “both a precondition and a motor for a specific form of peripheral 
globalisation of the economies at the edge of Europe”.48
 The case of Libya provides once again a paradigmatic example.49 While, as we have 
seen, the presence of migrants in Libya has been extensive since decolonisation, it was 
only in the context of the creation of the external border of the EU that Libya introduced 
restrictions on the presence of immigrants, opened detention camps for migrants, signed 
re-admission agreements with other African countries further south, and tightened 
controls along their Saharan border. During a long series of multilateral (EU–Maghreb) 
and bilateral (Libya–Italy) political negotiations, Libya has been obtaining political and 
economic concessions by raising the spectre of “invasion” by the “transit” Sub-Saharan 
migrants present in Libya.50 The “Treaty on Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation” of 
August 2008 (mentioned above) is a clear example of this: in exchange for infrastructural 
projects, “Libya has agreed to take back intercepted migrants, allow joint migration control 
patrols inside Libyan territorial waters and for Libyan authorities themselves to help 
prevent irregular migrants from both entering Libya and moving on towards Europe.”51 
 In this new “borderscape”, the Mediterranean Sea has acquired a new centrality. 
Rather than by the claims of exclusive control that characterised the colonial vision of 
the Mediterranean as an internal (French or Italian) lake, however, the vision of the 
Mediterranean as an external border of the EU is better encapsulated by the concept of 
a “virtual maritime border”. The European Council adopted this definition in 2003 “in 
order to reinforce the legal borders of Member States by means of joint operations and 
specific measures in the places where illegal migratory flows originate or transit”. With 
this definition, the council sought to extend the EU borders to “every vessel suspected 
of transporting ‘illegal’ migrants”, therefore creating a virtual border “irrespective of the 
geographic distance between the patrolled waters and the coastlines of member states”. 
The notion of virtuality, when understood in the Deleuzian meaning of potency, expresses 
well the instability of the maritime border, which is not constrained by a fixed location but 
can rather materialise anywhere that an unauthorised movement is detected. As I describe 
in more detail in chapter 3, this has given rise to a form of “unbundled” sovereignty that 
selectively expands or retracts its prerogatives and obligations, creating a fragmented and 
heterogeneous jurisdictional landscape which has become a liquid grave for thousands 
of people. Instead of representing an anomaly, the deeply uneven legal and political 
geography of the sea constitutes, in this sense, a paradigmatic example not only of the new 
formations of “territory, authority and rights” that characterise the contemporary borders 
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of Europe, but also of their violence.52
/
This genealogical sketch offers a different standpoint from which to rethink the events 
described at the beginning of this chapter. In the longue durée of Mediterranean history, the 
deterrorialisation of borders put in motion by the unauthorised movements that traversed 
the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the Arab Spring do not represent an exceptional event. 
Beyond the specific borders that each historical context has produced, what this genealogy 
brings out is precisely the persistence and overlap of different bordering technologies as 
well as the constitutive role played by different kinds of mobilities. Any analysis of the 
border regime needs to retrace the refractions and echoes that link experiences of mobility 
and techniques of control across different geographical and historical scales. What appears 
in this light is the continuity of enduring colonial asymmetries and socio-legal inequalities 
that structure mobilities along hierarchical lines, determining who can travel freely and 
who cannot.
 When seen in connection with this vaster and more heterogeneous assemblage 
of bordering technologies and infrastructures of movement, it seems impossible to trace 
a linear trajectory leading from the multiplicity of pre-modern mechanisms of control 
to the constitution of the Mediterranean as the southern border of the EU, and then to 
the current deterritorialisation of borders.53 If “the geometric abstraction of exclusive 
territoriality and linear borders, while it has exerted an extremely important influence on 
the way in which politics has been conceived and executed in the modern era, was only 
ever a convention”,54 even the contemporary ubiquity of borders that has received in-depth 
scrutiny by a growing literature should be understood as a more structural characteristic.55 
It stops being the exception and becomes the rule, showing that the border’s function “is 
not simply to keep out those who are perceived as ‘trespassers’ but, first and foremost, 
to govern populations both inside and outside the territory.”56 Observed from this 
perspective, the Mediterranean appears as a jellylike, tri-dimensional mass that “can 
oscillate between states of fluidity, enabling the passage of people, forms and ideas and 
states of solidity, blocking passage under given political and historical circumstances”.57 It 
appears, moreover, not as the exceptional space of risk and death that migration policies 
have tried to produce, but rather as a central space of politics constantly reshaped by 
various tangles of movement.
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Screenshot of a video broadcast on the evening news in early November 1978 by the SOIR 3 
channel (© INA.fr). It depicts the Hai Hong, one of the “rust buckets” fleeing Vietnam with 
thousands of asylum seekers onboard. Bernard Kouchner, who would later become one of the 
leading figures in the humanitarian response to that refugee crisis, describes the events as follow 
in the opening lines of his memoir: “It was raining on the Jardin du Luxembourg and on the 
China Sea. In the evening of 8 November 1978, Paris was calm: some cars and just a few cold 
passers-by. Off the coasts of Malaysia, some refugees were drowning. We had chosen ignorance. 
It was far away, and South-East Asia and Vietnam remained a sacred country despite the in-
vasion of Laos, despite the invasion of Cambodia. All of a sudden, the 8pm news broadcast a 
cargo ship shaken by the waves: ‘We are threatened by famine and epidemics. United Nations, 
save us!’ Written in English, the banner, held out in the midst of the monsoon storm on the poop 
deck of the Hai Hong, cried out through the world’s televisions.”1 
A cry through the world’s televisions
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THE TWO LIVES OF THE CAP ANAMUR: 
MEDIA AESTHETICS AND HUMANITARIANISM FROM THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA TO THE MEDITERRANEAN
Since the end of the 1970s the sea has become a fundamental terrain of intervention for 
an emerging form of humanitarianism without borders. It was in the second half of that 
decade, in the South China Sea, that a new category of people defined by the vehicle on 
which they travelled – the so-called “boat people – came to the fore. During what came 
to be known as the Indochinese refugee crisis, the exodus of thousands of Vietnamese 
by sea reflected not only the increasingly global geography of mass displacements and 
humanitarian catastrophes created by the expanding scope of the Cold War, 2 but marked 
also the rise of a novel relationship between the documentation of episodes of distant 
suffering and the kinds of political reactions these underpin. This new media aesthetics of 
humanitarianism and its lasting consequences is want I want to focus on in this chapter. 
By “media aesthetics”, I should say at the outset, I do not mean here simply the narrowly 
defined field designating traditional news broadcasting, photojournalism and the use of 
visual imagery in public campaigns. Rather, I am referring to a much wider domain that 
includes all the visual and aural protocols involved in the becoming-public of events of 
distant suffering and that is shaped by a complex assemblage of sensing, recording and 
broadcasting devices instituting a certain regime of (in-)visibility in relation to what 
happens at sea.
 Within this new aesthetic field, ships have played a crucial role, becoming not only 
spaces of humanitarian intervention in their own right, but also broadcasting studios of 
sorts. They have thus modified both the way in which humanitarian operations have been 
carried out and the way in which migration by sea has become a matter of public concern. 
It is no coincidence, then, that two ships bearing the same name, Cap Anamur, stand 
out as symbols of this new phase. Each of these two vessels, as well as the organisation 
that was named after them, figured prominently in two episodes that have profoundly 
marked the history of humanitarianism and its involvement with the practice of bearing 
witness to under-reported catastrophes around the world. The first ship to be named Cap 
Anamur began its operations in the midst of the Vietnamese exodus of 1979 when, so the 
organisation claimed, it helped to rescue “9,057 people from death” and, together with 
other similar humanitarian vessels, became a fundamental forum for the collection and 
transmission of images of the boat people’s plight.3 In 2004, this time in the Mediterranean, 
a second ship belonging to the same organisation, named Cap Anamur in homage to its 
64Chapter Two
predecessor, rescued 37 sub-Saharan migrants on their way to the southern shores of 
Europe and found itself at the centre of another affair in which not only the possibility of 
conducting rescue operations at sea but also that of raising awareness of the thousands of 
migrants who have been dying in recent years in the Mediterranean came under threat.
 Retracing the historical trajectory of these two Cap Anamurs and setting them 
in relation to more recent developments on the Mediterranean border, as I will do in 
the following pages, offers the chance not only to assess what has changed since the first 
humanitarian intervention in the South China Sea, but also to discuss the opportunities 
and risks present in the aesthetics of contemporary maritime borders. It allows me, more 
specifically, to explore how the latter have transformed under conditions of increased 
border surveillance and militarisation, to suggest new possibilities that have emerged in an 
era of proliferating image production, and to ask under what conditions these possibilities 
might be taken up.
1979, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The episode concerning the first Cap Anamur took place in the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War. After North Vietnamese troops entered Saigon in 1975, thereby unifying the country 
under Communist rule, there began an exodus of refugees which, within a few years, 
reached disastrous proportions.4 In late 1978, when larger ships started being used 
to transport people fleeing Vietnam, the number of recorded arrivals in neighbouring 
countries increased rapidly5 and “the trickle of refugees became a flood.”6 Aboard 
unseaworthy vessels, many of those leaving Vietnam drowned or were attacked by pirates 
who, attracted by the rumours of people carrying large amounts of gold, abducted, robbed 
and killed hundreds of them. Other ships navigating in the area largely ignored the 
refugees, and those who finally reached the coasts of neighbouring states, dehydrated and 
sick, were often refused disembarkation and pushed back into the sea, where their tragedy 
continued.7
 The story of the Hai Hong is in this sense paradigmatic and will certainly provoke 
some sense of déjà vu among those who are familiar with what has been happening in the 
Mediterranean in the past few years.8 This was the first of a series of ships carrying large 
numbers of Vietnamese to find itself in the midst of a long diplomatic standoff. Heading 
first towards Hong Kong, the rusty tramp steamer had to change course due to bad weather 
and reached Indonesian Anambas Islands, but was forced to leave shortly afterwards. After 
the Singapore Navy denied access to its territory, the ship finally reached Port Klang in 
Malaysia in November 1978, where it was caught in a diplomatic standoff. Interrogated by 
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Stills from an interview with Bernard Kouchner, aboard the ship Akuna in the China Sea, 
pointing, as the original caption of the video states, to “a boat of fishermen-pirates”. 7 December 
1981. © INA.fr
the local authorities, the ship’s captain claimed that he had found the refugees in distress 
on the open seas but his version was quickly challenged by growing rumours that the trip 
had been organised with the connivance, if not active collaboration, of the Vietnamese 
authorities against the payment of large sums of money. Fearing that a new wave of organised 
trips would jeopardise its national interests, the Malaysian authorities were determined to 
turn the ship back to the sea, while Western embassies and the UNHCR were pressuring 
to have the passengers disembarked.9 Finally, the disembarkation process started after a 
two-week delay and continued for months while people were slowly airlifted to Western 
countries, which had eventually accepted to resettle them. This was the moment in which 
“the world realized it had a crisis on its hands” and images of crammed, derelict boats and 
desperate people washing ashore started to make their way into Western news outlets.10 
As many accounts of these events show,11 it was the link established though television 
between the open sea and the rest of the world that spurred the international response.
 Shocked by the images of the refugees’ plight in the South China Sea, several 
private citizens around the world decided to act. At the forefront of this movement was 
one of the most prominent and controversial figures in the new wave of humanitarian 
figures that emerged in the late 1960s, Bernard Kouchner, who was years later to become 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the champions of “state-led” military-
humanitarian intervention. Influenced by the anti-totalitarian credo that had radically 
changed the French left in those years,12 he founded a committee called “Un Bateau pour 
le Vietnam” (A boat for Vietnam) which chartered the ship the Île de Lumière to bring 
assistance to the Vietnamese boat people. Significantly, a committee of the same name had 
been founded 12 years earlier by the French Communist Party. But while that was meant 
to be a militant initiative in support of the Communist anti-imperialist struggle, this time 
around it designated a humanitarian intervention in favour of the victims of those same 
Communist forces.13
 In Germany, the journalist Rupert Neudeck decided to follow the initiative of the 
French group and, with the support of leading West German intellectuals such as Heinrich 
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On board of the Hai Hong. 21 November 1978. © Alain Dejean/Sygma/Corbis
Böll, chartered the Cap Anamur, which started operations in the summer of 1979. Vessels 
of different kinds had been used earlier in the Indochinese refugee crisis to bring aid 
and relief supplies. This time, however, ships were transformed into veritable sea-going 
ambulances, floating refugee camps, which searched the same waters where pirates were 
operating for boat people in distress. Most importantly, these ships often carried teams of 
reporters and journalists who, by connecting the public with what was happening on the 
sea, transformed their decks into “forums” of a new kind.14 While the cargos crammed 
with refugees became symbols of the brutality of the Indochinese crisis, the busy upper 
decks of these humanitarian ships populated by solicitous crews and distressed boat people 
came to epitomise the independent role claimed by the new humanitarians. Through these 
“mixtures of bodies and vehicles”, the public image of the crisis was broadcast to a growing 
public and the boat people emerged as a subject of history and an object of government.15
 It is not surprising that it was on the ocean, the international space par excellence, 
that the new humanitarianism without borders which emerged in those years after the 
creation of Médecins Sans Frontières (“the humanitarian international, as Alex De Waal 
once called it”)16 found one of its favourite areas of operation. The high seas, being outside 
the full jurisdiction of any sovereign state, provided these new humanitarian actors with 
an effective form of extraterritoriality in which independent intervention was possible.
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Right: Poster by the first “Un Bateau pour le Vietnam” launched by the French Communist 
Party. January 1968. © Musée de l’Histoire vivante / Left: André Glucksmann accompanies Jean-
Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron to the press conference for the presentation of “Un Bateau pour 
le Vietnam”. The reunion under the banner of human rights of the left wing intellectual par 
excellence with the symbol of liberal anti-communism was seen as the inaugural moment of a 
post-ideological era whose anti-totalitarian credo was meant to transcend the division between 
left and right. 20 June 1979. © Richard Melloul/Corbis
Nevertheless, in the same way as international waters are not located outside any form 
of control,17 these new forms of maritime humanitarianism also did not exist in a power 
vacuum and thus immediately entered into difficult and ambiguous relations with state 
power. While (and because) these ships sailed under European flags as a guarantee 
that those rescued at sea would be allowed to disembark and be resettled in the West, 
their intention of operating as mobile rescue platforms met with strong resistance from 
Western national authorities. It was only after several weeks of functioning as a stationary 
hospital off the Indonesian Anambas Islands that the Cap Anamur was allowed to conduct 
operations at sea, and not before being reminded by the German Foreign Office “not to 
rescue too many [boat people]”.18 The dilemmas and contradictions that made it possible 
for humanitarian operations and human rights principles to be largely recaptured by the 
arsenal of state and military governmental techniques in the so-called “humanitarian 
present”19 already existed in embryonic form in the South China Sea of the 1970s.
MICHEL FOUCAULT THE HUMANITARIAN  
This was the context in which, in 1981, Michel Foucault, who had already been a supporter 
of “Un Bateau pour le Vietnam” a couple of years before, was invited to Geneva to speak at a 
press conference organised by the newly founded International Committee against Piracy 
(ICP). The event was intended to raise awareness of the pirate attacks on the Vietnamese 
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boat people, and took place near the UNHCR headquarters, whose corridors at the time 
“were decked with giant photographs of the boat people staggering ashore from their 
crippled vessels”.20 In a short but powerful statement titled “Confronting Governments: 
Human Rights”, written in the passionate tone of a manifesto, Foucault outlines the 
traits of an emerging “international citizenship”, of which the Committee against Piracy 
would constitute an example, and for which initiatives such as the Cap Anamur, which he 
explicitly mentions in the speech, constitute conspicuous antecedents.21 This new citizenry, 
he argues, has not been appointed by anyone and is composed of “private individuals [...], 
with no other ground for speaking, or for speaking together, than a certain shared difficulty 
in enduring what is taking place”.22 What binds together this unauthorised gathering of 
individuals is not their belonging to traditional ideologies or political constituencies, but 
rather the fact that they are “all members of the community of the governed”.23 Their duties 
and rights are outlined in forceful terms that are worth quoting at some length:
Because they claim to be concerned with the welfare of societies, governments 
arrogate to themselves the right to pass off as profit or loss the human unhappiness 
that their decisions provoke or their negligence permits. It is a duty of this 
international citizenship to always bring the testimony of people’s suffering to the 
eyes and ears of governments [...]. The suffering of men must never be a silent 
residue of politics. It grounds an absolute right to stand up and speak to those who 
hold power.24
This little-known text sits rather awkwardly within the French philosopher’s intellectual 
and political trajectory. For somebody who just a few years earlier had summarised his 
entire philosophical project as “an attempt to reverse the mode of analysis of the discourse 
of right in order to show that right is itself an instrument of domination”, claiming a new 
right might certainly sound odd.25 Moreover, for reasons that I shall discuss in more detail 
later, this piece places him at the beginning of a process which, given the subsequent use 
of that new right by his collaborators of the time – Kouchner first of all – has lead to places 
that he would have probably resisted more vehemently had he not died shortly afterwards. 
In any case, what is particularly significant here is that Foucault binds the introduction 
of this new, non-sovereign right to an aesthetic preoccupation, that of “bringing to the 
eyes and ears” of government the misfortunes of people. At the core of this “politics of the 
governed”, he claims, is an act of witnessing where what is at stake is the limit between the 
visibility and the invisibility of a claim, the point where it becomes audible and intelligible.26 
According to this understanding, humanitarian action (and non-governmental politics in 
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general) would consist not only of bringing aid and relief to suffering populations, but also 
of raising international awareness about their plight in way that could turn it into a matter 
of concern for a larger public.
 The idea that humanitarianism is founded on a fundamental act of “reporting” 
is anything but new. Recent scholarship has described in great detail the way in which 
“aesthetic concerns” have long been at the core of human rights activism.27 From the 
pamphlets and engravings depicting the disastrous effects of the 1755 earthquake in 
Lisbon28 to the reports written by British diplomat Roger Casement in the early 1900s 
from Congo and Colombia to denounce the horrors of the European colonialism,29 via 
Dunand’s gruesome description of Solferino battlefield in 1859,30 images of distant suffering 
have defined and continue to define not only what we understand as humanitarianism 
but also the “mediascape of modern democracies” tout court.31 Nevertheless, the aesthetic 
regime that emerged with the Vietnamese exodus is marked a specific reformulation of 
humanitarianism’s aesthetic paradigm, one that is characterised by a fundamental act of 
bearing witness.32 In this sense, Vietnam’s refugee crisis “stands out as a key event in the 
history of this new media-savvy interventionist humanitarianism”.33
 While this paradigm of “bearing testimony” has become the watchword and 
predominant practice of the international human rights movement, a series of problems 
have started to emerge since the very beginning. Foucault himself was certainly wary of 
some of these risks and, in his speech, he explicitly cautions against an understanding 
of activism that would rely on “the theatrical role of pure and simple indignation that is 
proposed to us”.34 However, in the mainstream discourse on humanitarianism, the idea 
of “bearing testimony” has been largely taken for granted and left unquestioned, thus 
engendering a whole web of presuppositions and (largely false) expectations about the 
role that the visibility given to a certain event or group of people might play and the 
interventions it might trigger. The risks implicit in this paradigm were highlighted, a few 
years later, by a second episode which involved the Cap Anamur’s successor and namesake.
2004, THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Fast forward to 2004. The Cap Anamur organisation that began in the 1970s is now a 
large and respected NGO which operates across the world bringing emergency medical 
care and humanitarian aid. Although they have continued to charter ships to deliver relief 
items all over the world, from 1986 their operations moved inland. In 2003, however, a new 
director, the former journalist Elias Bierdel, replaced Rupert Neudeck as the president of
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Stills from footage collected on board the Cap Anamur during the diplomatic standoff off the 
coast of Italy in the summer of 2004. Courtesy of Aquino Film Gmbh.
the organisation and proposed buying a ship to carry out its humanitarian operations.35 
Faithful to the principle of independence that has been one of the grounding ideals of 
contemporary humanitarianism, he decided to take advantage of the celebrations for the 
association’s 25th anniversary and the large influx of donations that the memories of the 
Vietnam action prompted to buy a new ship, which was immediately christened the Cap 
Anamur. His long- term project, besides using the ship to bring aid supplies to the areas 
where his NGO was operating, was to raise awareness of the dramatic effects of climate 
change on the small Pacific Island of Tuvalu, which is threatened with being swamped by 
rising sea levels. Bierdel’s idea was to navigate to Tuvalu side by side with another iconic 
non-governmental ship, Greenpeace’s Rainbow Warrior, in a demonstrative action that 
was meant to raise awareness on the growing issue of climate refugees. But during its 
inaugural journey, the story took an unexpected turn.
 After sailing from Germany to the coast of West Africa, where it unloaded several 
containers of aid material, the ship entered the Mediterranean through the Straits of 
Gibraltar on its route to the Suez Canal. While it was resolving some engine problems in the 
central Mediterranean between Malta, Libya, and the small Italian island of Lampedusa, 
the Cap Anamur rescued 37 African migrants in distress during their crossing to Europe. 
After deciding to disembark them in Sicily, the ship headed towards the port of Pozzallo 
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but was denied permission to enter Italian territorial waters. The ship was held off the 
coast of Sicily during a legal and diplomatic standoff in which the fate of the migrants, 
who in the meanwhile had applied for asylum, bounced between competing claims and 
denials by the governments of Italy, Germany, Malta, as well as the EU and the UNHCR. 
Over the course of two weeks, numerous lawyers, journalists, photographers, politicians, 
priests, activists, and doctors reached the ship. Itinerant disaster area and floating court at 
the same time, the ship became yet another temporary and precarious zone of contested 
political agency. The way in which events unfolded throughout its architecture – the way 
in which the migrants and the crew held assemblies in the hold; the way in which an 
improvised press area was organised on deck; the striking contrast between the huge hold 
of the ship and the fragility of the rescued dinghy – provided a veritable spatial diagram 
of the unfolding events and the changing power relationships on board, highlighting how, 
as deftly noted by William Walters in relation to the vehicles of migration, “the way in 
which publics are assembled [...] and experience the politicization of what is often called 
irregular border crossing, these very distorted and unsatisfactory forms of bearing witness, 
would be unthinkable without the mediating work undertaken by this field of material 
artefacts.”36
 Through press conferences, articles, and TV news, the situation on board was 
broadcast to a growing public. The rescued migrants were interviewed and could tell 
their stories, thereby challenging the widespread tendency to distance their plight “from 
the human rights abuse, from the conflict and dysfunctional inequalities in the global 
economic system that cause people to move, and [...] suppress their rationality, dehumanize 
them and suggest an analogue with natural disasters”.37 Yet the exposure of the migrants’ 
plight did not ultimately lead to salvation. When the ship finally entered a Sicilian port, 
the migrants were immediately expelled after being identified as “bogus” asylum seekers, 
and representatives of the Cap Anamur, including Bierdel himself, were indicted (and 
not acquitted until a few years later) for supporting illegal immigration and turning the 
humanitarian emergency into a “PR stunt” for their own profit.38 Under the authority of a 
sovereign power, the undocumented suddenly became overexposed, and aid-giving and 
news-making became equally culpable.
 The conditions in which the Cap Anamur found itself in 2004 were radically 
different to those in the Indochina of the late 1970s. First of all, the attitude of Western 
governments towards boat people and migrants in general had changed following the end 
of the Cold War. While the Vietnamese boatpeople provided Western liberal democracies 
with “evidence” of Communist regimes’ inhumanity – a situation that made of them 
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cherished “political trophies in a bipolar world”, at least by all appearances – after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the progressive recoding of migration as a security issue, they started 
to be increasingly treated as “undesirables”.39 The decision of the UNHCR to consider all 
people fleeing Vietnam as prima facie refugees, regardless of the circumstances of their 
trip, clearly exposes the gap existing with the current situation in the Mediterranean and 
elsewhere.40 As Nicholas De Genova remarked, the current system of asylum “is premised 
upon a comprehensive suspicion of people seeking asylum, and is designed to disqualify 
as many applicants as possible, as allegedly ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. In terms of its real 
effects and what it actually produces, therefore, the European asylum system is a regime 
for the production of migrant ‘illegality’.”41 While the figure of the “asylum seeker” was for 
a short time replaced by that of the “guest worker”, after the tumultuous transformations 
of capitalism that began to unfold in the early 1970s the figure of the “illegal” has come 
in recent years to fundamentally dominate governmental codes and taxonomies of 
migration.42
 As a premise and consequence of this situation, the maritime border itself has also 
been considerably transformed. The Mediterranean has been turned into a militarised 
border constantly scanned by remote sensing devices geared towards its enforcement, 
forcing more and more people to resort to clandestine trips in order to enter the EU. The 
dominant image of migrants that is produced through this vast surveillance apparatus 
and made public by border controlling agencies and mainstream media is either that 
of “illegal” trespassers who “invade” Europe, or that of the victims of trafficking at the 
mercy of unscrupulous smugglers. In both cases, by rendering “migrant ‘illegality’ [...] 
spectacularly visible” and thus naturalised, such representations have become a function 
of the border itself, their primary role being only to confirm the necessity of the latter.43
 So if, in 1978, despite the contradictions that were already present, the question 
for humanitarian actors might have been posed in terms of how to make the claims of 
refugees heard and their plight visible, today the issue seems far more complex. The fact 
is that, insofar as “only detected, that is to say failed acts of illegal immigration become 
visible”,44 images of migration have often already unwittingly become an integral part of 
the border regime itself. Under such conditions, the risk implicit in “bearing testimony” 
is to ignore the ways that openness and transparency can support governmental practices 
and regimes of power, in particular within the field of the politics of migration. Since 
for migrants the only possibility for moving is often to do so undetected, “showing what 
is hidden may sometimes lead to new forms of oppression.”45 This is what the case of 
the Cap Anamur painfully reminds us.46 Despite the courageous effort to make visible 
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the violence routinely perpetrated against migrants at the maritime borders of Europe, 
this act of exposure was infamously turned against the migrants and the crew of the ship 
themselves. For the migrants, it implicitly became proof of their illegal status, which led to 
their hasty deportation; for the crew of the ship, while it was insufficient to prevent them 
from being brought to court, accused of “illegal trafficking” of migrants, it was enough to 
morally “disqualify” their intervention as an alleged attempt to attract funding through a 
“high-visibility” crisis.
 This situation has been even exacerbated under the current military-humanitarian 
border where, as already recalled in the introduction to this thesis, the ability of the border 
regime to diffuse or even turn against itself the emancipatory potential of attempts to expose 
the violence it produces is growing. This reflects a larger process by which humanitarian 
discourse in general has increasingly been mobilised, not against states and the coercive 
dimension of borders, but rather in their support. While Foucault’s right to stand up and 
bear testimony “was envisaged as a non-sovereign right, available to private individuals 
whose only authority stemmed from their inability to bear the suffering of others”,47 in the 
course of the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention that proposition 
has been increasingly translated into a right for states to carry out military intervention.48 
“As the idea of international solidarity was detached from any broader emancipatory 
perspective and became focused not on collective struggle but on the rescue of victims, 
the right to intervene began its trajectory from a prerogative of private individuals to one 
of states.”49 This became clearly visible in the context of the Vietnamese boat people a few 
years after Foucault’s speech, when, in a striking anticipation of what would happen thirty 
years later in the Mediterranean with the operation Mare Nostrum, the US Navy “seized 
on the human rights rhetoric under President Carter” and started replacing independent 
humanitarian organisations as the main actors responsible for rescue operations at sea.50
FROM REPRESENTATION TO PARTICIPATION
As the situation sketched above seems to suggest, the paradigm of “bearing testimony” 
that has for long time guided humanitarian aesthetics has lost the emancipatory potential 
advocated by Foucault. A new aesthetic practice needs to be invented, one able to take stock 
of the changed situation at the maritime borders. On the one hand, it should be clear that the 
eyes and ears of today’s humanitarianism are no longer simply the official photojournalists 
and TV crews that were onboard the two Cap Anamurs. They include, as I shall explain 
in more detail in part two of this thesis, a much wider and more complex infrastructure 
that has turned the Mediterranean into a technologically mediated sensorium constantly 
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recording, transmitting, storing and broadcasting information. Traces of past events are 
scattered across this multiplicity of sensing devices, and imprinted in multiple formats, 
making it increasingly difficult for anyone to ground claims on the unstable status of these 
aural and visual data. This condition, however, has also opened up unexpected possibilities. 
Many of these sources, including those usually utilised for the purpose of surveillance, are 
no longer exclusively in the hands of states and even images produced by them can be 
obtained and repurposed as active sites of struggle by a much larger number of people. 
Much of the data normally used to monitor clandestine trips – satellite images, plane- and 
ship- spotters’ websites, vessel- tracking data, online ships’ logs, and oceanographic and 
meteorological data – can be accessed and used for purposes other than those for which 
they were originally commissioned. Moreover, the proliferation of small audio- and video-
recording devices means that many more people at sea, including migrants themselves, 
can now mass produce images and sounds outside of the control of border agencies, be 
they state, international, or non-governmental organisations. A renewed visual culture 
of humanitarianism should certainly be attuned to these new sensors and their modes of 
operation.
 On the other hand, the new media aesthetics of humanitarianism at sea that I am 
starting to delineate here should also necessarily need to leave behind the problematic 
relationship between representation and political action on which the notion of “bearing 
testimony” is based. Indeed, many of the assumptions on which this practice has been based 
have been brought into question. While, in its mainstream understanding, the paradigm 
of “bearing testimony” institutes a straightforward relationship between two supposedly 
discrete and well-defined entities such as, on the one hand, the public, and represented 
objects/events, on the other, none of these seem to be in a fixed position anymore, if they 
ever were. On the side of the public, so to speak, both the existence of recurrent media 
effects, as well as the presence of a public waiting to be addressed, have already been the 
object of insightful and sustained critiques. Thomas Keenan, for instance, writing about 
the post-Cold War humanitarian scenario (the events of Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda 
in particular) has questioned the existence of a media-induced causal link between the 
exposure to suffering and an ethico-political response,51 defining the public precisely as 
that “what is hailed or addressed by messages that might not reach their destination”.52 On 
the side of the “represented”, instead, the practice of “bearing testimony” presupposes that 
there exists a faithful representation waiting to be transmitted. It takes for granted that 
there is out there a univocal representation of suffering subjects that just needs to enter 
the frame of a compassionate camera to be made publicly visible. Paraphrasing Ariella 
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Mobile phone recording of the crossing of the Mediterranean made by one of the migrants who 
arrived in southern Italy in the summer of 2011. Image courtesy of Charles Heller. 
Azoulay, we might say instead that any visual “representation” does not exist as a priori 
but is rather the result of a process: it emerges from the unique encounter between a 
photographer, a photographed subject, a technical device and, successively, a spectator. It 
is this event that creates the condition for the appearance of a certain subject.53
 The failure of the old paradigm makes the invention of a new one all the more 
urgent. Different critical tools are needed to rethink the contours and the modes of 
operation of this new media aesthetics. Help, in this sense, might come from all those 
authors who have attempted to think beyond what artist Hito Steyerl calls “the struggle 
over representation”.54 In an important text, she delineates the contours of this possible 
practice in terms of participation, rather than representation. She writes:
To participate in an image – rather than merely identify with it – [...] would mean
participating in the material of the image as well as in the desires and forces it
accumulates. How about acknowledging that this image is not some ideological
misconception, but a thing simultaneously couched in affect and availability, a 
fetish made of crystals and electricity, animated by our wishes and fears – a perfect
embodiment of its own conditions of existence? As such, the image is – to use yet
another phrase of Walter Benjamin’s – without expression. It doesn’t represent 
reality. It is a fragment of the real world. It is a thing just like any other – a thing 
like you and me.55
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Demonstration of the families of the disappeared in Tunis in March 2013. The banners show TV 
stills that appear to show their relatives. Photo by Lorenzo Pezzani.
Under these new conditions, images and sounds cease to be simply “representations” of 
human rights violations and of the misfortune of people and rather become fields of possibility, 
actions and weapons in and of themselves.56 This shift from the indexicality to the materiality 
of the image, to its being a thing among things, has far-reaching consequences and opens 
up new possibilities of documentation. Images here become sensors which might contain 
information not only beyond the intentionality of their author, but also beyond what they 
represent. Ariella Azoulay makes this point forcefully when she writes that a photograph
“exceed any presumption of ownership or monopoly and any attempt at being 
exhaustive. Even when it seems possible to name correctly in the form of a 
statement what [they] show -”This is X”- it will always turn out that something 
else can be read in [them], some other event can be reconstructed from [them], 
some other player’s presence can be discerned through [them], constructing the 
social relations that allowed [their] production.”57
How the possibilities offered by this expanded understanding of visual and aural imaging 
might be able to ground a renewed practice of “bringing testimony” in the media aesthetics 
of humanitarianism at sea remains to be seen. Another aesthetic grammar waits to be 
defined, one that can move along the lines of new forms of circulation and interruption, 
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diversion and subversion, or, to say it in more cinematic terms, of montage.58 However, 
glimpses of how this renewed media aesthetics might look like can be already found 
among some of the practices that populate the maritime border and that operate at the 
intersection of moving bodies and moving images. For instance, the way in which migrants 
take part in the production of images of the crossing, offering an image of their journey at 
sea that radically challenges the victimising image prevalent in the public discourse, can 
be considered an example of this expanded filed of participation.
 Moreover, the way in which the families of the Tunisians “disparus”59 have used 
TV news images of migrants who have arrived in Lampedusa (which are usually shown to 
bolster the idea of “invasion”) to challenge the silence of Tunisian and Italian authorities 
over the fate of their missing relatives and demand that a proper investigation is carried 
out to ascertain their fate shows instead the power that interfering with the circulation 
of those images might hold.60 Here circulation is not “something that simply transmits 
meaning”, but rather “a constitutive act in itself ”.61
 Finally, the Forensic Oceanography and WatchTheMed projects that I have co-
initiated have also attempted to take stock of some of these new possibilities in different 
ways. They have, for instance, repurposed visual and spatial data that is normally used 
for other purposes, including surveillance itself, for mapping cases of violence against 
migrants at sea. The maps produced in this way have circulated widely in the press, in 
official legal and political documents as well as in activist flyers, allowing for the discussion 
around these cases to happen across different arenas.
 In all these examples, the emancipatory potential of images and maps lies not only 
in what they portray but also in what they enable, as they cease to be simple depiction of 
certain subjects or situations and rather become “a shared ground for action and passion, 
a zone of traffic between things and intensities”.62 This opens up a new field of struggle, 
one which, of course, is not devoid of pitfalls. Forms of re-appropriation and subversion 
are not hermetically sealed from the practices they seek to contest, since they often rely on 
some of the same epistemologies and technical tools. “The very maps [and images] they 
produce may “migrate” between different, and sometimes opposed, fields. In the process, 
the use their [...] authors had initially intended is frequently reverted, pointing to the 
politics that emerges in the circulation and use of knowledge and representations, rather 
than what is contained in them.”63 The way in which the Italian police has used mobile 
phone videos of the crossing shot by migrants at sea as evidence to identify and condemn 
the alleged “smugglers” is a clear instance of this.64 Here, as in many other cases, “the 
meaning and effects of the very same images may be radically altered by the technological 
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and institutional assemblage in which they are inscribed.”65 The police logo superimposed 
over the very images that I have myself often celebrated as examples of the power of 
subversion that image practices can yield is a painful reminder of this.
Mobile phone video shot by one of the migrants rescued by the operation Mare Nostrum on 26 
April 2014. The video was confiscated during the transfer to Sicily and later used by the Italian 
police to identify the alleged “smugglers”. It was subsequently publicly released with the addition 
of the police logo and edited together with the images of the “smugglers’” arrest that took place at 
the moment of disembarkation.
and institutional assemblage in which they are inscribed.”65 The police logo superimposed 
over the very images that I have myself often celebrated as examples of the power of 
subversion that image practices can yield is a painful reminder of this. 
 “One”, as Charles Heller has written, “might lament the risk of reappropriation of 
such imagery. But we may also recognize that the multifarious, contested, and unstable life 
of images and image practices is the very condition for them to shape the world.”66
 What this long winding trajectory from the South China Sea to the Mediterranean 
shows is that under certain conditions, however unstable these might be, images can indeed 
become tools for movement. In order for this to happen, however, a crucial rethinking of 
the role of aesthetic practices at the maritime border has to take place. The histories of the 
two Cap Anamurs point to the need to rethink a visual culture that would be able to operate 
within and against the ambivalences of the border regime and not betray the empowering 
potential of the new form of right advocated by Foucault. In marking the passage from the 
faith in a grandiose act of unveiling to the uncertainties of a process of editing images and 
sounds that are immanent to the very field of power they seek to oppose, they open up a 
whole new range of practices and emancipatory possibilities. These, however, can only be 
achieved if we acknowledge that the political relevance of migration does not reside in the 
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exposure and recognition of a new subject – the migrant – either as a victim or as a kind 
of (almost revolutionary) avant-garde figure, but rather that it is already for the very fact 
of moving and being “there where you are not supposed to be” that migration destabilises 
established geographies of power.67 The subjectivities that are produced in this process do 
not (always) need a public image to be political. What they need, if anything, are common 
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 If geography expresses in its very etymology the possibility to write and there- fore 
read the surface of the earth, the liquid territory of the sea seems to stand as the absolute 
challenge to spatial analysis. The waters that cover over 70% of the surface area of our 
planet are constantly stirred by currents and waves that seem to erase any trace of the past, 
maintaining the sea in a kind of permanent present. In Roland Barthes’ words, the sea is a 
“non-signifying field” that “bears no message.”1 Furthermore, its vast expanse and the lack 
of stable habitation on its surface lead events at sea to occur mostly outside of the public 
gaze and thus remain unaccounted for. The deaths of migrants at sea and the violation 
of their rights are no exception. While between 1988 and November 2012 the press and 
NGOs reported more than 14,000 deaths at the maritime frontier of the EU—including 
more than 7,000 in the Sicily Channel alone—the conditions in which these occur have 
rarely been established with precision and the responsibility for them has seldom been 
determined. Many more lives have been lost without being recorded other than in the 
haunting absence experienced by their families.2
 It is in relation to the challenges posed across this liquid frontier that we started 
the Forensic Oceanography project in summer 2011 in an attempt to document the deaths 
of migrants at sea and violations of their rights.3 This endeavour was spurred by the new 
demands for accountability that emerged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which 
represented a moment of paroxysm and rupture in a number of respects. The revolution in 
Tunisia and the civil war in Libya led to the sudden reopening of the central Mediterranean's 
clandestine migration routes. While this context saw an intense movement of people, the 
precarious conditions in which the crossings occurred led to a record number of deaths. 
However, as we will see, these deaths occurred while this very maritime space was being 
monitored with unprecedented scrutiny due to the NATO-led military intervention in 
Libya. The crossings and deaths were occurring in a space populated by a large number 
of Western states’ military ships and patrol aircraft, and there were strong indications 
that military forces were failing in their obligation to rescue migrants in distress, despite 
possessing the requisite means of surveillance to witness their plight.
 This was particularly apparent in the incident now known as the “left-to-die 
boat” case, in which sixty-three migrants lost their lives while drifting for fourteen days 
in the NATO maritime surveillance area, despite several distress signals relaying their 
location as well as repeated interactions, including at least one military helicopter visit 
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and an encounter with a military ship.4 By precisely reconstructing these events and the 
involvement of different actors within them, we demonstrated that traces are indeed left 
in water, and that by reading them carefully the sea itself can be turned into a witness 
for interrogation. The contemporary ocean is in fact not only traversed by the energy 
that forms its waves and currents, but by the different electromagnetic waves sent and 
received by multiple sensing devices that create a new sea altogether. Buoys measuring 
currents, optical and radar satellite imagery, transponders emitting signals used for vessel 
tracking and migrants’ mobile phones are among the many devices that record and read 
the sea’s depth and surface as well as the objects and living organisms that navigate it. By 
repurposing this technological apparatus of sensing, we have tried to bring the sea to bear 
witness to how it has been made to kill.
 Migrants do not only die at sea but through a strategic use of the sea. As this 
particular incident exemplifies, even when they drown following a ship-wreck or starve 
while drifting in its currents, there is nothing “natural” about their deaths. Following 
Elisabeth Grosz, the sea, like any geographic environment, can be considered to be endowed 
with a “geopower” that “refers to forces that precede, enable, facilitate, provoke and restrict 
‘life’,” but conversely political practices shape the way this geopower operates, and affect 
the ways some are empowered and others restricted by that power.5 Our project thus could 
not limit itself to reading the sea in order to document specific incidents, but demanded 
that we attempt to understand the conditions that have led the sea to become so deadly. 
As we will demonstrate, the Mediterranean has been made to kill through contemporary 
forms of militarized governmentality of mobility which inflict deaths by first creating 
dangerous conditions of crossing, and then abstaining from assisting those in peril. This 
governmentality is shaped by the complex legal structure and mode of governance of the sea 
that enables state actors to selectively expand or retract their rights and obligations. What 
emerges from these conditions is a form of violence that is diffused and dispersed among 
many actors and which often, as in the case we have investigated, operates less through 
the direct action of a singular actor than through the inaction of many. As a consequence 
of this form of systemic violence, the specific responsibility for deaths and violations at 
sea is difficult to detect and prove. Before describing the strategies and methodologies we 
applied to collect the testimony of the sea so as to reconstruct the “left-to-die boat” case 
and others, it is first necessary to chart the broader political, juridical, and technological 
conditions through which the sea was made to kill — conditions that we have mobilized 
against the grain in the task of breaching the impunity of the actors involved.
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MARITIME GOVERNANCE: BEYOND THE “FREEDOM V. ENCLOSURE” DIVIDE
In “The Nomos of the Earth” the German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt 
epitomized a vision of the sea as an anarchic space in which the impossibility of drawing 
long-standing and identifiable boundaries made it equally difficult for European states to 
establish a durable legal order or found claims of sovereignty.6 “The sea,” he wrote, “has 
no character, in the original sense of the word, which comes from the Greek charassein, 
meaning to engrave, to scratch, to imprint.”7 On this note, Schmitt based the fundamental 
distinction on which geopolitics has been predicated for many years: the binary division 
between a solid land, where territories can be clearly demarcated and where order may 
be imposed, and a sea where borders can be neither traced nor held and where freedom 
reigns absolute. This opposition found its expression in the evolution of maps of the world 
which, from the early seventeenth century onwards, tended to represent (European) land 
in great detail in terms of geographic morphology, human built environment and political 
boundaries, but signified the territory of the surrounding sea as an abstract and frictionless 
geometric space open to navigation.8
 While idealizations of the sea as empty and lawless still persist today,9 recent 
scholarship on maritime governance tells us a different story, in which the oceans have long 
been crisscrossed by multiple regimes of appropriation and juridical differentiation.10 
 
The waters of the Central Mediterranean, as seen from the coast of the Italian Island of 
Lampedusa, July 2013 Photo: Charles Hellar
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Nova Orbis Tabula in Lucem Edita, Map of the world by Frederik de Wit, 1662, Bibliothèque 
royale de Belgique. Source: Wikimedia Commons 
Geographer Philip Steinberg has effectively shown how maritime governance imposed by 
(Western) states and capital has oscillated throughout modernity between two poles: on 
the one hand, the desire to divide up the waters of the earth in a way that would mirror 
the carving up of territorial boundaries on land; on the other, the vision of the oceans 
as commons, open to free navigation—the “free seas.” However, rather than an either /
or application of these seemingly opposed tendencies, what we observe throughout this 
period is rather their productive entanglement.11
 This productive tension is at work in one of the founding moments of maritime 
law, commonly referred to as the “Battle of the Books” (1580—1650), which centred 
around the opposition between the vision of a free sea expressed by the Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius in his 1609 text Mare liberum (“the free sea”) and the defense of maritime 
division and control formulated by the English scholar John Selden in Mare clausum (“the 
closed sea”) in 1635.12 But this apparent contrast conceals a deeper convergence. While 
Selden, by noting that “mare clausum can go only so far as one can assert effective control,” 
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endorsed negatively the idea of freedom for the high seas,13 the concept of the “freedom of 
the seas” coined by Grotius routinely led to the use of coercion to ensure the smoothness 
and security of trade routes or block those of competitors.14 As Philip Steinberg writes, 
“freedom requires policing and mobility requires fixity, and both of these activities require 
continual efforts to striate the ideally smooth ocean.”15
 For both poles in the governance of the seas, the ability to map, measure, and 
exercise surveillance over the maritime space was fundamental. This knowledge did not 
precede its application in the service of power, but was inextricably bound to war, trade, 
and imperialism in its very production. It was the coupling of scientific epistemologies and 
Western commercial and military networks spanning the globe that enabled systematic 
measurements to be sampled across vast distances, and generated increasingly detailed 
knowledge of the winds, currents, tides, depths, landmasses, and living organisms that 
constitute the ocean’s global system.16 This understanding of the seas was essential to 
secure and fast navigation, as well as to charting maritime territory and life in a way that 
would eventually enable its division, exploitation and regulation.
 While Carl Schmitt was indeed right to state that the sea itself cannot be carved up 
and possessed as land, the same is not true of the resources located within the water and 
in the soil under it, or the traffic that floats on its surface. By going beyond his land—sea 
binary and by being attuned to the vertical dimension of maritime spaces, we are able to 
decipher a much more complex form of governance than the simple opposition between 
territorial control and deterritorialized flow.
 The tension between and coexistence of the tendencies of enclosure and freedom in 
the governance of maritime space have resulted in, on the one hand, a form of unbundled 
and spatially variegated sovereignty, and on the other a governance in motion that seeks 
to compensate for the impossibility of controlling the entire liquid expanse by focusing on 
the control of maritime routes and the mobile people and objects that ply them. Whereas
in 1702 the extension of the territorial waters could be defined by Cornelius Bynkershoek as 
the area covered by coastal states’ cannon-shot range, with the governance of routes largely 
dependent on the presence of ships along key corridors, today a far more complex jurisdictional 
regime and mode of governance has been enabled by the contemporary technological 
apparatus discussed below, which transforms the maritime space into a dense and extensive 
“sensorium.”17 In this situation, as we will see with reference to the Mediterranean, multiple 
lines of enclosure that run parallel to the coastline and dissect the surface and volume of 
the ocean into partial sovereignty regimes intersect with diagonal and ever shifting lines of 
control that attempt to follow routes of maritime traffic. These sets of lines do not simply 
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Map of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean. Based on data compiled by 
www .marineplan.es and the International Maritime Organization. Design: Lorenzo Pezzani.
coexist for, as we will see, the carving up of partial sovereignty regimes is the very legal 
basis for governance in motion to expand and retract selectively in policing the “free seas.”
LINES OF ENCLOSURE: UNBUNDLED SOVEREIGNTY AT SEA
The successive stripes of jurisdiction, which, by dissecting both surface and volume of the 
sea determine the current legal architecture of maritime territories, are mainly codified by 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).18 After establishing 
the criteria for determining the position of the so-called “baseline”—the ideal line that 
usually corresponds to the low-water line along the coast—the convention further defines 
several jurisdictional zones, over which states exercise decreasing degrees of control and 
exclusive privilege. These include, among others, “territorial waters” that extend up to 
twelve nautical miles from the baseline within which states have full sovereignty; the 
“contiguous zone,” covering up to twenty-four nautical miles and within which states may 
further exercise certain border police functions; the “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ), 
which may delimit a zone up to two hundred nautical miles from the baseline, within 
which coastal states have exclusivity over natural resources both in the water (such as fish) 
and under the soil (such as gas or oil). Beyond this zone lie the “high seas,” where no state 
can exercise its full sovereignty nor subject any part of them to its jurisdiction. While the 
high seas are “free for all states and reserved for peaceful purposes,” they do not become 
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Maritime jurisdictional concepts. Source: Juan Luis Suárez de Vivero, “Jurisdictional Waters in 
The Mediterranean and Black Seas” (European Parliament, 2010), p. 27. 
as a result a legal vacuum, since the rights and obligations of each actor and state are framed 
by international law. The jurisdiction of states applies to boats flying their respective flags, 
and each boat thus becomes a small piece of floating state jurisdiction, transforming the 
high seas into an international space in the strongest sense, since all states are potentially in 
contact with each other.19 Finally, vessels and coastal states also have particular obligations: 
among these, of central relevance for our investigation into the “left-to-die boat” case, are 
the duty of vessels to provide assistance to people in distress, and the obligation of coastal 
states to coordinate rescue operations. For this purpose, Search and Rescue (SAR) zones 
have been established across the high seas, delimiting the geographic areas within which 
particular states have a legal responsibility to coordinate rescue operations.20
 What emerges from this process of enclosure of the high seas by various and 
sometimes competing jurisdictional regimes, is the image of a space of unbundled 
sovereignty, in which the rights and obligations that compose modern state sovereignty on 
the land are decoupled from each other and applied to varying degrees depending on the 
spatial extent and the specific issue in question.21 As a result, a patchy legal space constituted 
by overlapping and often conflicting fragments has emerged. The Mediterranean is a 
paradigmatic example of this phenomenon, which is therein reproduced at a smaller scale 
but with increased rapidity and intensity. Until recently, most Mediterranean states had 
refrained from extending exclusive claims beyond their territorial waters, for fear of getting 
entangled in thorny legal conflicts and of reducing the navigational advantages guaranteed 
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by the high seas. Since the beginning of the 1990s however, under changed geopolitical 
conditions, the Mediterranean has entered a phase of accelerated juridicalization, and zones 
of exclusive maritime use have proliferated, extending national jurisdiction into what used 
to be high seas.22 These are zones of environmental protection and resource conservation 
which are often not even provided for by the UNCLOS, but which further subdivide the 
high seas according to specific functions such as fishing, ecological and archaeological 
protection. The complexity of these maritime jurisdictions has in turn created numerous 
disputes which involve states as well as fishing, oil, and shipping companies and which are 
often fought through scientific campaigns to map and measure the size of fisheries, the 
morphology of the seabed, and the presence of minerals located under it. 23
 These overlaps, conflicts of delimitation, and differing interpretations that have 
been the by-product of the recent carving up of the sea are less malfunctions than an 
exacerbated expression of the structural condition of global law, which, as Gunther 
Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano have argued, results from deep contradictions 
between colliding sectors of a global society.24 Furthermore, as we will see in relation to 
the policing of illegalized migrants at sea, this condition has become an integral part of the 
capacity of states and other actors to apply rights and abide by obligations at sea selectively 
according to their interests, expanding and retracting their jurisdictional claims at will—
for example to intercept migrants or to evade the obligation to rescue people in distress. 
This unbundled and elastic sovereignty is key to the operations of the mobile governance 
exercised to police the so called “freedom of the seas.”
LINES OF CONTROL: GOVERNANCE IN MOTION THROUGH SCOPIC SYSTEMS
In addition to the lines of enclosure running parallel to the coastline discussed above, 
the Mediterranean is crisscrossed by diagonal and ever shifting lines of control that 
emerge as maritime governance attempts to follow routes of maritime traffic and police 
the “freedom” of the high seas. As Michel Foucault had already noted in the late 1970s, 
this inextricable articulation between freedom and control is characteristic of forms of 
mobility governance in (neo)liberal societies, which operate by “maximizing the positive 
elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and [by] minimizing what 
is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while knowing that they will never be 
completely suppressed.”25 While the Mediterranean’s waters are central to global trade—
with an estimated total of 200,000 commercial ships crossing it annually26—this dense 
traffic and the maritime space itself are perceived though the lens of security as being 
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This map, produced by the European Commission Joint Research Centre, shows the density of 
Synthetic Aperture Radar images available in 2001 across the Mediterranean Basin. Source: 
D. Tarchi, oil spills statistics in The Mediterranean, PowerPoint presentation at the specialized 
training course on oil pollution monitoring, November 2006. 
constantly under threat: from international terrorism, criminality, illegal fishing, pollution, 
and, of course, illegalized migration. To detect threats amidst the productive flow of 
vessels and goods, states deploy means of surveillance, military and border patrols, and 
rescue agencies. In addition to national initiatives, NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour 
was launched in the wake of 9/11 to act as a deterrent and protect civilian traffic in the 
Mediterranean. Policing has thus become an increasingly structural part of the supposed 
freedom of the high seas. The exercising of the “right of visit” is an indication of this. 
While according to the UNCLOS this right allows officials to board a vessel in the high 
seas in “exceptional circumstances,” it has come to be used to justify an increasing number 
and array of interventions, including the routine interception of migrants.27 Nevertheless, 
thedeployment of aerial and naval forces remains insufficient to police the vast waters 
of the Mediterranean. The sorting out of “bad” traffic from large quantities of “good” 
mobilities within an extremely vast space necessitates the assemblage of a sophisticated 
and increasingly automated technological apparatus of surveillance.
 For the purposes of surveillance, the coasts of the Mediterranean, as well as state-
operated vessels, are equipped with radars that scan the horizon around them by sending 
out high-frequency radio waves that are bounced back to the source wherever they 
encounter an object, indicating these “re-turns” as an illuminated point on a monitor. 
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(Right) Finmeccanica PowerPoint slide from “Dal VTS al VT- MIS,” 2007. The graphic presents 
the “Vessel Traffic Management and Information System” (VTMIS).  (Left) Screenshot of one of 
the live online vessel tracking portals, which gathers and presents live AIS data. Source: www 
.marinetraffic.com. 
Automated vessel-tracking data for large commercial ships (AIS) or for fishing boats 
(VMS) is sent out by a transponder on board via the VHF radio frequency and captured 
either by coastal or satellite receivers, providing a live view of all registered vessels.28 
Optical satellites generate imagery by capturing reflected energy of different frequencies 
such as visible and infrared light, while satellites equipped with synthetic—aperture radar 
(SAR) emit a radio signal and create an image based on the variations in the returns. 
Both “snap” the surface of the sea according to the trajectory of orbiting satellites and are 
used to detect unidentified vessels or track pollution. The constant emission and capture 
of different electromagnetic waves these technologies utilize confers a new material 
meaning on Fernand Braudel’s metaphor of the Mediterranean as an “electro-magnetic 
field” in terms of its relation to the wider world.29 These technologies do not simply create 
a new representation of the sea, but rather constitute a new sea altogether, one which is 
simultaneously composed by matter and media. The current aim of different agencies 
striving to govern the sea is to assemble these different technologies so as to achieve the 
most complete possible “integrated maritime picture.” This is both a technological and 
institutional challenge, since it requires the interoperability of agencies from different 
countries (both within and outside the EU) across different fields of activity. Through 
this assemblage emerges what Karin Knorr Cetina has called, with reference to financial 
markets, a “scopic system”: “When combined with a prefix, a scope (derived from the 
Greek scopein, “to see”) is an instrument for seeing or observing, as in periscope. [...] A 
scopic system is an arrangement of hardware, software, and human feeds that together 
function like a scope: like a mechanism of observation and projection [...].”30
 While the assemblage of technologies and institutions that constitute the 
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Aerial video of a migrants’ boat recorded and published online by the Italian border police.  
Source: “Lampedusa: Immagini inerenti l’attività della Guardia di Finanza a con- trasto 
dell’immigrazione clandestina,” September 17, 2011, http://youtu.be/ E1eB--bK6w4. 
Mediterranean’s scopic system enable a “vision” of the sea that far exceeds that of its 
ancestor the telescope, it is still far from producing the totalizing panoptic view that 
state agencies and surveillance companies regularly call for. For a start, agencies come 
up against their limits when faced with the huge quantity of data generated by the dense 
maritime traffic and the increasing deployment of remote-sensing technologies. To deal 
with the ensuing information overload, surveillance agencies are increasingly resorting to 
the use of algorithms that allow the automatic detection of “anomalies” so as to distinguish 
“threats” from the “normal” maritime traffic.31 An even bigger challenge is posed by the 
task of detecting the kinds of small boats used for clandestine migration—such as ten-
meter rubber boats or fifteen-meter wooden boats— within such a vast area. In this 
respect, all solutions to date have run up against the conflict between resolution and swath: 
while the detection of small boats necessitates high-resolution means of sensing (such as 
SAR satellite imagery), this can only be achieved for small geographic areas, thus leaving 
much of the maritime area unattended.32 As such, the Mediterranean’s scopic system 
operates a form of incomplete and patchy surveillance that runs up against the frontiers of 
information quantity and resolution.
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Recognizing the impossibility of monitoring the entire space of the sea and the totality of 
traffic that populates it, state agencies focus the attention of their mobile governmentality 
on the main vectors and lines of sea crossing. At work then is a form of “viapolitics,” a 
concept coined by William Walters to describe a politics that takes as its object routes 
and vehicles.33 For Walters, “vehicles and their infrastructures are nodes, relays, surfaces, 
volumes in a dispersed and uneven governance of population and territory.”34 The modality 
of governance of the maritime frontier is thus deeply shaped by and to a certain extent 
consubstantial of the surveillance apparatus that enables it. For if the border exists only 
in its violation, the latter must first be detected either by human perception or its various 
technological extensions. Conversely, the strategies of invisibility enacted by clandestine 
migrants so as to slip though the cracks and gaps in this surveillance apparatus are essential 
to subverting the violent border regime that operates at sea.
THE CONTESTED FRONTIER: MOBILE KNOWLEDGES, ELASTIC BORDERINGS, 
AND THE POLITICS OF IRRESPONSIBILITY
Like the ocean, the mobility of people has proven particularly difficult to govern 
throughout history. In the past twenty years, severe restrictions have been imposed on 
the movement of people across the Mediterranean with the introduction of Schengen 
visas and the progressive externalization of border controls into the maritime frontier 
and onto North African states. This brought to an end to the phase following World War 
II in which “guest-worker” programs and post-colonial relations promoted the influx of 
migrant labourers into European countries—who frequently crossed the sea by ferry.35 
The recent restrictions to the movement of non-European migrants have however proven 
unsuccessful in curbing “unwanted” migration flows.36 Migration from the southern 
shores of the Mediterranean has continued, but in a clandestine and precaritized form, 
employing, amongst other methods, the crossing by sea on unseaworthy vessels.
 Those wanting to cross the Mediterranean despite being denied access to formal 
and legal modes of doing so had to create a new transport infra- structure, constituted 
as much by actual vessels as by interpersonal relations and knowledge of borders. Faced 
with governmental agencies’ interlinking of their means of surveillance to form an 
“integrated maritime picture” so as to control mobility, illegalized migrants developed 
their own social network through which information and services are exchanged.37 As 
the work of the sociologist Mehdi Alioua has shown, contrary to common perception, 
resorting to smugglers is usually limited to particularly difficult stages in the crossing of 
borders, whereas the majority of migrants’ trajectories are organized autonomously and 
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collectively. Through their mobility, migrants progressively generate a shared knowledge, 
which allows them to orient themselves in new environments and know where and how 
to cross borders undetected.38 This collective knowledge and practice of border crossing 
has a deep and ambivalent aesthetic dimension, in that it hinges on the conditions of 
appearance of migrants.39
 The very term “clandestine,” from the Latin clandestinus meaning “secret” or 
“hidden,” points to their aim to circulate undetected—literally, under the radar; this is also 
why most crossings begin at night. However this desire to go undetected is always weighed 
against the risk of dying unnoticed at sea, as in the “left-to-die boat” case when, in distress, 
the migrants did everything they possibly could to be noticed and rescued.40
 In response to the continued capacity of illegalized migrants to reach the southern 
shores of Europe, through a series of policies and practices the Mediterranean was 
progressively militarized and transformed into a frontier area that allows border operations 
to both expand and retract far beyond the legal perimeter of the EU, thus adding further 
friction to the mobility of migrants.
 In an important report submitted in 2003 to the EU Commission by CIVIPOL—a 
semi-public consulting company to the French Ministry of the Interior—the authors 
explain that in order to “hold a maritime border which exists by accident of geography,” 
it is necessary to go well beyond an understanding of the maritime border as delimited 
by EU states’ territorial waters.41 To exploit the geopower of the sea and use its physical 
characteristics to reinforce the border, surveillance has to cover “not just an entry point, 
as in an airport, nor a line, such as a land border, but a variable-depth surface.”42 The 
unbundled sovereignty at work in the high seas enabled European and non-European 
coastal states—assisted since 2001 by NATO as part of its “Operation Active Endeavour” 
and since 2006 by Frontex (the European border management agency)—to deploy 
maritime border patrols using boats, helicopters, airplanes, and the aforementioned 
surveillance technologies to intercept incoming migrants.
 Through these means of governance in motion, the line of the border has become 
elastic, expanding and retracting with the movement of patrols. However, the increasing 
militarization of the maritime frontier of the EU has not succeeded in terms of the stated 
aim of stopping the inflow of illegalized migrants, but rather has resulted in the splintering 
of migration routes towards longer and more perilous areas of crossing.43 It is thus the 
strategic use of the maritime environment as a frontier zone that has turned the sea into an 
unwilling killer. The fact that such policies remain active despite policy makers’ knowledge 
of their “failure” is a reminder of the productive dimension of illegalized 
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Deaths at the Borders of Europe. Source: Migreurop, Atlas of Migration in Europe: A Critical 
Geography of Migration Policies (London: New Internationalist Publications, 2013).
migration. It makes it possible for governments to engage in a never ending “war on 
migration” whose benefits include attracting the populist vote, keeping the surveillance 
and military industries buoyant, and, last but not least, providing the labor market with a 
ready supply of de-qualified and precaritized laborers. This is the obscene supplement of 
the spectacular scene of border enforcement to which Nicholas De Genova rightly draws 
our attention.44
 As a result of these policies and militarized practices, once travelling at sea, 
migrants frequently find themselves in difficult situations of distress, due to a variety 
of factors such as failing motors, vessel overload, or loss of direction. However, as soon 
as they enter the Mediterranean Sea, they enter a space of international responsibility. 
We have already noted the obligation of vessels at sea to provide assistance to those 
in distress, and for coastal states to coordinate rescues within their respective Search 
and Rescue (SAR) zones. The strategic mobilization of the notion of “rescue” has at 
times allowed coastal states to justify police operations in the high seas or even within 
foreign territorial waters for which they would otherwise have little legal ground, thus 
blurring the line between policing and humanitarian activities.45 But along with rescue 
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comes the burden of disembarkment, which in turn entails responsibility for processing 
possible asylum requests or deporting migrants in accordance with the so-called Dublin 
Regulation.46 To avoid engaging in rescue missions, states have strategically exploited the 
partial and overlap- ping sovereignty at sea and the elastic nature of international law.47 
The delimitation of SAR zones has been the first battlefield. In the central Mediterranean, 
Tunisia and Libya have refrained from defining the boundaries of their SAR zones, while 
Italy and Malta have overlapping SAR zones and are signatories to different versions of 
the SAR convention, a situation which has led to repeated standoffs.48 The latter have been 
exacerbated by the lack of clear definitions of concepts such as “distress” and “assistance” 
within international maritime law, enabling divergent interpretations.49 Moreover, coastal 
states’ unwillingness to accept the disembarkment of migrants has led to an increased 
reluctance on the part of seafarers to allow those in distress on board their vessels, “in 
some cases fearing criminal liability for being accused of facilitating illegal immigration.” 
In such ways, the international legal norms established to determine responsibility for 
assisting those in distress at sea have been used precisely for the purpose of evading and 
deferring this responsibility. As a result, many migrants have been left unassisted, leading 
to human tragedies. It was precisely this politics of irresponsibility that was at work in the 
unfolding of the “left-to-die boat” case.
 While Italy and Malta had been informed of the location and distress of the 
passengers, with the vessel still outside of their SAR zones (but soon to enter their zone 
of overlapping and conflicting responsibility), they limited themselves to sending out 
distress signals to vessels transiting the area and informing NATO command, which was 
monitoring the “Maritime Surveillance Area” within which the passengers were located.50 
However during the time of the international military intervention in Libya, NATO 
operated a practice of minimal assistance, the aim of which was to ensure that the migrants 
could continue their journey until they entered the Italian or Maltese Search and Rescue 
(SAR) zone so that they would become a concern for those states. While this did occur in 
several instances, in the case of the “left-to-die boat” the evaluation of the distress of the 
migrants and the minimal assistance provided to them (a helicopter visited them twice 
and dropped a few bottles of water and biscuits) were clearly insufficient as they soon 
started to drift back to the Libyan coast, left to merciless winds and currents that inflicted 
on the passengers a slow death.
 If migrants thus die at sea from a range of direct causes such as dehydration, lack 
of food, the ingestion of salty water and drowning, all of which are related to the geopower 
of the sea, it should be clear from the above that it is through the enforcing of migration 
104Chapter Three
policies imposed by the EU and their articulation within a particular maritime legal and 
governance regime that the sea has been turned into a deadly liquid, the site and means of 
a rising number of deaths and structural violations of migrants’ rights. What has emerged 
is a form of violence that is exercised less by effecting a destructive force onto a given actor, 
than by creating the conditions in which the sea becomes a liquid trap and refraining to 
help those who are caught in it. In this, the governmentality of migration at sea constitutes 
an example of a form of biopolitical power described by Foucault, which is exercised 
not only by actively sustaining and protecting the life of certain populations, but also by 
causing death of others by simply abstaining from any form of action. To paraphrase his 
famous summary of this form of power, one could say that the maritime border regime 
“makes flow and lets drown.”51 The migration regime thus produces a form of systemic 
violence that kills without touching and is exercised by several actors simultaneously. As a 
consequence, the responsibility for the deaths and violations that are its structural product 
is shared, diffuse, and thus difficult to address. While migrants’ rights organizations have 
been documenting the deaths of migrants for a number of years and have denounced 
the deadly policy of the maritime border regime, it was not until 2011, with the radical 
geopolitical shifts brought about by the “Arab Spring” and the military intervention in 
Libya, that new possibilities for addressing this form of violence arose.
2011: RUPTURES IN THE MIGRATION REGIME AND RENEWED OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
In relation to the context outlined above, 2011 represented a moment of paroxysm and 
rupture in a number of respects. The so-called Arab Spring led to a temporary power 
vacuum in Tunisia that enabled over 28,000 people to cross the sea to Italy during that year. 
This intense mobility in the immediate aftermath of a revolution is a clear indication that 
the aspiration to freedom and justice of the Tunisian people was directed not only towards 
the way their country was governed, but also extended towards the imposition by the 
EU—with the active participation of the Ben Ali regime—of a violent and discriminatory 
migration regime within and beyond Tunisia’s borders.52 The uprising in Libya led less to 
the seizing of a new freedom than to forced displacement. The entrenched civil war and 
the ensuing NATO-led military intervention forced almost 26,000 people to cross the sea 
to reach the southern shores of Italy, with Gaddafi’s regime playing an active role in forcing 
migrants onto boats with the aim of using them as weapons of war.53 With boats loaded 
to the point of collapse and without regard for even the minimal safety measures usually 
provided by smugglers, over 1,822 recorded deaths occurred in the Central Mediterranean 
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during 2011, one of the all—time highs.54 However, these deaths occurred at a time when 
the militarization of the EU’s maritime frontier had taken on entirely new dimension, 
with the usual agents of the low intensity “war on migration” joined by a large number 
of additional military ships and patrol aircraft deployed by Western states off the Libyan 
coast in support of the international military intervention. Their mission included the 
surveillance of a wide maritime space off the coast of Libya in order to enforce an arms 
embargo.55
 In this context, a coalition of NGOs was formed with the aim of identifying direct 
responsibility for these deaths. Their claim was that, given the means deployed, it would 
have been impossible for military and border control personnel to have failed to witness 
the distress of migrants at sea.56 The “left-to-die boat” incident provided a case in point and 
the coalition decided to focus on this paradigmatic incident to launch a legal case claiming 
liability for non-assistance of people in distress at sea. In support of this endeavor, together 
with the architectural practice SITU Research, we produced a seventy-three-page report 
which, by mobilizing a wide range of digital mapping and modeling technologies and by 
relying on an unorthodox assemblage of human and non-human testimony, reconstructed 
and mapped as accurately as possible what happened to this vessel.57 Having outlined 
above the conditions that have turned the sea into a deadly liquid, we are now in a position 
to explain how we brought the sea to bear witness to the conditions that have led it to kill.
 As should now be clear from our discussion of the scopic system assembled 
to monitor maritime traffic, it is no longer true that the sea entirely resists being written. 
The maritime space is constantly registered in optical and thermal cameras, sea-, air-, and 
land-borne radars, vessel tracking technologies, and satellites that turn certain physical 
conditions into digital data according to specific sets of protocols, determining the 
conditions of visibility of certain events, objects, or people. While many of these remote 
sensing means remain in the exclusive hands of states and their agencies, certain types of 
automated vessel tracking data (“automatic identification system,” or AIS), meteorological 
data, as well as satellite imagery are available to the public. Moreover, parallel civilian 
networks also supplement these sensors: migrants frequently film their crossings with mobile 
phones, while networks of ship- and plane-spotters post photographs of naval activities, 
thereby contributing to documenting, transmitting and archiving events at sea.58  
 Through this vast process of imaging and dataization of the maritime space, the sea 
has become a vast and extended sensorium, a sort of digital archive that can be interrogated 
and cross-examined as a witness. This is precisely what we did in order to produce our 
report: in the absence of external witnesses, we corroborated survivors’ testimonies by 
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Still from a video depicting the digital navigation system onboard one of the trawlers of the 
Mazara del Vallo fleet (Southern Sicily). The map shows the various trawling paths and the 
presence of obstacles (rocks and shipwrecks) around the island of Lampedusa, Mazara del 
Vallo, July 2012. Video: Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani. 
interrogating the very environment where these events took place, the sea itself.
 But in a context in which remote sensing is so central to the process of policing 
illegalized migration and the success of clandestine border crossings hinges on not being 
detected, how to avoid becoming complicit with the governmental attempt to manage 
migration by shedding light on the transgression of borders? The use of these technologies 
and other sources of information demanded that we position ourselves strategically 
in relation to their usual application by border agencies. While the latter perform an 
ambiguous act of unveiling practices of clandestine migration while concealing the violent 
political and legal exclusion that produce this clandestine status in the first place, as well 
as the numerous legal violations the migration regime generates in turn, our approach 
needed to invert this strategy.59 We aimed not to replicate the technological eye of 
policing, but to exercise a “disobedient gaze,” one which refuses to disclose clandestine 
migration but seeks to unveil instead the violence of the border regime. Applying this 
strategy to the “left-to-die boat” investigation entailed redirecting the light shed by the 
surveillance apparatus away from clandestine migrants and towards the act of 
policing the sea, and spatializing the practices of different actors so as to reinscribe 
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Schematic overview of marine observational strategies (drawing by Irene Gooch). Source: Silke 
Kröger and Robin J. Law, “Biosensors for Marine Applications,” Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 
vol. 20, no. 10 (April 2005): 1905. 
responsibility within the space of the unbundled sovereignty at sea.60
 As described in more detail earlier in this volume, we mobilized different 
remote sensing technologies to reconstruct the events and determine the degree of 
involvement of different parties in several ways.61 In this endeavor, it has been crucial to 
couple a robust understanding of the technical characteristics of these technologies with 
a thorough analysis of the web of economic, scientific and political relations in which 
they are embedded and which shape both their potential usage and the epistemological 
frame they impose on the world.62 Only then was it possible to insert ourselves within 
the complex chain of production that their use involves, in order to locate specific nodes 
from where information could be extracted and repurposed towards the spatio-temporal 
reconstruction of the events and actors involved in the incident.
 First, we reconstructed the trajectory of the migrants’ boat up to its point of drift, 
by georeferencing the position of the migrants’ distress calls using a satellite phone and by 
reconstructing the boat’s speed and route based on detailed interviews with the survivors. 
But to determine the entire trajectory of the boat during its fourteen days of deadly drift, 
we also had to bring the winds and the currents to bear witness. An oceanographer 
reconstructed a model of the drifting vessel by analyzing data on winds and currents 
collected by buoys in the Sicily Channel.63 In this way, we determined that the migrants’ 
vessel remained for the majority of its trajectory within the NATO maritime surveillance 
area.
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With the migrants’ boat’s trajectory determined and the knowledge of its distress by other 
vessels operating in the area at the time established by tracing the different distress signals 
that were sent out, the key question became “which ships were in its vicinity and failed to 
respond?” To answer this, we relied on synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite imagery, 
which, analyzed by a remote sensing specialist, allowed us to establish the presence of a 
number of ships in the immediate vicinity of the migrants’ boat. However, the relatively 
low resolution of the images (1 pixel represents 50 m2 or 75 m2) did not allow us to locate 
migrants’ boats (usually small wooden and plastic vessels), but only the bigger military 
and commercial vessels. The resolution of the image thus became a highly political issue, 
in that it determined the frontier between the visible and invisible, and separated the 
practice of a disobedient gaze from an uncritical act of revealing that risks complicity. 
In the process, not only were we using against the grain a technology usually used for 
surveillance, but repurposing the very images surveillance produces: the availability of 
those SAR images was probably due in the first place to the military operations in Libya, 
since there was a sharp increase in the number of available images coinciding with the 
days of the conflict.
 In a third strategic use of surveillance technology, this time in line with the claim 
made by the coalition of NGOs, we turned the knowledge generated through surveillance 
means into evidence of responsibility. While the military had deployed exceptional means 
of surveillance to impose the embargo and detect any threat at sea, the knowledge they 
generated also made them aware of the distress of migrants—and therefore responsible for 
assisting them. After collecting several official statements by military officials celebrating 
the technical capability of the means of surveillance deployed in the Mediterranean, we 
carried out a detailed analysis of the range and precision of their sensing technologies in 
order to prove that the naval assets in operation at the time of the “left-to-die boat” case 
had the means to detect the drifting migrants’ boat. While, as Bruno Latour reminds us, 
with the capacity to sense events should come “sensitivity”—the capacity to respond to 
them—the lack of response despite the knowledge generated by surveillance became in 
this case evidence of guilt.64 In this way, we attempted to close the gap which the politics 
of irresponsibility tries to leave open, between the possibility of sensing a certain event (of 
distress) and the obligation to intervene.
 While many questions remain open in terms of the identities of the different actors 
involved—crucially the two helicopters and the military ship that entered into direct 
contact with the migrants have not yet been identified—we were able to provide a precise 
reconstruction and to point to the implication and failures of several actors, including 
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Analysis of April 4, 2011 Radarsat-1 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) by Rossana Padeletti, GIS 
and Remote Sensing specialist. Addendum to the Report by Forensic Oceanography on the “left-
to-die boat,” June 2013. By overlaying the drift model of the “left-to-die boat” and underlining in 
yellow the position of the vessel on the day the image was taken, Padeletti’s analysis demonstrated 
that there were 78 probable vessels of over 50 m surrounding the drifting migrants’ vessel at the 
time in which, according to the survivors’ testimony, they encountered a military vessel. There 
may have been further vessels present in the Eastern side of the image, which however presented 
too much scattering and background noise to detect possible targets. 
NATO and the coalition of national militaries, the Italian and Maltese Coast Guards, the 
fishing and commercial vessels present in the area and Gaddafi’s troops. Because of this 
multiplicity of actors and the partial and overlapping juridical regimes with which the 
migrants’ boat intersected, the question of who should be held responsible for the systemic 
violence perpetrated onto the passengers emerged. While the fragmentation of juridical 
regimes at sea so often allows for the evasion of responsibility, in this case it was mobilized 
strategically towards the multiplication of potentially liable actors and of forums where they 
could be judged and debated. Not only were several legal complaints lodged in the courts 
of France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium against unknown parties for nonassistance to people 
in danger at sea—each time generating press attention—but several other initiatives took 
place in parallel: two documentary investigations were screened on television as well as at 
festivals;65 a report was published by the Council of Europe, leading to several hearings with 
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representatives from different states; and finally, the case was presented in many venues 
to activist and academic audiences across Europe and North Africa. Each of the forums, 
with their respective languages, rules and technologies, became a space of judgment. But 
even managing to address the responsibility of the numerous actors involved would have 
been insufficient if the multifarious policies of exclusion, militarization, and evasion of 
responsibility that shaped the incident in the first place were not themselves put on trial. 
While demanding accountability for all the deaths of migrants at the maritime frontier 
of the EU has not been possible so far within the forum of the law and its particular 
language, the different actors investigating this case had to go beyond the realm of the law 
and venture into that of politics. In this way, they denounced the violence of the denial of 
freedom of movement and the deaths it generates, which no amount of compliance with 
legal obligations will be able to undo.
CONCLUSION: LIQUID LANDS
Following the meandering route of the history of the governance of the seas and its 
intersection with the policing of the mobility of people was necessary to understand the 
conditions under which the sea was made to kill, and which have led to the structural 
violations of the rights of migrants. Only through a “hand-to-hand” struggle with this 
network of geographic, aesthetic, technological, legal, social, and political conditions were 
we able to reinscribe history and responsibility into a sea of impunity.
 Understood in these terms, incidents such as the “left-to-die boat” shed a new and 
crude light on contemporary forms of maritime governance and migration management. 
The image of the Mediterranean that emerges is that of an environment crisscrossed by 
“a thick fabric of complex relations, associations, and chains of actions between people, 
environments, and artifices.”66 It is the totality of this field of forces that constitutes the 
particular form of governance that operates at sea. With regard to the policing of illegalized 
migrants, we have seen that the selective expansion and retraction of sovereignty that this 
space enables has led to a form of governmentality that, although highly militarized, diverts 
and modulates movement rather than blocking it, blurs the line between humanitarian and 
policing functions, and inflicts deaths on a large scale by creating conditions of precarious 
crossing and by refraining from acting to save those caught in this liquid trap.
 The fantasy of a soft governance that would make the movement of people and 
things simultaneously orderly and productive is a mere chimera, since there will always be 
subjects that refuse this order, and attempts to tame them can only lead to deaths and legal 
violations on a structural basis. The deaths at the maritime frontiers of the EU are, in 
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I-Map, 2012. Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) map of Irregular and Mixed 
Migration Flows. Source: International Centre for Migration Policy Development (IC- MPD). 
The I-Map project developed by the ICMPD in collaboration with states and international 
organizations is an interactive cartography that traces out migration routes, initially on the 
borders of Europe, but increasingly expanding to the wider region of Africa, The Middle East, 
and Eurasia. I-Map was designed to develop a new sensibility among border and migration 
management agencies to the complexities of migrant routes across a wide geographic area.67
this sense, the necropolitical ghost that haunts this vision of neoliberal governmentality.68 
They will continue unabated as long as the current migration regime and governance of 
the seas prevails. While European publics seem to have come to accept these deaths as a 
necessary lesser evil, documenting violations, filing multiple contentious legal cases, and 
supporting the mobilization of the relatives of the migrants lost at sea in their struggles 
to shed light on what has happened to their family members, may be seen as inserting 
“grains of sand” into the migration regime’s mechanisms, blocking them temporarily, 
forcing them to change slightly.69 In this process, an important shift has occurred: states, 
the military, and other actors at sea no longer have the monopoly over watching. Civil 
society demands that the increased capacity to monitor the sea be accompanied by an 
increased level of responsibility, and uses the same sensing technologies against the grain 
to follow the (in)actions of the different actors who operate in the frontier space of the sea, 
reinscribing responsibility where they attempt to evade it. But if the change that maybe 
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affected through such a practice is only in its infancy, we already observe the tendency of 
maritime-like forms of governance being exported onto land, in a striking inversion of 
Carl Schmitt’s land—sea binary. While, as we saw, the challenge for Schmitt was to impose 
onto the ocean a form of power characteristic of the land, the sea has become a laboratory 
in which new forms of contemporary governance have been devised and experimented 
with and are now being brought to bear on the land. As at sea, border functions on the 
land have been decoupled from the limits of the territorial border and are becoming 
increasingly dispersed and mobile, able to follow ever-shifting routes. From the notion 
of “Routes Management,” which revolves around the charting of clandestine migrants’ 
routes, to that of “Integrated Border Management,” which seeks to control migration 
“before, at and after the border,” practices of border control seem to have increasingly 
done away with fixed territorial thinking.70 In a move that echoes the practice of maritime 
governance over several centuries, their focus seems instead to be on following the routes 
of migrants as they move across different geographical and political spaces. Rather than 
the “solidification of the sea”—a term that was suggested by the collective Multiplicity to 
describe the progressive invasion of the terrestrial logics of bordering into the sea—what 
we observe here is rather a “liquefaction of the land.”71
 There would be another, more desirable way to draw inspiration from the sea, one 
that is still out of sight of the hegemonic public view and policy circles. Viewing the world 
“from the sea,” from the perspective of the constant movement of the liquid element that 
defies the appropriation of the ocean, one might be able to perceive the unruly freedom 
of human mobility which, far from being an anomaly, has been a constant throughout 
history, and that persists in excess of the multifarious practices that try to tame it.
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While from 1988 to March 2012 there were 13,417 documented deaths at the maritime 
borders of the EU, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), 2011 was the “deadliest year” in the Mediterranean since the 
organization began recording migration statistics for the region in 2006.1 The UNHCR 
estimated that over 1,500 migrants died while fleeing Libya during the initial stages of the 
conflict that began in February 2011 while a wave of uprisings, known collectively as the 
Arab Spring, enveloped the Middle East.
  Most notable is the fact that the loss of lives at sea in 2011 occurred in the context of 
the heightened concentration of Coalition/NATO assets in the area enforcing a maritime 
embargo of Libya during the conflict. This places these deaths squarely in the most highly 
surveyed area of sea in the entire world.
 Among the many vessels that attempted the journey, one particular boat was 
covered extensively in the international press. Coming to be known as the “left-to-die 
boat,” the case involved the journey of 72 sub-Saharan migrants fleeing Tripoli by boat 
on the morning of March 27, 2011. After traveling about halfway to the Italian island 
of Lampedusa during their first day at sea, the vessel ran out of fuel and subsequently 
drifted for the following 14 days without food or water until landing back on the Libyan 
coast. Only 9 of the passengers ultimately survived. In interviews following the event the 
survivors recounted a series of interactions they had with others while at sea. This included 
a military aircraft that flew over them, a distress call they placed via satellite telephone, 
two encounters with a military helicopter and fishing vessels, and an encounter with a 
military ship. Moreover, the Italian and Maltese Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers, 
as well as NATO forces present in the area, were informed of the distress of the boat and 
of its location, and had the technical and logistical ability to assist it. Despite the legal 
obligation to render assistance to people in distress at sea enshrined in several international 
conventions,2 none of these actors intervened in a way that could have averted the tragic 
fate of the people on the boat. An NGO coalition was formed to demand accountability 
for these deaths that were allowed to occur despite heightened surveillance and for those 




In an effort to understand the events that led to this tragedy, we undertook a report, with 
the aim of providing a spatio-temporal reconstruction of the 15-day period between 
March 27, 2011, when the vessel left the Port of Tripoli, and April 10, 2011, when it washed 
ashore at Ziltan.4 In this effort, we attempted to account both for the events as they were 
experienced by the passengers and for the conduct of the actors who were either in direct 
contact with the passengers, in the vicinity of their vessel, or informed of their distress. 
Because of the complex legal structure of the Mediterranean and the high number of 
actors operating there during the time of the event in question, creating a coherent spatial 
picture was critical for determining the degree of involvement of each of these parties.
 A comprehensive textual analysis was undertaken in concert with the production 
of a series of visualizations, diagrams, and figures. This work was an exercise in the 
culling of disparate data (geospatial, meteorological, testimonial, military, and other) that 
was ultimately recombined in an effort to assemble a coherent spatial narrative of the 
chain of events. The diversity of sources and types of data required the report to draw 
upon the methodologies and expertise of a variety of disciplines, among them remote 
sensing, cinematography, architecture, and oceanography. The result is a synthetic spatial 
product that leverages increasing technological interoperability and cross-disciplinary 
collaboration to help address what was a humanitarian and legal failure.
GATHERING THE INITIAL DATA
Before focusing specifically on the “left-to-die boat” case, extensive fieldwork was 
conducted in Southern Italy to build an overall understanding of the conditions in which 
maritime crossings were taking place during this period. 68 migrants who had recently 
crossed the Mediterranean were interviewed, as well as representatives from the Coast 
Guard, immigration lawyers, and fishermen operating in the Sicily Channel.
 Following the decision of the NGO coalition to focus its demand for accountability 
on the “left-to-die boat” case, specific information on the case was initially acquired through 
interviews—conducted by ourselves, human rights workers, and journalists—with the 
survivors and other actors involved. In the interview we conducted with Dan Haile Gebre, 
one of the survivors, we tried to depart from formats of witnessing normally associated 
with humanitarian organizations. Rather than placing the emphasis on the subjective 
dimension of his experience, the interview methods we employed aimed at assisting 
him in the recollection of any precise element that could support the reconstruction of 
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the spatio-temporal coordinates of the event and the identification of the various vessels 
and aircrafts that the migrants encountered while at sea. To this end, we gave Dan Haile 
Gebre a notepad and a felt-tip pen, asking him to draw or write any element that he made 
reference to. We also asked for temporal points of reference throughout the narrative of 
the events, inquiring for instance whether events had taken place at dawn, in the daytime, 
at sunset, or at night, and trying to reconstruct the passage of time by making informed 
guesses about fuel consumption, average speed of the boat, and so forth. Finally, we 
inquired about information such as the color and shape of the encountered vessels and 
aircraft, the presence of flags or writings on their hull, and the language spoken by the 
crew. To support this process, we presented him with pictures of maritime assets that were 
present in the area at the time of the events.
 Elements of information were also extracted from news reports, as well as publicly 
available official documents concerning the incident. In this respect, an important source 
of information was the parallel and complementary inquiry led by Dutch Senator Tineke 
Strik on behalf of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which resulted in 
a report entitled “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: who is responsible?”5
DETERMINING THE TRAJECTORY OF THE MIGRANTS’ VESSEL
Based on these initial elements, we began writing the report with the aim of determining 
the location of the migrants’ vessel throughout its 15 day drift at sea. To this effect, all 
available information was geolocated. This information was collected in a variety of 
formats and translated into latitude/longitude and mapped in relation to a timeline of 
events. This initial set of points, which documented key information such as encounters 
with other vessels and point of drift, provided the foundation for all subsequent analyses. 
With this main timeline in place, strategies were explored to model the trajectory of the 
boat from the time it ran out of fuel until when it finally landed back on shore, south of 
Tripoli. A conversation was begun with oceanographer Richard Limeburner of Woods 
Hole Oceanographic Institute, who had experience modeling the trajectory of objects in 
the open ocean based on subsurface currents and wind. Working with Limeburner, a drift 
model was created that takes known components of the case (i.e. the point of drift, and 
the dimensions and type of vessel used by migrants) and projects its trajectory over the 
ensuing 14 days of drift based on available meteorological data. (See figures 16 -18 of the 
“Left-To-Die Boat” Report). The drift model allowed us to offer a complete map of the 
vessel’s trajectory (with a certain stated margin of error) during the period in question.
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Images taken from the video of the interview with survivor Daniel Haile Gebre conducted by 
Lorenzo Pezzani and Charles Heller, Milan, December 22, 2011.
(Top). In this still, Haile Gebre writes the text that he saw on the side of the helicopter. It reads 
“RESCUE ARMY,” although he is not sure about the presence of the first word (“RESCUE”).
(Middle). Image of the United Kingdom Army Air Corps West- land Lynx, which Haile Gebre 
recognizes as having a similar color to the helicopter that hovered over the migrants’ boat.
(Bottom). When shown the image of the Italian ship Borsini, he recognizes it as having the same 
shape as that of the ship the migrants encountered.
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ASSESSING MILITARY PRESENCE
The analysis then turned to assessing where and when military assets might have 
encountered or been in the vicinity of the vessel. The first task in this respect was to 
determine the overall maritime laydown as well as its spatial distribution. In order to do 
that, we analyzed several documents, among which were various maps released by the 
US Department of Defense at news briefings showing the maritime laydown of 38 naval 
assets, press releases and declarations from NATO officials, and the online journals of some 
of the ships involved in the military operations. (See ANNEX B.3 of “Left-To-Die Boat” 
Report). Whilst these sources provided an overall image of a congested stretch of sea, they 
did not help in determining the location of specific assets at certain times and locations. 
To achieve a more precise picture, we resorted to satellite imagery. (See figures 21- 26 of 
the “Left-To-Die Boat” Report). Optical satellite imagery, however, was not useful for this 
application due to its very limited coverage of the open ocean. Alternative remote sensing 
technologies were explored and, ultimately, a satellite-mounted sensor known as Synthetic 
Aperture Radar (SAR) was utilized. Not only is SAR uniquely suited for vessel detection, 
it also generally offers a greater degree of coverage over the open ocean—particularly the 
Mediterranean—than optical satellite imagery, since it is used by states for monitoring 
diverse activities, including those of terrorists and irregular migration towards Southern 
Europe. For the purposes of this case, we inverted this more common application of the 
technology in order to try to monitor the activities of naval assets in the region. A survey 
was conducted to assess public avail- ability of SAR data for the period and locations in 
question and a series of relevant SAR images were acquired for analysis. Each tile provides 
documentation of vessel locations in the form of radar returns. When viewed in relation 
to the drift model, the SAR tiles provide a snapshot of maritime activity in the vicinity of 
the drifting vessel at specific moments in its trajectory.
 While it is not possible to identify the specific identity of a ship based on SAR 
return alone, it is possible to use this data to draw some conclusions regarding the size of 
the ship. Since the resolution of available SAR data can only trace ships of 50 meters and 
above, what ultimately emerges from this analysis—circumstantial though it may be—is 
an image of a number of very large vessels in and around the area where the migrants’ 
boat was adrift. In the context of the maritime embargo that was in full effect at the time, 
and given that normal commercial shipping activity was limited, the question ultimately 
becomes: are the radar returns showing the position of military assets? And if so, to whom 
do they belong?
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In response to these questions, informed guesses regarding the specific identity of the ships 
and helicopters encountered by the migrants were made on the basis of the description 
provided by the survivors and information gathered from official military documents and 
statements, news reports, and plane-and ship-spotters websites. (see Figures 11-15 and 
19-20 of the “Left-To-Die Boat” Report).
ASSESSING AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE MIGRANTS’ DISTRESS
Finally, the analysis turned to assessing, firstly, which actors were initially informed of the 
migrants’ distress and, secondly, whether military actors operating in the NATO maritime 
surveillance area might have had the technical capability to detect the migrants’ boat while 
it was drifting. This evaluation was important because international law obliges seafarers 
to rescue anyone in distress at sea if informed of their distress.6
 In order to answer the first question, we reconstructed the way in which information 
about the distress of this boat circulated among the various actors involved. Firstly, we 
conducted an interview with Father Mussie Zerai, the Eritrean priest who had initially 
received the migrants’ distress call and had subsequently called several state agencies. 
We also consulted official statements (made at press conferences and in correspondence 
between Senator Tineke Strik and government officials) referring to the communication 
between parties concerning the migrants in distress. Finally, we inquired into the technical 
characteristics of the maritime distress signals that were sent out by the Italian Maritime 
Rescue Coordination Center and mapped the extension of their reach. (see Figures 8-10 
of the “Left-To-Die Boat” Report). Based on these elements, we determined that all vessels 
in the area—including naval assets under NATO command and those operating under 
their respective national commands—should have been informed of the position of the 
migrants’ vessel and the distress of its passengers.
 With regard to the second question, we analyzed a vast quantity of military 
statements and documents relating to the remote sensing capacity in the area. In addition 
to this, we attempted to determine the spatial extent of the remote sensing technologies 
onboard specific assets and found that aerial and naval assets deployed at the time had 
previously been capable of detecting small rubber boats similar to that used by the migrants. 
(see Figures 29-32 of the “Left-To-Die Boat” Report). This allowed us to conclude that the 
states participating in the military intervention had the means to detect the drifting boat, 
and that detecting such an unidentified vessel with anomalous behavior was precisely the 
task assigned to numerous assets monitoring the embargo area.
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Our report sought to combine qualitative and quantitative information into a single 
analysis so as to provide as comprehensive a picture of the chain of events as possible and 
to assess the degree of involvement of all parties implicated. To this end, testimony and 
geospatial data were combined and cross-referenced, official documents and news reports 
analyzed, and the technical characteristics of maritime distress signals and satellite phone 
calls examined. The result is a synthetic approach to the model of the human rights report 
that draws upon varied and disparate forms of evidence.
 While we were unable to determine the identity of the helicopter and vessel that 
entered into direct contact with the migrants in distress, we were able to confirm that the 
account of the survivors was highly accurate. We established with certainty that the Italian 
and Maltese Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers, as well as NATO command, were 
informed of the location and distress of the migrants, and that there were several naval 
assets in the vicinity of the boat that had the ability to detect and assist it. None of these 
actors intervened in a way that could have averted the 63 deaths.
LEGAL CHALLENGES
The ultimate destination of this report has been a series of legal cases regarding non-
assistance to people in distress at sea led by a coalition of NGOs. While it has been 
deemed impossible to bring NATO to court for this case due to its status of immunity, 
the legal strategy has been to file different cases in the national courts of each of the 
states participating in the military operations against Libya. A complaint “against persons 
unknown” was initially lodged before the section of the Paris High Court (Tribunal de 
grande instance) specializing in military cases in April 2012, after a similar procedure in 
Italy. After the decision of the Paris Prosecutor’s Office to take no action on this initial 
complaint, the survivors and NGOs initiated proceedings in France and Spain as civil 
parties. Both these actions have been dismissed and appeals have been filed against these 
decisions. A complaint was further launched in Belgium. Finally, Freedom of Information 
requests have been submitted in Canada, the US, and the UK. Should these states fail to 
investigate the incident comprehensively, the case may be brought to the European Court 
of Human Rights.
OUTCOMES
In line with the practice of strategic litigation, beyond the goal of holding accountable 
those individuals, states, and organizations that failed to assist the people onboard the 
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“left-to-die boat,” the broader aim of the investigation has been to draw greater attention 
to the systemic and long-standing issue of migrant deaths at sea in the Mediterranean 
and the impunity that surrounds the perpetrators of human rights violations committed 
against migrants at sea.
 Whereas the report has been primarily directed towards the legal sphere, its 
contents have circulated in a much wider arena. In particular, Human Rights Watch has 
sent several information requests to the actors involved in this case based on the evidence 
we generated, and some of our visualizations were included in the above-mentioned report 
by the Dutch Senator Tineke Strik. The analysis, maps, and images generated by our report 
have also been widely circulated within the international press.
 Finally, an additional outcome of the report has been the attempt by ourselves 
and others to replicate the use of such innovative methodologies in relation to other 
incidents involving the deaths of migrants and the violation of their rights at sea. In 
particular, Forensic Oceanography has collaborated with a network of NGOs to create 
“WatchTheMed,” an online and participatory mapping platform, so as to enable the 




1  UNHCR, “Mediterranean takes record as most deadly 4 stretch of water for 
refugees and migrants in 2011,” Briefing Notes, January 31, 2012, http://www.unhcr 
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A''E1 A Full report 9y Richard Lime9urner, Senior Research Specialist in the epartment of Physical 
Oceanography at 0oods Hole Oceanographic "nstitution.
A''E1   Primary ocuments
. istress call launched 9y Rome &RCC on  &arch  at  G&- on the "nmarsat-C Gateway 
Enhanced Group Call EGC.
. Hydrolant 'avigational 0arning sent out through the 0orld 0ide 'avigational 0arning Service 
00'0S on  &arch  at  G&-.
. Slide presented 9y /ice Admiral Gortney at a US epartment of efence news 9riefing on  &arch 
. -he image shows the “US  Coalition &aritime Forces Laydown”.
. 'A-O &aritime Surveillance Area &SA 9etween  &arch and  April  in the frame of the arms 
em9argo Operation Unified Protector.
. Slide presented 9y /ice Admiral Gortney at a US epartment of efence news 9riefing on  
&arch . -he image shows cruise missiles striBes launched from ships and su9marines in the 
&editerranean on  and  &arch .
. Letter sent on  'ovem9er  9y Gil Arias, eputy EOecutive irector of the European Agency for the 
&anagement of Operational Cooperation at the EOternal orders of the &em9er States of the European 
Union FRO'-E1, in reply to a reHuest of information sent 9y a colation of 'GOs.
. Email sent 9y &athias Eichenlau9 Press and &edia Section d &edia Operation Centre, 'A-O 
HeadHuarters on  Octo9er , in response to an email 9y journalist Emiliano os. -his document 
was Huoted in Emiliano os and Paul 'icolhs documentary “&are deserto” produced for the RS" and 
9roadcasted on  #anuary .
. Letter from 'A-O to the Council of Europe dated  Fe9ruary .
A''E1 C "nterviews with the survivors note that the interviews with the migrants are listed here only as 
references 9ut will not 9e made pu9lic
C. "nterview with an Haile Ge9re, conducted 9y Lorenzo Pezzani and filmed 9y Charles Heller in &ilan on 
 ecem9er .
C. "nterview with A9u $urBe $e9ato conducted on the phone 9y Emiliano os in April , while the former 
was still in Li9ya.
C. Second interview with A9u $urBe $e9ato conducted 9y Emiliano os on  and  August  in San 
Giorgio Lucano &-, "taly.
C. "nterview with Elias &ohammed $adi conducted 9y &ichel -ou9iana, mem9er of RE&H eOecutive 
committee and honorary president of the League for Human Rights France, on  Septem9er  at 
the U'HRC camp in Choucha, -unisia.
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C. "nterview with Elias &ohammed $adi conducted 9y Emiliano os 9etween  and  August at the 
U'HRC camp in Choucha, -unisia.
C. "nterview with Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegergis conducted 9y Emiliano os on  and  Octo9er  in 
LarviB, 'orway.
C. "nterview with ilal 2acou9 "dris conducted 9y Emiliano os on  Septem9er  in Rome.
C. "nterview with &ohammd Ahmed "9rhaim conducted 9y Emiliano os 9etween  and  August at the 
U'HRC camp in Choucha, -unisia.
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ARC"  Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale "taliana
C"RR  Coordination et "nitiatives pour RVfugiVs et Etrangers
ECG  Enhanced Group Call
F"H  "nternational Federation for Human Rights  FVdVration internationale des ligues des droits de   
  lhHomme
G&SS Glo9al &aritime istress Safety System
G"S-"  Groupe dhinformation et de soutien des immigrVs
HR0  Human Rights 0atch
"O&  "nternational Organization for &igration
LH  Ligue des droits de lhhomme  Human Rights League
&RCC  &aritime Rescue Coordination Centre
&SA  &aritime Surveillance Area
&SF  &Vdecins Sans FrontiWres  octors 0ithout orders
'A-O  'orth Atlantic -reaty Organization
PACE  Parliamentary Assem9ly of the Council of Europe
RE&H RVseau Euro-&VditerranVen des roits de lhHomme  Euro-&editerranean Human Rights   
  'etworB
R&P  Recognised &aritime Picture
RS"  Radiotelevisione svizzera
SAR  Synthetic Aperture Radar
SAR zone Search and Rescue zone
SOLAS  "nternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
U'CLOS United 'ations Convention on the Law of the Sea
U'HCR Office of the United 'ations High Commissioner for Refugees
U'SC  United 'ations Security Council
U'SCR  United 'ations Security Council Resolution
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111 *o;t the ;thor9 
-his report was prepared in the frameworB of “Forensic Oceanography”, a project 9y Charles Heller and Lorenzo 
Pezzani, 9oth Ph students at the Centre for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London, as well 
as 9y S"-U Studio, a creative practice in rooBlyn, 'ew 2orB committed to spatial investigations in a wide range 
of scales and media. Additional technical eOpertise was provided 9y Richard Lime9urner, Senior Research 
Specialist in the epartment of Physical Oceanography at 0oods Hole Oceanographic "nstitution and Lawrence 
FoO """, Hum9oldt State University Emeritus Professor of Remote Sensing, who was recruited for us 9y G"Scorps. 
Ayesha Ahmed, a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Centre for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London 
also contri9uted to the research informing this report.
-his study forms part of the European Research Council project “Forensic Architecture” at the Centre for 
Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London, U$.
SITU STUDIO
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-he “Forensic Oceanography” team is thanBful to the numerous individuals who have shared their eOperiences, 
ideas, and eOpertise to inform and help shape the content of this report. 
Our gratitude goes in the first instance to the survivors of the “left-to-die 9oat” case ilal 2acou9 "dris, 
Ghirma Halefom, an Haile Ge9re, A9u $urBe $e9ato, &ohammd Ahmed "9rhaim, $a99adi Asfao adi, Elias 
&ohammed $adi, Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegergis and &ariam &oussa #amal. 0e further thanB all of the 
migrants who shared their eOperiences with us during our field research in "taly.
-he support and colla9oration of Emiliano os, journalist and Father &ussie 3erai were essential. 
-he colla9oration and eOchange with the mem9ers of the 'GOs spearheading the demand for accounta9ility into 
the case G"S-", &igreurop, C"RR, F"H, LH and HR0 provided for important dialogue. -he feed9acB provided 
9y Senator -ineBe StriB, "sild Heurtin and 'eil Falzon of the Committee on &igration, Refugees  isplaced 
Persons, Parliamentary Assem9ly of the Council of Europe PACE was also much appreciated. 0e are grateful 
for the support provided towards our field research in "taly 9y representatives of the organisations ARC" and &SF 
as well as Giorgio Scia9ica .
0e further address our grateful acBnowledgements to Susan 0olfin9arger and #onathan raBe at the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science AAAS Lars romley at U'"-ARhs Operational Satellite Applications 
Program U'OSA- Shoreh Elhami G"SCorps Philippe Leymarie of the &onde iplomatiHue.
0e also would liBe to thanB Richard Lime9urner of 0oods Hole Oceanographic "nstitution for his tremendous 
worB on the drift model as well as Lawrence FoO """, Professor Emeritus of Remote Sensing at Hum9oldt State 
University and consultant recruited through G"Scorps, for his eOtremely helpful analysis of Synthetic Aperture 
Radar data. 0e thanB Ayesha Hameed, who has contri9uted in a fundamental way to the research informing this 
report, for her comments and support. Finally, a thanB you to /eronica Popescu, &ichael Saltarella and ABshay 
&ehra for all of their hard worB and dedication on this project. 
0e received important feed9acB in response to several presentations of this project within academic seminars. 
0e thanB all participants for their fruitful Huestions and comments. 
-he European Research Council project “Forensic Architecture” at the Centre for Research Architecture, 
Goldsmiths, University of London has supported every stage of this project. "n particular, Susan Schuppli, 
-homas $eenan, and Eyal 0eizman provided invalua9le guidance.
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-he U'HCR defined  as the “deadliest year” in the &editerranean since the organisation 9egan recording 
these statistics in , estimating that over , migrants died while fleeing Li9ya during the initial stages of 
the violent conflict. -his num9er is eOtremely high in comparison to the , deaths documented from  to 
&arch  at the maritime 9orders of the EU, and the , deaths occurred solely in the Sicily Channel during 
the same period. Furthermore, the loss of lives at sea in  occurred despite the significant naval and aerial 
presence in the area due to the military intervention in Li9ya launched 9y an international coalition of states and 
'A-O hereafter referred to as ”participating states'A-O” under the United 'ations Security Council Resolution 
. 
One particular event, reported 9y the international press, provoBed widespread pu9lic outrage. "n the case 
of what is now referred to as the “left-to-die 9oat”,  migrants fleeing -ripoli 9y 9oat on the early morning of 
&arch   ran out of fuel and were left to drift for  days until they landed 9acB on the Li9yan coast. 0ith 
no water or food on-9oard, only nine of the migrants survived. "n several interviews, these survivors recounted 
the various points of contacts they had with the eOternal world during this ordeal. -his included descri9ing the 
aircraft that flew over them, the distress call they sent out via satellite telephone and their visual sightings of a 
military helicopter which provided a few pacBets of 9iscuits and 9ottles of water and a military ship which failed to 
provide any assistance whatsoever. -he events, as recounted 9y these survivors, appeared to constitute a severe 
violation of the legal o9ligation to provide assistance to any person in distress at sea, an o9ligation sanctioned 
9y several international conventions.
"n response to this incident, several initiatives were undertaBen to shed light on these deaths and demand 
accounta9ility for them. On  &ay , Human Rights 0atch demanded that 'A-O and its mem9er countries 
conduct a full investigation of the case. On  #une , the French 'GO G"S-" sent out a pu9lic call which 
led to the formation of a coalition of 'GOs constituted primarily 9y C"RR, F"H, G"S-", LH, and &igreurop 
that sought accounta9ility for the non-assistance of migrants at sea during and in the aftermath of Ara9 Spring 
in general and in the case of the “left-to-die 9oat” in particular. -he Committee on &igration, Refugees and 
Population of the Parliamentary Assem9ly of the Council of Europe PACE appointed the utch Senator -ineBe 
StriB to prepare an in-depth report on the deaths that have occurred in the &editerranean in . Her report 
titled “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le” was presented in russels on  &arch .
-he enclosed report focuses on the spatial analysis of data surrounding the case of the “left-to-die 9oat” and 
includes a series of visualizations that supplement the written reports produced 9y the organisations and 
institutions mentioned a9ove. "n order to generate our analysis and report we employed a wide range of digital 
 U'HCR, “&editerranean taBes record as most deadly stretch of water for refugees and migrants in ”, riefing 'otes,  #anuary . URL httpwww.unhcr.orgfef.html 
All we9sites accessed in &arch . 
 See the data gathered 9y Fortress Europe, one of the leading sources concerning the documentation of migrantsh deaths within and at the 9order of the EU 
httpfortresseurope.9logspot.compfortezza-europa.html 
 0e discuss our use of the terminology “participating states'A-O” in section ...
 Several newspapers reported the news of the deaths and various journalists conducted specific investigations on this 
case. Among these we would liBe to mention Stefano Li9erti, “La 'A-O dovhera”, "l &anifesto,  April . URL 
httpwww.ilmanifesto.itapprofondimentiimmigrazionenaufragio--morti-risposta-natoimmigrazionenaufragio--morti Emiliano os, “*uellhelicottero che non W 
tornato a salvarci”, RS",  April . URL httpinfo.rsi.chhomechannelsinformazioneinfo6on6line--Lelicottero-che-non--tornato-a- , #acB ShenBer, 
“Aircraft carrier left us to die, say migrants”,  &ay . URL httpwww.guardian.co.uBworldmaynato-ship-li9yan-migrants. &oreover, Emiliano os and Paul 
'icol conducted the in-depth documentary investigation titled “&are eserto” on 9ehalf of the Swiss national television which was 9roadcasted on  #anuary . 
URLhttpla.rsi.chfalowelcome.cfmidgidsidc.
 -o our Bnowledge this particular designation was first introduced 9y the utch Senator -ineBe StriB in several communications relating to her inHuiry. See for eOample Parliamentary 
Assem9ly of the Council of Europe, “g-he left-to-die 9oath there should 9e no gaps in the division of responsi9ility for search and rescue”,  ecem9er . URL httpassem9ly.
coe.intASP'ews&anagerE&6'ews&anager/iew.asp"L
 Human Rights 0atch, “'A-O "nvestigate Fatal oat Episode”,  &ay . URL www.hrw.orgnewsnato-investigate-fatal-9oat-episode
 G"S-", “Le Gisti va dVposer plainte contre lhO-A', lhUnion europVenne et les pays de la coalition en opVration en Li9ye”,  #une . URLhttpwww.gisti.orgspip.phparticle.
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mapping and modelling technologies, which included the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar SAR imagery, 
geospatial mapping, and drift modelling. "n com9ining these technologies to elucidate the chain of events of this 
particular case we also suggest new ways in which these emergent technologies could 9e applied to the field of 
international law and human rights advocacy.
"n collecting, analysing, and synthesising data, reports, and human testimonies related to the case, this report 
reconstructs as accurately as possi9le what happened to this vessel. "t ultimately aims to answer the following 
Huestion what happened to the “left-to-die 9oat” and who was involved in the events leading to the deaths of  
migrants 0hile some differences 9etween oral testimonies occur on specific points and while there are some 
instances in which more data would have 9een desira9le, overall a coherent picture emerges from the synthesis 
of these disparate 9odies of information, a picture that demonstrates how the migrants were lead to a slow death 
despite repeated contacts with several parties. An a99reviated summary of Bey events is outlined as follows fig. 

!" "n the early morning of  &arch , 9etween  and  G&-, a 3odiac-style ru99er 9oat, 
approOimately  metres in length with  people on-9oard left the port neOt to the &edina Old City of 
-ripoli, Li9ya and headed in the direction of the island of Lampedusa in Southern "taly. 
!" At  G&- an aircraft flew over the migrantsh vessel notifying the "talian &aritime Rescue and 
Coordination Centre &RCC of its sighting. -his fly-over generated a photograph and provided the eOact 
location of the vessel fig. A.
!" At the end of the afternoon of the same day, with little fuel and almost no food and water left and no sight 
of land, the migrants called Father 3erai, an Eritrean priest 9ased in Rome, 9y satellite phone to asB for 
help. After receiving the call, Father 3erai informed of the situation Rome &RCC, which after o9taining 
the GPS location of the 9oat at  G&- from the satellite provider fig. , informed their &altese 
counterparts, 'A-Ohs 'aples &aritime H* and sent out a distress signal to all ships in the area.
!" -wo to three hours after having placed the call and while the migrantsh vessel continued sailing in the 
direction of Lampedusa, it was flown over 9y a military helicopter, which 9ore the writing “AR&2” or 
“RESCUE AR&2” on its side. espite the migrantsh clearly identifia9le gestures for help - waving, holding 
the 9a9ies on 9oard at arms length, showing the empty tanBs of petrol -, the helicopter hovered over the 
9oat 9ut left without providing any immediate assistance. -he migrants now 9elieved they would soon 
9e saved, and the “captain” therefore threw over9oard the satellite phone, which had failing 9atteries 
and could have 9een used as evidence of his involvement in a smuggling networB. -he last GPS position 
registered 9y the satellite provider at  G&- fig. C thus corresponds in all liBelihood to the 
location of the first helicopter encounter.
!" After - hours of waiting, floating in approOimately the same position and with no sign of rescue, the 
migrants decided to asB for help from some fishermen, whose 9oats they noticed around them. -hey 
attempted to reach those 9oats 9ut the fishermen too left without providing any assistance. Shortly 
afterwards, and still in approOimately the same position, the same helicopter came 9acB. -his time, 
military personnel on-9oard threw down  9ottles of water and a few pacBets of 9iscuits 9efore leaving 
again. 
 -hroughout this report times will 9e indicated in Greenwich &ean -ime G&-, the convention predominantly used 9y Rome &RCC in its official communications. However when 
Huoting migrant testimonies local times are used, which at the time of events for 9oth "taly and Li9ya was G&- plus two hours. For the purposes of this report G&- is considered as 
eHuivalent to Coordinated Universal -ime or U-C.
142Chapter Four, Report
 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE INTRODUCTION

!" Following this second helicopter visit, the migrants were shown the direction of Lampedusa 9y yet 
another fishing vessel. etween  and  G&- on  &arch , they resumed movement in 
this direction for - hours until they ran out of fuel in the early morning fig. . From this moment, until 
they landed 9acB on the Li9yan coast, their 9oat drifted on the open sea without any use of its motor. 
!" After several days of drifting, 9etween the rd and th of April, the migrants encountered a military ship 
with one or two helicopters on its decB fig. E. -he migrants got as close as  metres to this ship in 
their plea for help. -he crew on the decB of the military ship did not provide assistance and only tooB 
photos 9efore departing.
!" -he migrantsh vessel continued to drift until it eventually landed 9acB on the coast of Li9ya, near 3litan, 
on April th. "n total, the 9oat drifted for  days. Of the  people who departed from -ripoli only  
survived. One woman died shortly after arriving ashore, while the others were caught and imprisoned 9y 
Li9yan soldiers. uring the imprisonment another person died. "n total nine people survived the journey 
and  perished.
0hile the involvement of all actors in these dramatic events will 9e discussed in greater detail in chapter 
three, the reconstruction of the events will clearly demonstrate that the actions or inactions of different actors 
contri9uted to the death of  migrants. At least one patrol aircraft, one helicopter, two fishing 9oats, and a 
military ship, whose identities still remain unBnown, allegedly had direct contact with the 9oat. &oreover, the 
"talian and &altese &RCC as well as participating states'A-O forces present in the area were informed of the 
distress of the 9oat and of its location, and had the technical and logistical a9ility to assist it. espite all this, 
none of these actors intervened in a way that could have averted the tragic fate of the people on the 9oat. 
"n her report “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le” Senator -ineBe StriB has spoBen of a 
“catalogue of failures” that led to the loss of “many opportunities for saving the lives of the persons on 9oard the 
9oat.” Furthermore, these deaths occurred in an area that was under strict surveillance 9y 'A-O to enforce an 
arms em9argo as provided for 9y U'SCR  and where at least  naval assets were present at some time 
during the event. 0hile this report focuses on the “left-to-die 9oat” case specifically, it should 9e recalled once 
again that this is only one amongst the many incidents that have caused the death of more than , deaths at 
the maritime 9orders of the EU over the last  years.
	
 $   (
-his report is the first outcome of an investigation that 9egan in the summer of . etween  to  August 
, we conducted a fact-finding mission in Southern "taly to inHuire into the reasons that had caused several 
hundred deaths in the &editerranean. uring this mission we conducted nineteen interviews in the provinces 
of ari, rindisi and Palermo with  migrants who had recently crossed the &editerranean. "n Lampedusa we 
had meetings with officials of the "talian Coast Guard and order Police Guardia di Finanza, &SF personnel, 
"O& and U'HCR representatives. "n Palermo we interviewed Fulvio /assallo Paleologo, a lawyer who specialises 
in migration law. -hese interviews were fundamental to 9uilding an overall understanding of the more general 
conditions in which the crossings were taBing place.
Among the several cases of deaths and claims of non-assistance around which we gathered video testimonials 
or of which we heard, we decided to concentrate on the “left-to-die 9oat” case. uring our investigation into 
 Senator -ineBe StriB, European Parliamentary Assem9ly, Committee on &igration, Refugees and isplaced Persons, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”,  
&arch , p.. URL httpassem9ly.coe.intCommitteeocs6mig6RP-.E'.pdf
 See the data gathered 9y Fortress Europe, one of the leading sources concerning the documentation of migrantsh deaths within and at the 9order of the EU 
httpfortresseurope.9logspot.compfortezza-europa.html 
143Chapter Four, Report
 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE INTRODUCTION

this case, which tooB place 9etween Octo9er  and &arch , we were a9le to gather several pieces of 
evidence as well as analyse a significant amount of material availa9le in the pu9lic domain. -hese elements form 
the 9asis of the in-depth visual and spatial analysis that constitutes the core of this report and which has allowed 
us to create a synthetic picture 9uilt upon corro9orating and cross-referencing disparate sources and pieces of 
information. ecause of the compleO legal structure of the &editerranean and the numerous actors operating 
there during the time of the event in Huestion, creating a coherent spatial picture 9ased upon the data gathered 
is critical to determining the degree of involvement of each of these parties.
"n esta9lishing our findings, we relied primarily and whenever possi9le on information gathered first-hand or 
whose sources could 9e directly verified. 0hen, in certain cases, this has not 9een possi9le, it has 9een clearly 
indicated.
For the purposes of this report, we rely primarily on the following types of sources and information-gathering 
methods
. "nterviews with witnesses and other persons having relevant information, conducted either 9y us or 9y 
Swiss journalist Emiliano os, with whom we have had direct contact.
-hroughout this document, we will refer to specific points within witnessesh interviews 9y Huoting the 
initials of the interviewee followed 9y a num9er that refers to line of the interview where the Huote is taBen 
from. "f more than one interview is availa9le, the second interview is differentiated from the first one 9y 
inserting the num9er “” after the initials.
"t should 9e noted at the outset that while the testimonies of the survivors are occasionally divergent in 
terms of the timing of events they are remarBa9ly consistent in terms of the seHuence of events. -he 
temporal or factual inconsistencies d as minimal as they are d must 9e understood in relation to the 
volatile conteOt of the war that they were fleeing, the lacB of spatio-temporal references in the open sea 
and the cumulative effects of having endured over two weeBs with little to no food or fresh water and of 
drinBing sea water.
-hroughout the reconstruction, we will use survivor an Haile Ge9rehs narrative as a main point of 
reference while corro9orating or adding to his testimony 9y comparing it to interviews conducted with 
other survivors - A9u $urBe $e9ato, Elias &ohammed $adi, Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegergis, ilal 
2acou9 "dris, and &ohamed Ahmed "9rahim. 
an Haile Ge9rehs testimony is foregrounded as the interview we conducted with him is, to our 
Bnowledge, one of the most detailed that has 9een carried out with any of the survivors. Secondly, 
unliBe several of the other survivors interviewed, he can speaB English proficiently. -his allowed him to 
communicate with us very precisely and clearly. -hirdly, his version of the events is the most consistent 
with the other sources of data descri9ed 9elow. 
A9u $urBe $e9ato recalls the same chain of events with a sometimes striBing degree of precision. 
Some of the events that an Haile Ge9re remem9ers, such as the encounter with several fishermenhs 
9oats and the second visit of the helicopter, are not mentioned 9y A9u $urBe $e9ato, who nevertheless 
 Senator -ineBe StriB refers to the following effects of drinBing seawater eOcessive thirst, increased heart rate, headaches, dizziness, and nausea, vomiting, 
9rain damage, impairment of judgement, and dehydration. See &arine"nsight, “ Effects of rinBing Salt 0ater of the Sea”,  Septem9er . URL 
httpwww.marineinsight.commiscmarine-safety-effectsofdrinBingsaltwater-of-the-sea 
 HG interview conducted 9y Lorenzo Pezzani and filmed 9y Charles Heller in &ilan on  ecem9er . Father 3erai was present and provided additional translation from -igrine.
 A$$ interview conducted on the phone 9y Emiliano os in April . Audio recording availa9le at 
httpinfo.rsi.chhomechannelsinformazioneinfo6on6line--Lelicottero-che-non--tornato-a- A$$ translation in "talian of the transcript of another, more detailed interview 
conducted 9y Emiliano os towards his documentary “&are deserto”, RS",  #anuary . URLhttpla.rsi.chfalowelcome.cfmidgidsidc
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did not contradict them. 
Elias &ohammed $adi mentions the same events recalled 9y an Haile Ge9re the encounter with 
several fishermenhs 9oats, with a helicopter and a military ship, 9ut the seHuence of events is not always 
consistent 9etween their two narratives. 
Finally, the testimonies of Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegerBis, ilal 2acou9 "dris and &ohamed Ahmed 
"9rahim, which we could analyse only in the form of written and translated transcripts, have 9een used as 
references to corro9orate or disprove some specific points, 9ut have not 9een the o9ject of as detailed 
an analysis as the other testimonies. 
Another important interview we conducted was with Father 3erai, who received the migrantsh first distress 
call via satellite phone. He also provided us with the eOact teOt and dispatch time of an S&S that he had 
sent to the satellite phone of the migrants on the  &arch .
. Geo-referenced locations logged 9y Rome &RCC.
. A drift model figs. , ,  which simulates the path of the migranths vessel over the  day period in 
which it was floating without any use of its motor. Richard Lime9urner, Senior Research Specialist in the 
epartment of Physical Oceanography at 0oods Hole Oceanographic "nstitution, created a model that 
tracBs the path of the vessel on the 9asis of ocean current data and wind data. A detailed account of how 
this has 9een produced is provided in Lime9urnerhs full report anneO A.
. Commercially availa9le Synthetic Aperture Radar SAR data for our time and area of interest was 
analysed 9y Lawrence FoO """, Hum9oldt State University Emeritus Professor of Remote Sensing figs.  
to . A detailed account of this analysis is provided in figs.  and .
. Official communications among different actors involved in this case 'A-O, FronteO and the &inistries 
of efence of "taly, France, and Spain and several investigating 9odies or individuals among which, in 
particular, are Senator -ineBe StriB and journalist Emiliano os.
. -he review of pu9licly availa9le information from military sources, statements 9y the participating states
'A-O concerning the  military operations in Li9ya and official statements 9y other actors involved 
such as the "talian Coast Guard and media reports.
. -he evidence collected 9y Senator -ineBe StriB towards the report “Lives lost in the &editerranean 
Sea who is responsi9le” on 9ehalf of the Committee on &igration, Refugees and Population of the 
Parliamentary Assem9ly of the Council of Europe PACE.
-he synthesis of these various forms of information has allowed us to 9uild a compelling picture of the events 
surrounding this case. "n order to reconstruct certain specific moments for which definitive evidence was lacBing, 
we have formulated informed hypotheses 9y cross-referencing different sources of data. -hese hypotheses are 
clearly indicated as such. As soon as further inHuiry taBes place and the Bey actors involved in the case release 
 E&$ interview conducted 9y &ichel -ou9iana, mem9er of RE&H eOecutive committee and honorary president of the League for Human Rights France on  Septem9er  at 
the U'HRC camp in Choucha, -unisia E&$ translation in "talian of the transcript of an interview conducted 9y Emiliano os towards his documentary “&are deserto”, i9id.
 F0-, 2" and &A" translations in "talian of the transcripts of interviews conducted 9y Emiliano os towards his documentary “&are deserto”, i9id.
 "nterview conducted and filmed 9y Charles Heller in Geneva on  'ovem9er .
 As reported in an article that appeared in the newspaper “La Repu99lica”, Father 3erai initially indicated the morning of the  &arch  as the time when he received the 
distress call from the “left-to-die 9oat” Carlo onini, “Sessanta profughi alla deriva lasciati morire da navi 'A-O. Lh Alleanza replica tutto falso”, La Repu99lica,  &ay . URL 
httprassegna.governo.ittesto.aspd. However, Father 3erai later amended his initial version of the facts following a review of his phone 9ill, which confirmed that he 
was first called 9y the migrants of the vessel in Huestion on the afternoon of the th. "t should 9e noted that during the time of events Father 3erai received several calls, freHuently 
within a single day, either 9y migrants who were in distress at sea or 9y relatives of people who went missing in the &editerranean.
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the relevant data, the pertinent sections of this report will 9e updated. -his is particularly the case in su9-chapter 
., in which disclosure of information 9y participating states'A-O forces is reHuired to prove or disprove the 
reconstruction of facts that we have compiled.
	 
		 “$ #$ (R  $ $RRA 
-he phenomenon of migrants dying at sea in their attempt to reach the shores of the EU is not new. Since the 
9eginning of the s, we have simultaneously witnessed the consolidation of freedom of movement within the 
EU for its citizens and increasing restrictions on the entry of non-European migrants. As a result, migrants have 
resorted to clandestine means to enter EU territory. One freHuent strategy involves em9arBing on unseaworthy 
vessels to cross the &editerranean. EU policies that aim to contain and control these movements have thus far 
failed to stop clandestine migration across the &editerranean. Rather they have resulted in the splintering of 
migrantsh routes throughout the &editerranean 9asin and led to increasingly dangerous points of passage. -he 
independent 9log Fortress Europe, which has 9ecome one of the most authoritative sources covering the death 
of migrants within and at the 9orders of the EU, documented that from  to &arch , , deaths at sea 
have occurred, and , in the Sicily Channel only. -heir estimate is 9ased primarily on news reports and thus 
there are certainly many more deaths that have gone unreported.
-he dramatic geopolitical changes that swept across 'orth Africa in  nonetheless marBed an important 
9reaB in migration patterns 9oth within 'orth Africa and 9etween 'orth Africa and the EU and have led to an 
unprecedented num9er of migrantsh deaths in the &editerranean. -he collapse of the -unisian and Li9yan 
regimes, which had until that moment contained the migration of their nationals and non-nationals on 9ehalf of 
the EU, provoBed a temporary crisis in migration patterns in 'orth Africa, an increase in the num9er of migrants 
attempting to cross the &editerranean to Europe and an increase in the num9er of migrants losing their lives in 
this attempt.
		 $;n191)
"n -unisia the revolutionary process sparBed 9y the immolation of &ohamed ouazizi on  ecem9er  led 
to the collapse of the en Ali regime on  #anuary . A temporary power vacuum ensued. 0ith the regime 
no longer controlling the emigration of its citizens, a significant num9er of people seized the opportunity to cross 
the &editerranean to the small "talian island of Lampedusa. etween  and  Fe9ruary  five thousand 
migrants arrived in Lampedusa. y the 9eginning of April, , had arrived. -he num9er of arrivals led to a 
diplomatic crisis at the EU level since different states disagreed as to who should 9e responsi9le for managing 
these new arrivals. However, these diminished rapidly following the agreement signed on  April  9etween 
the "talian and -unisian authorities allowing for the repatriation of new arrivals and 9y the end of #une the total 
num9er of -unisian arrivals in "taly had reached approOimately ,. y the end of , , -unisians 
had reached "taly  and Fortress Europe had counted  deaths amongst the migrants departing from -unisia. 
 Concerning these 9roader developments, see the synthesis provided 9y &igreurop, “Atlas des migrants en Europe d GVographie critiHue des politiHues migratoires”, Armand Colin 
Paris, .
 Hein de Haas, “&editerranean migration futures Patterns, drivers and scenarios,” in Glo9al Environmental Change, forthcoming. URL 
www.9is.gov.uBforesightour-worBprojectspu9lished-projectsglo9al-migrationreports-pu9lications 
 See httpfortresseurope.9logspot.compfortezza-europa.html 
 A9derazaB el Haj 3eBri, “La dimension sociopolitiHue actuelle de la migration en -unisie”, CAR"& Analytic and Synthetic 'otes ,  #uly . URL 
httpcadmus.eui.euhandle
 &igreurop, “note de synthWse janvier-juin ”,  #une , p.. URL httpwww.migreurop.orgarticle.html 
 Ibid., p..
 Ibid.
 U'HCR, “HCR nom9re record de migrants ayant traversV la &VditerranVe en ”,  #anuary . URL  
httpwww.un.orgappsnewsFrstoryF.asp'ews"CrHCRCr 
 Al9erta -orres, “'el Canale di Sicilia almeno . morti dal ”,     ecem9er . URL  httpfortresseurope.9logspot.comnel-canale-di-sicilia.html.
-he recently formed movement ofrelatives of -unisians who have gone missing after trying to reach "taly 9y 9oat claims that the num9er of missing persons oscillates 
9etween  and . -his num9er includes people who might have died during the crossing, as well as persons who went missing after their arrival in "taly. See 
httpwww.senato.it0e9Lavori.nsfAllAFCCCACCOpenocument 
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"n Li9ya the popular revolt that 9egan on  Fe9ruary  aimed at toppling the Gaddafi regime was met with 
strong repression leading to a civil war which was officially ended on  Octo9er  9ut the effects of which 
are still felt as we write. As of  &arch , a military intervention was launched 9y an international coalition 
and 'A-O under the United 'ations Security Council Resolution  see section . for further details on this 
operation. -he conflict led to numerically important and rapid movements of civilians. 0hile some eOpatriates 
were evacuated very HuicBly 9y charter flights, many more migrant worBers fled to neigh9ouring countries. 
However, the mounting violence and the targeting of Su9-Saharan Africans 9y 9oth Gaddafi forces and the re9els 
forced them into hiding, often without food and in very precarious conditions. Furthermore for many migrants 
residing in Li9ya, no return to a country of origin was possi9le. Some arrived too late in the main cities to 9e 
a9le to 9oard the charter flights organised for the repatriation of third country nationals. Others had in fact fled 
countries such as Sudan, Somalia or Eritrea or "raH and would risB their lives if they returned. For many migrants, 
the only solution for fleeing the conflict was to attempt the crossing of the &editerranean. -hese crossings were 
first reported at the end of &arch.
y  &arch , U'HCR estimated that a total of , persons had fled Li9ya, escaping to -unisia 
,, Egypt ,, 'iger , and Algeria ,. y  Octo9er , the "O& counted a total of 
, persons who had crossed the Li9yan 9order, mainly escaping to -unisia ,, Egypt ,, 
'iger ,, Algeria ,, and Chad ,. A comparatively smaller num9er of migrants succeeded in 
crossing the &editerranean from Li9ya 9y  Octo9er, , people had arrived in "taly and , in &alta.  
&igrants maBing these crossings had at times to rely on paying smugglers and Gaddafi forces. -here were also 
widespread reports of Su9-Saharan migrants 9eing forced into 9oats 9y Gaddafi forces. Gaddafi himself had 
warned the EU on two occasions that he would cease all cooperation with European states in attempts to control 
migration should these states continue their support of the re9ellion against his regime. -he 9odies of migrants 
had thus 9ecome a form of ammunition within the international conflict. -he eOtremely precarious conditions of 
such crossings lead to a new high in the num9er of deaths. -he U'HCR defined  as the “deadliest year” 
in the &editerranean “since U'HCR started to record these statistics in ” and estimates that the num9er of 
deaths among the people fleeing Li9ya 9y water was more than ,.
Reviewing the num9er of arrivals 9oth from Li9ya and -unisia, we see that slightly more than , people 
arrived in "taly and &alta. -his num9er is far lower than the “up to . million” potential arrivals European 
politicians and the European order agency FronteO warned of at the 9eginning of the Ara9 Spring. -he 
majority of the movement of civilian populations occurred within the region itself, with close to , people 
fleeing to neigh9ouring countries.
From a humanitarian point of view, much more alarming than the amount of people arriving on the European 
 U'HCR, “U'HCR fears for the safety of refugees caught in Li9yahs violence,”  Fe9ruary . URL httpwww.unhcr.orgde.html
 U'HCR, “Some , people flee from -ripoli 9y 9oat to "taly and &alta”,  &arch . URL httpwww.unhcr.orgdff.html 
 U'HCR, “Update no  Humanitarian Situation in Li9ya and the 'eigh9ourng Countries”,  &arch . URL httpwww.unhcr.orgd9af.html 
 "O& “Response to the Li9yan Crisis”, EOternal Situation Report,  Octo9er  . URL 
httpwww.iom.intjahiawe9davsharedsharedmainsitemediadocsreports"O&-sitrep-&E'A.pdf 
 &artin Chulov and Simon -isdall, “Li9yan regime accused of eOploiting 9oat people”, -he Guardian,  &ay . URL 
httpwww.guardian.co.uBworldmayli9ya-accused-of-eOploiting-humanitarian-crisis. See also #ohn "rish, “Li9ya may 9e using migrants as weapon against EU-U'”, 
Reuters,  &ay . URL httpaf.reuters.comarticleli9ya'ewsidAFLEA2sptrue
 Ghaddafi first announced this intention to European representatives in -ripoli on  of Fe9ruary . Later he reasserted that Europe would 9e 
invaded 9y thousands of people if he were to lose power. See “Li9ya threatens to stop help on illegal EU immigration”,  Fe9uary , URL 
httpwww.eu9usiness.comnews-euli9ya-unrest.p and “$adhafi “#hen appelle T la France”, Le #ournal de imanche,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.lejdd.fr"nternationalAfriHueActualiteEOclusif-L-interview-integrale-accordee-par-&ouammar-$adhafi-au-#-.
 U'HCR, “&editerranean taBes record as most deadly stretch of water for refugees and migrants in ”. "t should 9e noted that this is an estimate 9ased just on satellite phone calls 
from 9oats in distress, and on reports from survivors, from migrants arrived on other 9oats or from relatives of the missing living in the EU. -he death toll is therefore liBely higher than 
,.
 Euronews, “"talyhs EU immigration rescue call”,  Fe9ruary . URL httpwww.euronews.netitalys-eu-immigration-rescue-call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coasts was the amount of people who lost their life during the crossing. Here, comparing the num9er of deaths 
9etween -unisian and Li9yan crossings is instructive. From the total of , deaths documented 9y Fortress 
Europe in ,  were from -unisia and , from Li9ya. "n relative terms this means that while one in  
migrants departing from -unisia lost their lives, this ratio rose to one in  for those departing Li9ya. 0hile the 
area and time of crossings were similar, the great difference 9oth in a9solute and relative terms in the num9er 
of deaths amongst migrants fleeing -unisia and Li9ya has to 9e primarily related to the organisation of the 
crossings 9y Gaddafi forces.
	 !)ttern9 o. ro991n/9
0e will not review in detail the  interviews we conducted in the summer of  with  migrants who had 
recently crossed the &editerranean from Li9ya to "taly in the "talian cities of ari, Palermo and Lampedusa. "n 
the following section, however, we will provide a 9road overview of the patterns of crossings that emerged from 
them.
&ost of the migrants we interviewed testified to the active role that Gaddafihs troops played not only in organizing 
and managing the crossing 9ut also in often forcing Su9-Saharan migrants to leave.  -he great majority 
among them did not have to pay for the trip, or paid just a small amount, and were searched 9y soldiers 9efore 
em9arBing. -his prevented them from carrying any water or food, cellular phones, or money. -he majority left 
from -ripoli &edina or #anzur port. &ost of the 9oats were wooden fishing 9oats less than  metres long 
9ut 9igger fishing vessels that could transport several hundred people were also used at times. &igrants were 
usually distri9uted on three levels of the 9oats on the top of the small pilothouse on the main decB and in 
the lower level where the engines are housed. Safety measures were almost completely non-eOistent. "n some 
instances a few life-jacBets were availa9le 9ut were not enough to supply all passengers, many of whom did not 
Bnow how to swim. &igrantsh 9oats usually moved at a speed of  or  Bnots which means that, in good weather 
conditions and when a9le to hold the shortest course, it normally tooB them 9etween  and  hours to cover 
the  nautical miles that separates -ripoli from Lampedusa. However crossings lasting two or three days were 
very common. Almost all migrants we interviewed reported having crossed several vessels at sea, ranging from 
the 9oats of other migrants, fishermen, 'A-O ships, cruise ships, and the coast guard patrols of &alta and "taly.
0hile many of the migrants we interviewed did not have any casualties on 9oard, we were also regularly told 
of deaths. -he most common causes were the suffoca tion of the migrants in engine section of the 9oat, falling 
over-9oard of migrants following a collision with another 9oat or heavy weather, and finally lacB of food and water 
if the 9oat got lost at sea for several days. 
-he general conteOt provided a9ove as well as the overall patterns of crossings that emerged from our interviews 
allowed us to have a more thorough understanding of the events in the “left-to-die 9oat” case, to which we now 
turn.
 Al9erta -orres, “'el Canale di Sicilia almeno . morti dal ”,  ecem9er . URL  httpfortresseurope.9logspot.comnel-canale-di-sicilia.html 
 Ibid.
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-he migrantsh individual life stories that lead them to em9arB upon the perilous journey cannot 9e reconstituted 
eOhaustively since the majority of the migrants perished and the interviews of the remaining survivors we have 
accessed do not necessarily mention their lives prior to departure. -he case of an Haile Ge9re however 
provides a more detailed eOample. 0hile he worBed and earned a decent living as a mechanic in a garage 
located in -ripoli, with the onset of the conflict the situation 9ecame increasingly perilous for the population as a 
whole and for Su9-Saharan migrants in particular. “-he people are divided in two, pro Gaddafi and pro enghazi 
groups. So any9ody will asB you asBed who do you support "f you say gre9elsh the person you are speaBing to 
might 9e pro Gaddafi, and if you say with gGaddafih he might 9e with the re9els. "t is very complicated, especially 
for the lacB people. -hey started Billing 9lacB people. -hey come to our homes and steal everything you have. 
-hey stole everything from my worBshop 9ecause of the green flag, mandatory if you want to find worB under 
the Gaddafi regime. 0e were afraid. -here was a lot of things if you want to taBe a taOi, the driver will asB you 
the same Huestion. "n a 9aBery 9uying 9read was not allowed for Africans. -here was no more police, so iths a 
matter of chance if something good or 9ad happens to you.” HG, -
For an Haile Ge9re as for many others, fleeing to "taly seemed to 9e the last option availa9le amidst a very 
volatile conteOt. He could not asB for the protection of the Eritrean Em9assy since he had fled his country, 9ut 
neither did he have the means to go to -unisia. “At this time only if you have a passport you can go to -unisia, 
and also you will pay a lot of money to the police, 9ut we had nothing. 4b5 -he only thing we could do is cross 
to "taly.” HG, -
 A friend of an Haile Ge9re informed him that a 9oat was a9out to leave and he was directed towards a group in 
a camp in the Gargash area of -ripoli. He told us “" found a lot of Ethiopians, many of them women and mostly 
young people.” HG, -. He further descri9es staying with the group for one night. On the second they 
had an a9orted departure, which an Haile Ge9re descri9es as follows “-he second night we started to travel. 
0hile we were there, we were shot at 9y pro-Gaddafi soldiers, 9ecause they thought we were from the enghazi 
group. ut then they said “if you are immigrant, you want to go to "taly, come 9acB tomorrow and we will send 
you to "taly with respect”. HG, - -heir actual departure would occur the following night.


 !R$%R R  $R! 
-he vesselhs departure location is consistently identified throughout all interviews as the commercial port of 
-ripoli, near the &edina area. -he interviews conducted 9y Forensic Oceanography during the summer of  
in Southern "taly with several other migrants as well as posts on the Fortress Europe 9log confirm that this, 
together with the Sidi ilel port in #anzur were the main departure points in the -ripoli area for migrantsh vessels 
fig. .
-he survivorsh testimonies differ on the date of departure. 0hile 9eing Huite consistent on the time of the night 
when they left port midnight for HG,  three am for E&$,  and A$$, , they differ on the date itself  
&arch  according to HG, , A$$,  and &A",   &arch  according to E&$, . "t is difficult to 
understand whether the migrants, when talBing for instance of three am on  &arch , are really referring 
to the th or would rather 9e mistaBenly referring to the early morning of the th as it might very well 9e instead. 
 Fortress Europe, “Sidi ilel this is where they use to leave for Lampedusa”,  Septem9er . URL 
httpfortresseurope.9logspot.comsidi-9ilel-this-is-where-they-use-to.html, and “A video shows Gaddafihs role in the landings in Lampedusa”,  Septem9er . URL 
httpfortresseurope.9logspot.comvideo-shows-gaddafis-role-in-landings.html
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-he first a9orted departure of the previous day may 9e an additional reason for confusion.
-he timing after the departure is however very consistent 9etween the interviews. Survivors state to have 
contacted Father 3erai via satellite phone - hours after the departure HG,  A$$, . Furthermore, 
the moment and location of this call is documented 9y several pieces of evidence to have occurred 9etween 
 and  G&- on  &arch . 0orBing 9acBwards starting from the moment when the distress call 
was placed, we can then esta9lish the time and date of departure as 9etween -am Li9yan time, or - 
G&-, on  &arch .
-he 9oat on which the migrants travelled was provided 9y the Li9yan military and is descri9ed 9y an Haile 
Ge9re as a 3odiac-type plastic vessel this is confirmed 9y E&$,  eHuipped with a 2amaha motor of  
horsepower figs. , . -welve tanBs with a capacity of  litres of petrol each were provided and loaded into the 
9oat. -he migrants were told that this amount of fuel should allow them to reach Lampedusa and that the trip 
should have lasted around  hours HG, .
On the vessel there were  people including three children,  who had 9een gathered in the near9y camp and 
waiting for over  hours. Additionally a group of  people were 9rought to the point of departure in the last 
moments 9efore leaving port HG, . According to A9u $urBe $e9ato, there were seven people from 'igeria, 
siO from Ghana, five from Sudan and seven from Eritrea, all of the  others were from Ethiopia A$$, . -he 
Li9yan military that were organising the departure provided a “captain”, from Su9-Saharan Africa. His nationality 
is not defined consistently across the testimonies an Haile Ge9re 9elieves he was a francophone from 0est 
Africa H, , while A9u $urBe $e9ato A$,  and Elias &ohammed $adi E&$,  9elieve he was from 
Ghana. According to an Haile Ge9re the “captain” told the migrants on 9oard that he had already successfully 
9rought migrants to "taly in the past, so they more or less trusted him at first. He continues “ut we had no 
choice. 0e only trusted in God” HG, . -he migrants were given a GPS, a compass and a -huraya satellite 
phone HG, -.  'o food or water was provided HG, .
According to an Haile, the 9oat was much too small to carry  people and at the moment of departure they 
contested 9eing forced to travel in such a vessel HG, , 9ut finally, with little choice, they em9arBed. -he 
9oat was overloaded to such an eOtent that at first it only travelled at minimum speed, “very, very slowly” as an 
Haile testifies HG, , while the sea was calm HG, . From an Haile Ge9rehs testimony and the fact that 
the vessel carried  people we have estimated that the 9oat was slightly a9ove m in length.

 RR$ #$
At  G&- Rome &RCC received a notice from a French aircraft descri9ing a small ru99er 9oat with a9out 
 people on-9oard. "t located the position of the migrantsh vessel as follows LA- ]h ', LO'G ]h E. 
According to the testimonies collected 9y Senator -ineBe StriB, the migrants “noticed an aircraft flying high 
a9ove them”. Ghirma Halefom said “the aircraft was white, and not a helicopter 9ut rather a small patrolling 
aircraft.” Rome &RCC provided Senator -ineBe StriB with evidence corro9orating this sighting, in particular with 
a photograph of the ru99er 9oat taBen from the aircraft itself fig. .  
 “-huraya -elecommunications Company is a world-leading mo9ile satellite service provider of voice, data, maritime, rural telephony, fleet management and other telecommunication 
solutions in remote areas. Providing mo9ile satellite communications to over  countries around the world, -huraya offers a congestion-free networB that now covers most of the 
planet, encompassing Asia, Africa, Australia, the &iddle East and Europe.” URL httpwww.thuraya.coma9out
 -he AS"S 0 , a commercially availa9le ru99er 9oat of . metres in length, is descri9ed as having a floor9oard usa9le area of . sHuare metres. "ths advertised capacity, 
in accordance with the "SO  standard, is  people. However if we consider that it is possi9le to overcrowd the 9oat with  people per sHuare metre, this 9oat would have a 
capacity of  people. URL httpwww.asiscommercial9oats.comasis-commercial-worB-9oat-w9-.html
 Senator -ineBe S-R"$, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le” p. .
 Ibid.
 Ibid., p. .
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ased on the information gathered 9y Senator -ineBe StriB, we can reasona9ly conclude that this event did 
occur as descri9ed. -he event is mentioned 9y the testimony of at least one survivor moreover Senator -ineBe 
StriB presented one of the survivors with the photograph taBen 9y the aircraft and the 9oat it documents was 
identified as the one pertinent to the case and finally the time and location of the identification are consistent 
with the esta9lished trajectory of the 9oat. 

 #$R## 
an Haile Ge9re and A9u $urBe $e9ato say that after approOimately - hours at sea they called Father 3erai 
9ecause they were a9out to run out of fuel HG,  A$$, . an Haile Ge9re recounts the following “" 
looBed at the GPS and it seemed we were travelling in the right direction 9ut not very fast. At the time we called 
Father &ussie 43erai5 we had not even covered half the distance.” HG, -. -he 9oat seems thus to have 
moved at a speed of slightly less than  Bnots covering . nautical miles in around  hours. Considering that 
according to an Haile Ge9re the 9oat was moving at slow speed HG, , this is consistent with the average 
speed of - Bnots of vessels loaded with migrants that the "talian CG provided us. 
According to the survivors E&$, - A$$, - and to Father 3erai, there were several calls 
eOchanged, first 9etween the migrants and Father 3erai, then 9etween the migrants and Rome &RCC. Several 
calls were necessary 9ecause the driver was not a9le to read the 9oaths GPS instrument and could not provide 
the eOact GPS coordinates of the 9oat. A$$, . -he connection was made more difficult 9y failing 9atteries 
HG,  and  A$$,  E&$, .
Rome &RCC confirmed to Senator -ineBe StriB that they logged and recorded Father 3eraihs call on the  
&arch  at  G&-. Father 3erai has provided us with the S&S he sent the migrants the same day at 
 G&- in order to eOplain them how to read the GPS “Go to display menu gps maenager actual solution 
selected put my phon num9er send”. -his attempt at eOplanation proved unsuccessful. -huraya, the satellite 
phone company, was contacted 9y Rome &RCC at  G&-. "t provided the location of the satellite device at 
 G&- at LA- ]h.” ', LO'G ] h.” E. -his location effectively corresponds approOimately to “half 
the distance” 9etween -ripoli and Lampedusa, as was o9served 9y an Haile Ge9re HG, .
Rome &RCC sent out several distress signals which we will discuss in detail in su9-chapter .. see also figs. 
, ,, the first 9eing an Enhanced Group Call EGC 9roadcast to all ships transiting in the Sicily Channel at 
 G&- via the "nmarsat C system. -he message with the priority code “"S-RESS” warned of the presence 
of a “9oat with a9out  passengers, pro9a9ly in difficulty. All ships transiting in the area are reHuested to Beep 
a sharp looBout and reporting any sighting urgently at &RCC Rome” fig. . "t also directly informed specific 
parties such as &alta and 'A-O headHuarters allied command in 'aples.

 R#$  !$R  %$R
Following Father 3eraihs advice to continue on their way 9ecause Rome &RCC had 9een warned and 9elieving 
that rescue would soon come HG, , they continued for “a few hours” HG, , until a helicopter arrived. 
-his account is confirmed, with small differences, 9y A9u $urBe $e9ato who says that after the distress call 
they waited for a short time and then they proceeded for two more hours 9efore encountering the helicopter 
A$$, -. All testimonies converge in descri9ing the helicopter as “military” and, some of the survivors 
 Ibid., p. .
 "nterview conducted 9y Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani with Sottotenente di /ascello Salvatore Porcaro, Lampedusa, Capitaneria di porto,  August .
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p..
 -he GPS signal is accurate to  meters and there should 9e no doppler effect. See httpwww.universatitalia.itpdfSER/"3"SA-ELL"-AR"-AllegatiSat'etworB
rochurerochure-huraya6en.pdf
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add, eHuipped with a machine gun HG,  E&$,  A$$,  A$$,  and  &A",  F0-, -. 
Furthermore, witnesses state that it 9ore the English writing “AR&2” A$$,  2", - or “RESCUE AR&2” 
HG,  F0-, . -he helicopter ca9in door was open and at least  people wearing military uniforms could 
9e seen HG,  E&$,  A$$,  F0-,  &A", . 
an Haile Ge9re descri9es the helicopterhs approach as follows “"t circled around us - times and came closer. 
"t was maBing a lot of wind, and we almost lost our 9alance” HG, . A9u $urBe $e9ato adds “-he helicopter 
came very close to us down, we showed him our 9a9ies, we showed them we finished oil, we tell them gPlease 
help ush” A$$, . He continues “" thinB " saw them taBe our picture. " thinB " saw a photo camera or something 
liBe that” A$$, . -his description is consistent with protocols for vessel identification missions in the frame of 
'A-Ohs monitoring of the em9argo over Li9ya during Operation Unified Protector.
espite the fact that the helicopter clearly came very close, approOimately  meters according to A9u $urBe 
$e9ato, A$$, , and that the migrants clearly communicated signals of distress, the helicopter left without 
providing any assistance. Following that encounter, the migrants 9elieved they would 9e soon rescued A$$, 
-. an Haile eOplains “-he captain told us g-his is the rescue 0e are safeh. 0e were very happy. He told 
us we were far from "taly and we needed to leave a 9it of time for the rescue to arrive.” -he captain then threw 
GPS, satellite phone and compass into the water. He disposed of these items 9ecause he was afraid that if a 
Search and Rescue team found this on-9oard he would 9e identified as a smuggler and deported HG, -.
-huraya identified the last signal from the migrantsh satellite phone at  G&-, with the position  . ' - 
 . E, i.e.  nautical miles further in the direction of Lampedusa in relation to the earlier position provided 
9y Rome &RCC. 0e can reasona9ly assess that this timelocation was esta9lished just 9efore the satellite phone 
was thrown over9oard and is therefore very close to that of this first helicopter encounter.
0aiting for rescue, the migrants remained in place - hours HG, , E&$,  or “over  hours” A$, . 
y then, it was the middle of the night, i.e. around - G&-. -he women on the 9oat told the captain 
“0e can not wait any more, lets go HG, .” -he migrants decided to start moving again despite the little fuel 
they had left and with no communication means and with a small plastic compass attached to a 9elt HG, . 
-his compass and the stars in the sBy were their only means of orientation at this point A$$, . 

 #R  %$R
Once they resumed movement, the migrants tried to approach some fishermen whose 9oats they noticed 
around them to asB for help an mentions - vessels. an Haile Ge9re 9elieves that they were from -unisia 
and &alta HG, . 0hen the fishermen saw the migrantsh 9oat arriving though, they drew in their nets and 
sailed away swiftly, almost maBing the small migrantsh vessel capsize HG, . uring this time, the migrants 
navigated for very short stretches in random directions, i.e. without following the direction of Lampedusa 9ut 
rather moving from one 9oat to the other. 0e can therefore estimate that during this time they did not move 
considera9ly from the previously esta9lished GPS position.

 #   !$R  %$R
According to an Haile Ge9re, this encounter with the fishermen was immediately followed 9y the re-appearance 
of what appeared to 9e the same helicopter that had visited the vessel previously. -his time, the military on-9oard 
lowered down eight 9ottles of water and small pacBets 9iscuits, 9oth of which had "talian writing on them, and 
 -his practice is illustrated in a video depicting the H&CS Charlottetownhs Sea $ing helicopter on a reconnaissance mission during which the military taBe photographs of the ships 
they encounter for identification. 'atochannel.tv, “&aritime Helicopter Patrols”,  April . URL www.natochannel.tv or httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchvsj/oGOh/g 
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left again HG, , A$$, , E&$,  F0-, -. 
After the helicopter departed for a second time, the migrants encountered one more -unisian fishing 9oat E&$, 
, which gave them the direction of Lampedusa in Ara9ic. Pointing to the "slandhs direction the fisherman said 
“four hours” HG, . 0e can estimate that the entire interaction with the fishermen and the second helicopter 
visit lasted one hour, leaving us at 9etween  G&- and  G&- on  &arch  9ut in approOimately 
the same location as that of the first helicopter encounter.
Following the -unisian fishermanhs indications, the migrantsh vessel thus started to navigate again with the 
out9oard engine. -he estimate of the duration of this second phase of navigation varies 9etween four hours, as 
indicated 9y an Haile Ge9re a first time HG,  and A9u $urBe $e9ato A$$,  or eight to nine hours, 
as indicated 9y an Haile Ge9re some time later in the same interview HG,  and 9y Filmon 0eldemichail 
-eBlegergis F0-, . -wo witnesses specify that when they started navigating again, they were moving at 
“greatest possi9le speed” HG,  F0-,  and they consumed all the remaining  litres of fuel HG, , 
a detail that is confirmed 9y A9u $urBe $e9ato A$$,  while Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegergis mentions  
litres instead F0-, . All accounts agree that the vessel Bept sailing until the following morning HG, , i.e. 
until there was daylight again. "n that area the sun rose at around  G&- on  &arch, with daylight pro9a9ly 
already visi9le at around  G&-. ased on this information, we have concluded that the motor run out of fuel 
and the vessel 9egan to drift 9etween  and  G&- on  &arch . -wo timeposition possi9ilities for 
the start of the drift were calculated 9y Richard Lime9urner of 0oods Hole Oceanographic "nstitution 9ased on 
the information a9ove 
!" -he vessel started to drift at  G&- after  hours navigation . nm north northwest of last GPS 
position.
!" -he vessel started to drift at  G&- after  hours navigation . nm north northwest of last GPS 
position.

 R$  $ #$ R
From the morning of the  &arch , the migrants found themselves drifting in high waves for which their 
small, overcrowded ru99er 9oat was unfit A$$, . an Haile Ge9re recalls that “the sea was very darB with 
too much waves and wind. 0e lost our direction. From then on and for several days we donht Bnow anything” 
HG, -. 
As part of this report a drift model has 9een created to simulate the trajectory of the vessel as it travelled from the 
morning of the th until eventually landing ashore in 3iltan on  April   figs. ,,.
Left without food or water, the migrants 9egan drinBing sea-water as well as their own urine miOed with 
toothpaste HG, . According to an Haile, after - days of this weather people started to die HG, -
. According to A9u $urBe, the num9er of people dying increased daily. First two, then four, then five or siO 
people died everyday A$$, -.
0hile drifting the migrants sighted the lights of 9oats in the distance during the night. “uring the night we would 
see the lights of other 9ig 9oats in the distance, we could not see them 9ut the reflection of their lights looBed liBe 
a city in the distance” HG, . "n the attempt to come closer to these vessels four people in the 9oat started 
paddling with their hands 9ut the effort was unsuccessful HG, .
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After - days of drifting in 9ad weather HG,  the migrantsh vessel encountered a military ship. an Haile 
Ge9re descri9es its approach in the following way “At first the ship was very far. &ay9e  metres. -hey then 
circled around us, three times, until they came very close,  meters. 0e are watching them, they are watching 
us. 0e are showing them the dead 9odies. 0e dranB water from the sea to show them we were thirsty. -he 
people on the 9oat tooB pictures, nothing else.” HG, - see also E&$, . espite coming within 
viewing distance and despite the migrantsh evident signs of distress, the military vessel left without providing 
them with any assistance.
-he survivorhs testimonies provide indications concerning the military vessel in Huestion. 0hile we will discuss 
these elements of identification further in su9-chapter .., suffice to mention here that according to three 
witnesses the military-ship 9ore two helicopters HG,  E&$,  F0-, , while &ohamed Ahmed "9rahim 
recalls just one helicopter &A", . uring our interview with an Haile Ge9re, we showed him images of 
different naval assets. 0hen presented with a photograph of the orsini ship of the "talian Fleet fig.  he 
recognized the typology of the ship 9eing very similar to the one they encountered and stated “2es eOactly liBe 
this, liBe two steps” HG, . He also recalled elements leading him to 9elieve the vessel was French HG, 
.
an Haile 9elieves this encounter occurred “- days” after the 9eginning of the drift in the storm HG, , 
which would lead us to  April . However he told us that approOimately siO days after the encounter they 
landed 9acB in Li9ya HG, . 0hile we Bnow that the migrants landed in 3litan on  April , counting 
9acBwards leads us to  April . -his date is corro9orated 9y Elias who 9elieves the encounter occurred 
nine days after em9arBing on their journey E&$, . Considering the a9ove, we 9elieve it is most liBely that the 
encounter with the military ship occurred 9etween the rd and the th.

	 R$  $  $ (  #$
After the military ship left the migrants without assisting them, morale dropped precipitously. “0e Bnew that 
we would die little-9y-little”, says an Haile Ge9re HG, . According to him, they continued to drift for 
approOimately siO days 9efore landing in 3litan HG, . 
He states that for the last four days of drifting they could see the Li9yan coast. “0e could see 9uildings at night. 
-he driver thought this is &alta, 9ut some 'igerians on the 9oat said “no, these are the Hotels 9uilt 9y Gaddafi in 
-ripoli” HG, -. -he proOimity of the vessel to the coast during this period is confirmed 9y the drift model 
fig. .
uring the last days of drifting almost all migrants seem to have lost consciousness or were in a very 9ad 
physical state. Ultimately only  of them landed 9acB on Li9yan soil alive A$$, . -heir arrival and 
su9seHuent imprisonment is thus remem9ered in fragments. A9u $urBe $e9ato descri9ed these events as 
follows to journalist Emiliano os one day after 9eing released from prison “-he wind and the sea made us drift 
on Li9yan land, to a small village area near &israta. 0hen we reached that place we didnht Bnow it was Li9ya, we 
thought it was "taly 0hen we reached the land one girl died within the hour. -he military tooB the ten of us to a 
pharmacy, not a hospital. -hey only gave us a 9it of water and tooB us to prison in 3litan. 0e spent three days 
there. 0ithout food. One more of our 9rothers died there 9ecause lacB of food. 0hen he died they tooB us to 
Homs hospital, all of us. ut they still wouldnht give us anything and 9rought us 9acB to 3litan prison. -he neOt 
day they tooB us to a -ripoli prison, called -oyesha. 0e stayed there two days and told them we were very sicB, 
that people were going to die, “Please help us, taBe us to hospital”. ut the policemen answered “die die die”. 
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After that my 9rother Bnew an Ethiopian 9oy in -ripoli, he Bnew his num9er. Using the phone of a angladeshi 
man we called him and Father &ussie. -he man came to prison with drinBs and food. He tooB us from -oyesha 
prison yesterday. He said “" can taBe these people to my house”, they said “-aBe them”. He rented a room and 
tooB us there in two taOi cars.” A$$, -.
-he day after 9eing released from prison the nine survivors met with representatives of the Catholic Church. 
uring this meeting organised 9y Father 3erai A$$,  HG, , the survivors were interviewed and provided 
with medical assistance.
A group of survivors fled shortly after to -unisia where they have 9een residing in Choucha refugee camp since. 
-he rest attempted the crossing to "taly once again, this time with success. -hey now reside in different countries 
throughout Europe "taly, 'orway and the 'etherlands.
 For details concerning the individual trajectories of the survivors and their legal statuses at the time of writing, see Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is 
responsi9le”, p. .
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-his section attempts to answer the following Huestion who was involved and to what degree in the events 
leading to the deaths that occurred in the “left-to-die 9oat” case 0ith this o9jective in mind, we will review 
evidence that points to the involvement of different parties. 0hile the tragic effects of Gaddafihs forces facilitating 
and, in some cases, directly organising the eOodus of hundreds of migrants in unseaworthy vessels was already 
addressed in su9-chapter ., we will now focus eOclusively on the involvement of those actors who, although 
informed of the distress of the people on the “left-to-die 9oat”, might have failed to assist them. 0hereas the 
previous section looBed at the chain of events from the point of view of the migrants 9y corro9orating their 
testimony with verifia9le data, this section analyses the same events from the point of view of the former parties.
0hile we will limit ourselves to collecting and assessing the facts that will allow for a determination regarding the 
degree of involvement of different actors, the legal frameworB that sets out the o9ligations of ships and states 
to assist any person found in distress at sea provides a useful point of reference for our inHuiry. -his o9ligation 
is mainly framed 9y two essential teOts, the  United 'ations Convention on the Law of the Sea U'CLOS 
convention and the  "nternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea SOLAS convention. -hese 
provide that every state shall reHuire the master of a ship civilian or military flying its flag to provide assistance 
to seafarers if informed of their distress and if the ship does incur danger in doing so. Furthermore, coastal states 
have the o9ligation to coordinate search and rescue operations within a given area SAR zone as defined 9y 
the U'CLOS, SOLAS and SAR conventions. "n the particular conteOt of war in which the “left-to-die 9oat” case 
occurred, "nternational humanitarian law may also provide an important point of reference, in that, it o9liges 
parties to armed conflict ”to taBe all possi9le measures to search for, collect and evacuate the shipwrecBed, 
wounded and sicB, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment and to ensure their adeHuate care. -here are 
also o9ligations on parties to taBe feasi9le measures to account for persons reported missing, with respect to the 
right of families to Bnow the fate of their missing relatives, and with respect to the management of the dead and 
related issues”.
-his chapter will mainly enHuire into the implication of participating states'A-O forces involved in the  
military operations in Li9ya. Our choice of emphasis is motivated 9y the fact that the involvement of non-military 
parties has already 9een esta9lished with a sufficient degree of clarity 9y Senator -ineBe StriBhs report “Lives lost 
 "nternational &aritime Organization "&O and the Office of the United 'ations High Commissioner for Refugees U'HCR, “Rescue at sea, a guide to principles and practice as 
applied to migrants and refugees”, Septem9er . URL www.unhcr.orgd.html 
 -he  United 'ations Convention on the Law of the Sea U'CLOS Convention provides that “Every State shall reHuire the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do 
so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers 
  a to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of 9eing lost
  9 to proceed with all possi9le speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasona9ly 9e eOpected of him.” 
Art.  
 -he  "nternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea SOLAS Convention o9liges the “master of a ship at sea which is in a position to 9e a9le to provide assistance, on 
receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is 9ound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possi9le informing them or the search and rescue 
service that the ship is doing so....” Chapter /, Regulation .
 Ibid. -he  United 'ations Convention on the Law of the Sea U'CLOS Convention imposes an o9ligation on every coastal State Party to “...promote the esta9lishment, 
operation and maintenance of an adeHuate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so reHuire, 9y way of mutual 
regional arrangements co-operate with neigh9ouring States for this purpose”. Art.  
 -he  "nternational Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea SOLAS Convention reHuires State Parties “... to ensure that necessary arrangements are made for distress 
communication and coordination in their area of responsi9ility and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around its coasts. -hese arrangements shall include the esta9lishment, 
operation and maintenance of such search and rescue facilities as are deemed practica9le and necessary ...” Chapter /, Regulation 
 -he  "nternational Convention on &aritime Search and Rescue SAR Convention o9liges State Parties to “... ensure that assistance 9e provided to any person in distress at sea 
... regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found” Chapter .. and to “ 4...5 provide for their initial medical or other 
needs, and deliver them to a place of safety.” Chapter ..
 -he &ay  amendments which came into force in #uly  to the SOLAS and SAR conventions as well as Guidelines on the -reatment of Persons Rescued at Sea further 
specify their application. -he Guidelines contain the following provisions -he government responsi9le for the SAR region in which survivors were recovered is responsi9le for 
providing a place of safety or ensuring that such a place of safety is provided. para. .. A place of safety is a location where rescue operations are considered to terminate, and 
where the survivorsh safety or life is no longer threatened 9asic human needs such as food, shelter and medical needs can 9e met and transportation arrangements can 9e 
made for the survivorsh neOt or final destination. para. . 0hile an assisting ship may serve as a temporary place of safety, it should 9e relieved of this responsi9ility as soon as 
alternative arrangements can 9e made. para. .
 U'HCR, “Refugees and Asylum-SeeBers in istress at Sea - how 9est to respond”,  ecem9er . URL httpwww.unhcr.orgrefworlddocideded.html. -he document 
refers to “Articles , , ,  of the  Convention "" for the Amelioration of the Condition of 0ounded, SicB and ShipwrecBed &em9ers of Armed Forces at Sea, entered into 
force  Octo9er  Article  of the  Convention "/ relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in -ime of 0ar, entered into force  Octo9er  Articles , , , , 
 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  August  and relating to the Protection of /ictims of "nternational Armed Conflicts Protocol ", entered into force  
ecem9er  Articles ,  of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  August  and relating to the Protection of /ictims of 'on-"nternational Armed Conflicts 
Protocol "", entered into force  ecem9er .”
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in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”. -he specific focus of our report is further 9ased on two initial 
elements of evidence
. -he drift modelling figs. ,, produced towards our report, which indicates that the migrantsh 
vessel remained within 'A-Ohs &aritime Surveillance Area &SA or within the highly surveilled Li9yan 
territorial waters for the entirety of its trajectory fig. . -his area was closely patrolled to impose an 
arms em9argo on Li9ya and densely populated with a high num9er of maritime and aerial military 
assets.
. -he testimonies of the survivors, who state that they encountered naval and aerial assets that failed to 
assist them. 
espite our choice of emphasis, we will first review the involvement in the incident on the part of non-military 
parties, relying almost eOclusively on secondary sources as well as on the evidence gathered 9y Senator -ineBe 
StriB.
	  $R( !R$# & &$
		 19her4en
As we have indicated in the previous section, the passengers on 9oard the “left-to-die-9oat” claim to have 
encountered a num9er of fishing vessels in the hours that followed the distress call and the first helicopter 
encounter during the night of  and into the morning of  &arch. an Haile Ge9re mentions - 9oats, some 
of which were from -unisia and &alta HG, . -he migrantsh vessel went from one 9oat to the other asBing 
for help, 9ut none of them provided any assistance. On the contrary, they left swiftly, almost maBing the small 
migrantsh vessel capsize. One -unisian fishermen indicated the direction towards Lampedusa 9ut provided 
no other assistance. All these fishermen failed to render assistance to the migrants in any way that could have 
averted their tragic fate, thus disregarding their o9ligation to rescue vessels in distress at sea. Furthermore, 
according to the evidence analysed 9y Senator -ineBe StriB, the fishermen also failed to inform any maritime 
authorities.  0hile we are not a9le to identify the fishing vessels in Huestion, it might 9e possi9le to do so 9y 
analysing /&S data in possession of national authorities. 
However, this episode of non-assistance should 9e also understood in connection to the process 9y which 
assistance to migrants in the Sicily Channel on the part of fishing andor commercial vessels has 9een heavily 
discouraged in recent years, if not criminalized. oth in the “Cap Anamur” case in  as well as in the case 
involving two -unisian fishermen in August , shipmasters have 9een arrested and criminally charged with 
facilitating illegal immigration after having taBen on-9oard migrants in distress at sea and disem9arBing them in 
"taly. Even though in 9oth these cases the defendants have 9een acHuitted, they have nevertheless suffered 
sever economic damages, having 9een on trial for several years and having had their vessels confiscated for 
several months. &oreover, a strong disincentive for ships to comply with their o9ligation to assist has 9een the 
growing reluctance on the part of Southern European coastal states to accept responsi9ility for disem9arBing 
migrants, which has caused difficult situations of standstill for shipmasters. Since the enforcement of the u9lin 
Regulation which sets out that the first state of entry of an asylum seeBer in the EU is responsi9le for following 
his or her claim, coastal states have 9een increasingly hesitant to receive migrants rescued at sea and have 
in several occasions engaged in diplomatic rows with neigh9ouring states to esta9lish where those migrants 
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 See for eOample Statewatch, “"taly - Criminalising solidarity - Cap Anamur trial underway”, . URL 
httpwww.statewatch.orgnewsapritaly-cape-anamur.htm and Fortress Europe, “Lampedusa fishermen arrested having saved  shipwrecBed migrants”,  August . 
URL httpfortresseurope.9logspot.comlampedusa-fishermen-arrested-having.html 
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should have 9een disem9arBed. "n the already mentioned case of the “Cap Anamur” as well as in the case 
involving the -urBish cargo ship Pinar in  the ships were denied the possi9ility to disem9arB the rescued 
migrants for several days.Although these events have acted as a strong disincentive for shipmasters of fishing 
andor commercial vessels to comply with their o9ligation to assist and rescue at sea, this situation does not 
diminish the fact of non-assistance 9y the fishermen to the passengers of the “left-to-die 9oat”. 
	
 o)9t)3 #t)te9
-he responsi9ility of coastal states “to ensure arrangements for distress communication and coordination in 
their area of responsi9ility and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea around their coasts” is defined in 
several maritime conventions. "n the Sicily Channel, SAR responsi9ilities are divided 9etween "taly, &alta and 
Li9ya, while -unisia still hasnht esta9lished its SAR zone 9oundary fig. . -he delimitation of SAR zones is 
aimed at avoiding situations wherein a ship might find itself in danger and no state is designated as responsi9le 
for coordinating its rescue. However coastal statesh divergent interpretations of SAR norms have 9een used to 
evade this responsi9ility. "taly and &alta, for eOample, have an on-going and notorious dispute 9ecause they are 
signatories to different versions of the SAR convention. -his dispute is well summarized 9y -homas Gammeltoft-
Hansen and -anja E. Aal9erts “"taly has signed the  amendments to the SAR and SOLAS conventions 
that stipulate that the migrants should 9e disem9arBed on the territory of the state within whichhs SAR zone its 
vessel is identified or intercepted. &alta however, due to the size of its SAR zone, has refused to ratify these 
amendments for fears that it would impose unrealistic o9ligations to disem9arB migrants rescued 9y other states 
and private vessels. &alta conseHuently maintains the interpretation that the coordinating countryhs o9ligation 
is to disem9arB rescued persons at the nearest safe port of call. -his has led to tensions 9etween &alta and 
"taly following a series of incidents where migrants were rescued in &altahs SAR zone yet closer to the "talian 
islands Lampedusa and Pantelleria. -he result has 9een lengthy stand-off during which migrants have died, and 
a num9er of confrontations 9etween "talian and &altese naval vessels literally trying to 9locB each other from 
entering its territorial waters and disem9arB rescued migrants”. 
"n the case of the “left-to-die 9oat” 9oth "talian and &altese &RCCs were informed of the distress of the migrants. 
As discussed a9ove, Father 3erai called Rome &RCC. -hey esta9lished communication with the migrants and 
later sent out a distress signal to all ships transiting in the Sicily Channel at  G&-. According to evidence 
provided to Senator -ineBe StriB, considering that the ship would have soon entered the &altese SAR zone, 
Rome &RCC then informed &alta &RCC 9y phone. -he call was followed 9y a faO alert sent at  G&-. At 
 G&-, Rome &RCC sent a faO to 'A-O headHuarters allied command in 'aples. On  &arch at  
G&- Rome &RCC sent out to all vessels another form of alert message, a Hydrolant navigational warning. -he 
evidence provided to Senator -ineBe StriB does not indicate that Li9yan authorities were informed.  0hile we 
will discuss the precise content and geographic scope of these signals in short order, suffice it to say here that 
9oth "talian and &altese authorities were informed of the 9oats distress, 9ut given the localisation of the vessel 
at the moment of its distress signal within the Li9yan SAR zone they did not consider they had the responsi9ility 
to coordinate rescue operations. However, according to the drift model produced for our enHuiry 9y Richard 
Lime9urner 0oods Hole Oceanographic "nstitution, it appears pro9a9le that the vessel entered the &altese 
SAR zone for at least part of one day fig. , drifting in an area located  nautical miles from Lampedusa and 
 nautical miles from the "sland of &alta, and thus within the zone of conflicting responsi9ility 9etween "taly 
 C, “"taly taBes in stranded migrants”,  April . URL httpnews.99c.co.uBhiworldeurope.stm  
 U'HCR, “Rescue at Sea. A Guide to Principles and Practice as Applied to &igrants and Refugees”, Septem9er . URL 
httpwww.unhcr.orgrefworlddocid9de.html
 -homas Gammeltoft-Hansen and -anja E.Aal9erts, “Sovereignty at Sea -he law and politics of saving lives in the &are Li9erum”, ""S 0orBing Paper 
, p. -. 
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 "9id., p. .
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and &alta descri9ed a9ove.
According to the analysis provided 9y Senator -ineBe StriB, even if the vessel had remained within the Li9yan 
SAR zone, this would not completely eOempt "taly and &alta from all responsi9ility, for Li9yan SAR capacity 
was compromised 9y 'A-Ohs intervention. Li9yan Coast Guard vessels were involved in com9at and targeted 
9y participating states'A-O forces as an enemy naval asset.  0hile Senator StriB notes that the situation of 
a failing SAR zone is not foreseen in the eOisting legal frameworB, she also reminds all actors that “not 9eing 
responsi9le on the 9asis of SAR zones, doesnht relieve another state which is informed a9out an incident at sea 
of its responsi9ility to ensure the rescue operation”. 0hile Rome &RCC told Senator StriB that 9etween  and 
 &arch  the "talian authorities were engaged in incidents involving approOimate , persons with over 
, of these people assisted at sea and around , rescued from distress situations, we may also note that 
the "talian Coast Guard had the technical and logistic capa9ility to conduct a SAR operation well into Li9yan 
SAR zone. On  August , around  migrants were rescued 9y the "talian Coast Guard nm South of 
Lampedusa, hence several nautical miles south of 9oth "talian and &altese SAR zone. 
	 ronte>
As of  Fe9ruary , following the demand from the "talian &inistry of "nterior, FronteO, the European 
Agency for the &anagement of Operational Cooperation at the EOternal orders of the &em9er States of 
the European Union, deployed the “#oint Operation EP' Hermes EOtension  4b5 to assist the "talian 
authorities in managing the influO of migrants from 'orth Africa, most of whom have 9een arriving on the island 
of Lampedusa”. -he operation was descri9ed 9y FronteO as follows “All maritime assets and crews will 9e 
provided 9y the "talian authorities and will patrol a predefined area with a view to detecting and preventing 
illegitimate 9order crossings to the Pelagic "slands, Sicily and the "talian mainland. Aerial assets made availa9le 
9y other &em9er States 4"taly, France, Germany, the 'etherlands, &alta, Spain5 for enhanced 9order surveillance 
and search and rescue capa9ility will support these sea patrols. &eanwhile, second-line 9order control will 9e 
supported through the deployment of de9riefing and screening eOperts to identify migrantsh nationalities and to 
gather intelligence on people-smuggling networBs. Further support may also 9e made availa9le in the area of 
return operations.”
According to evidence provided to Senator -ineBe StriB, FronteO was directly informed 9y Rome &RCC of the 
vessel in distress. However on  'ovem9er , FronteO wrote a letter in response to a reHuest of information 
advanced 9y a group of 'GOs in which it clarified the scope and location of its mission. "n the letter, FronteO 
provided the coordinates of the “operational area” of the naval assets, which were involved in the “joint 
operations that were taBing place in Central &editerranean 9etween nd of &arch and th of April”. From 
the information provided, it emerges that the trajectory of the “left-to-die 9oat” never entered any of FronteOhs 
operational areas.
 uring the evening of  &arch, only one day after the migrantsh distress call, a U.S. 'avy P-C &aritime Patrol aircraft, a U.S. Air Force A- -hunder9olt attacB aircraft 
and the guided-missile destroyer USS arry G- engaged the Li9yan Coast Guard vessel /ittoria and two smaller crafts, which were firing indiscriminately at merchant 
vessels in the port of &israta. See #oint -asB Force Odyssey awn Pu9lic Affairs, “US 'avy P-C, USAF A- and USS arry Engage Li9yan /essels”,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.africom.milgetArticle.aspartlang
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 Francesco /iviano, “gCento corpi in mareh, nuova strage di migranti”, La Repu99lica,  August . URL 
httpwww.dirittiglo9ali.ithomecategorie-immigrati-a-rifugiati-Hcento-corpi-in-mareH-nuova-strage-di-migranti.html 
 EC Press release, “-he European Commissionhs response to the migratory flows from 'orth Africa”, &E&O,  April . URL 
httpeuropa.eurapidpressReleasesAction.doreference&E&O 
 FronteO press release, “Hermes  running”,  Fe9ruary . URL httpwww.fronteO.europa.eunewsroomnews6releasesart.html 
 Letter 9y Gil Arias, FronteO eputy EOecutive irector, to Souhayr elhassen, President of F"H Olivier Clochard, President of &igreurope StVphane &augendre, President of G"S-" 
Fred &awet, irector of C"RR Pierre -artaBowsBy, President of LH. 0ritten in 0arsaw on the th 'ovem9er .
 Ibid.
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131t)r? !)rt1e9 n<o3<e4ent
From what precedes, it appears that fishermen failed to assist the migrants in the open sea and that "taly 
and &alta, although informed of the distress of the migrants the migrantsh vessel was on the threshold of, 
if not inside, the &altese SAR zone, did not intervene to rescue them or assure that their rescue was 9eing 
coordinated. -he “left-to-die 9oat” thus remained adrift for  days within a non-operational Li9yan SAR zone. 
-his same area was however populated 9y an intensified amount of aerial and maritime assets deployed in 
support of the multi-state military operations in Li9ya. 'A-O monitored all maritime traffic as part of the maritime 
em9argo over Li9ya. Furthermore the migrantsh testimonies state that they encountered military aerial and naval 
assets that failed to assist them. All these elements point in the direction of a strong involvement on the part of 
participating states'A-O forces, which we will now investigate in detail. 

 !R$!$ #$$#$  & &$
"n the remainder of this chapter we will enHuire into participating states'A-O involvement with regard to the 
“left-to-die 9oat” case. -o this effect we will try to answer, to the 9est of our Bnowledge, the following Huestions 
. -o what eOtent were participating states'A-O naval and aerial assets present during the events in 
Huestion 0e estimate that at least  naval assets had 9een in operation off the coast of Li9ya at least 
for some time during the time of events. Several aerial assets were also deployed in the same time and 
area.
. 0ere participating states'A-O naval assets informed of the migrantsh distress 'A-O has admitted 
that its maritime command did receive a “general notice in the evening of  &arch from the "talian 
Authorities to alert them to the presence of a vessel in difficulty carrying  people.” 0e will further 
demonstrate that participating states'A-O naval assets themselves were informed of the migrantsh 
distress through two maritime distress signals that provided them with the distressed vesselsh location.
. How did participating states'A-O forces respond to the information of distress "n one of its statements 
on the events dated  Octo9er , 'A-O claims that the message its maritime command received did 
not reHuest assistance.  "n a letter sent to Senator -ineBe StriB, 'A-O has further specified that “there 
is no record of any aircraft or ship under 'A-O command having seen or made contact with the small 
9oat in Huestion”. However, 9ased upon the migrants testimonies descri9ing two encounters with 
military helicopters and 9ased upon prior practices of assistance 9y 'A-O, we will argue that a 'A-O 
or a participating statesh naval asset pro9a9ly did send out a helicopter to assess the condition of the 
migrantsh vessel and limited itself to providing them with food and water.
. Could participating states'A-O have detected the vessel as it drifted 9acB towards the Li9yan coast 
during  days  within 'A-Ohs &SA and the remaining three within the highly surveilled Li9yan 
territorial waters 0e will argue that participating states'A-Ohs sensing capa9ilities did ena9le them to 
detect the migrantsh vessel.
. id the migrantsh vessel encounter a military ship that failed to assist them Considering the survivorsh 
overall agreement on this point and the num9er of naval assets of the type recognised 9y the survivors 
present at the time in the area, we will argue that this is not only plausi9le, 9ut also pro9a9le.
y reviewing the a9ove Huestions and assessments in detail we will demonstrate a high degree of involvement 
 Email in response to journalist Emiliano os sent on the  Octo9er  9y &athias Eichenlau9 Press and &edia Section d &edia Operation Centre, 'A-O H* the content of which 
“can 9e attri9uted to &s Oana Lungescu, 'A-O spoBesperson”. -his email was Huoted in Emiliano os and Paul 'icolhs documentary “&are deserto”, produced for the Swiss Radio 
and -elevision and 9roadcasted on the th of #anuary anneO . 'ote the reference to “ people” is Huoted from the "talian Coast Guard signal sent out on the &arch th . 
-he num9er is inaccurate 9ut reflects their Bnowledge at the time. 
 Ibid.
 Letter sent on  Fe9ruary  to Senator -ineBe StriB 9y Richard Froh, eputy Assistant Secretary General, Operations irectorate, 'A-O, Huoted in Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost 
in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
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on the part of participating states'A-O command and assets that contri9uted to the death of  passengers on 
9oard the “left-to-die 9oat” and to grave psychological and physiological conseHuences for all  passengers. 

	 !)rt1+1p)t1n/ #t)te9$  )<)3 n, er1)3 99et9 !re9en+e
'A-O and states participating in the military intervention have so far not provided precise lists or locations of 
their active naval assets during the time of the events in Huestion. "n what follows, we nevertheless offer a general 
picture of the scope and density of participating states'A-Ohs maritime and aerial presence in the area and time 
of interest, 9ased on pu9licly availa9le information released 9y 'A-O command as well as 9y various national 
navies. -he accuracy of this general picture will 9e tested against Synthetic Aperture Radar imagery figs.  to 
, which will allow for an assessment of the presence of ships, 9oth military and civil, in the area.
-he international response to the Li9yan crisis was framed 9y two United 'ations Security Council Resolutions. 
0hile Resolution  adopted on  Fe9ruary  instated the arms em9argo, Resolution  adopted 
on  &arch  lead to international military deployment 9y authorizing “mem9er States that have notified 
the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in 
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to taBe all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph  of 
resolution  , to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attacB in the Li9yan Ara9 
#amahiriya” -o the effect of protecting civilians, the Resolution further decided to “esta9lish a 9an on all flights in 
the airspace of the Li9yan Ara9 #amahiriya in order to help protect civilians” and called upon “all &em9er States, 
in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order 
to ensure strict implementation of the arms em9argo esta9lished 9y paragraphs  and  of resolution  
.”
-his resolution led to an international military intervention in Li9ya involving the deployment of naval and aerial 
assets from  states. -he official names for the interventions 9y the states contri9uting most importantly to the 
military effort are Operation Harmattan 9y France Operation Ellamy 9y the United $ingdom Operation &o9ile 
for the Canadian participation and Operation Odyssey awn for the United States. 'A-Ohs role progressively 
grew as it tooB under its command the arms em9argo on  &arch, the no fly zone on  &arch and actions 
the protection of civilians from attacB or the threat of attacB on  &arch.
-he structure of command thus evolved rapidly at the 9eginning of the military operations and official statements 
remain contradictory, maBing it eOtremely difficult to determine which assets were under which command at what 
time. 
-he French &inistry of efence eOplained in its presentation of Operation Harmattan that “while the multinational 
mechanism 4dispositive5 is 9eing installed and grows more important, the command of each military asset 
falls under the command of its national joint-staff. "n France the command of assets falls under the Centre for 
Planning and Conduct of Operations CPCO, under the authority of the CE&A.” espite having 9een updated 
in Septem9er , this statement seems to refer to the period prior to 'A-Ohs increasingly important role.
 United 'ations Security Council Resolution. , adopted on  Fe9ruary , point . URL httpwww.un.orgocsscunsc6resolutions.htm
 United 'ations Security Council Resolution. , adopted on  &arch . URL httpwww.un.orgocsscunsc6resolutions.htm 
 -he "nternational "nstitute for Strategic Studies mentions  states contri9uting military assets to the operations undertaBen to enforce U' Security Council Resolution  as of  
#une . See httpwww.iiss.orgwhats-newiiss-voicesoperation-odyssey-dawn-ellamy-harmattan-mo9ile 
 'A-O Fact sheet, “Operation Unified Protector - 'A-O Arms Em9argo against Li9ya”, &arch . URL  
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf66unified-protector-arms-em9argo-factsheet.pdf  
 'A-O Fact sheet, “Operation Unified Protector - 'A-O 'o-Fly 3one over Li9ya”, &arch . URL  
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf66unified-protector-no-fly-zone.pdf  
 'A-O Fact sheet, “Operation Unified Protector - Protection of civilians and civilian populated areas“, April . URL 
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf666unified-protector-protection-civilians.pdf  
 French &inistry of efence, “LhopVration Harmattan”, last updated  Septem9er . URL httpwww.defense.gouv.fractualitesoperationsl-operation-harmattan 
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uring a press 9riefing on  &arch , 'A-O &ilitary Committee Chairman Admiral Giampaolo i Paola 
stated that “over the past weeB we have seen 'A-O gradually taBing over responsi9ility of operations in Li9ya. 
-oday we can announce that 'A-O has full responsi9ility of Operation Unified Protector d which includes the 
arms em9argo, the no-fly zone and actions to protect civilians.” He further declared that the  mem9ers of the 
Alliance had “decided that a unified chain of command under 'A-O was the 9est solution for dealing with this 
crisis from a military point of view”
However 'A-Ohs response to Senator -ineBe StriB dated  Fe9ruary  states clearly that “not all 
military ships in that part of the &editerranean were operating under 'A-O command”. Furthermore, 
during a telephone conversation we were granted on  &arch , Stanislas Gentien, Adjunct director of 
communications for the French 'avy, eOplained that the majority of French naval assets involved in the military 
effort operated under national command while one naval asset d which could shift through time - was provided to 
'A-O towards operations under its command. According to an article pu9lished in the newspaper “LhEOpresse” 
9ased on an interview with French Admiral Philippe Coindreau, the French aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle 
remained under national command 9ut upon taBeoff its aircrafts came under 'A-O command. 
Considering the compleOity and the evolving nature of the command over military assets 9y states taBing part in 
the military intervention and 'A-O, we will refer throughout this section to “participating states'A-O” assets to 
encompass all assets present at the time of events and their relative commands.
... Participating States'A-O 'aval Presence -owards Enforcement Of -he 'o-Fly 3one And For Protection 
Of Civilians
-he military operations launched to enforce U'SCR  started early on the afternoon of  &arch , 
when around  French aircrafts were deployed over Li9ya. -he presence of naval assets in the first  hours 
was pro9a9ly limited 9ut eOpanded rapidly in the following  to  hours, with the first ships 9eing joined 9y 
several others which were already on hold in the &editerranean or were deployed for the possi9le evacuation of 
foreigners trapped in Li9ya. -he national navies most heavily involved in this very early phase were the French, 
the American, the ritish, and the "talian, although other significant contri9utions from other countries cannot 9e 
eOcluded on the 9asis of the information at our disposal. -he main naval means deployed 9y those countries 
within the first  hours of com9at were
!" -wo French military ships the anti-air frigates #ean art and For9in, which started to taBe part in military 
operations on the afternoon of  &arch. -he #ean art was one of the first naval assets to reach the 
coast of Li9ya. "t received the order to head towards Li9yan waters on  &arch  and arrived of 
the coast off -ripoli on the th. "ts initial mission was to gather intelligence on the situation in Li9ya. 
-he For9in left -oulon on  &arch and arrived on the coast of enghazi on the th to join Operation 
Harmattan.
 'A-O Press 9riefing,  &arch . URL httpwww.nato.intcpsennatoliveopinions6.htm  
 Letter sent on  Fe9ruary  to Senator -ineBe StriB 9y Richard Froh, eputy Assistant Secretary General, Operations irectorate, 'A-O, Huoted in Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost 
in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. 
 Romain Rosso, “Le Charles-de-Gaulle accusV dhavoir laissV mourir  migrants”, Lh EOpress,  &ai . URL 
httpwww.leOpress.fractualitemondele-charles-de-gaulle-accuse-d-avoir-laisse-mourir--migrants6.html
 French &inistry of efence, “Li9ye point de situation opVration Harmattan n]”,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.defense.gouv.fractualitesoperationsli9ye-point-de-situation-operation-harmattan-n-  
 As it was the case, for instance, of the ritish H&S Cum9erland 
see httpwww.mod.uBefence"nternetefence'ews&ilitaryOperationsHmsCum9erlandeploys-oLi9yanCoast.htm and of the Canadian H&SC Charlottetown see 
httpwww.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.cavnr-spindeO-eng.aspid
 See the posts on the #ean arths “#ournal de 9ord” httpjd9.marine.defense.gouv.frindeO.phppostLe-`CA#ean-artCAa-au-ccur-de-la-crise-li9yenne and 
httpwww.defense.gouv.frenglishcontentviewfull 
 See the posts on the For9inhs “#ournal de 9ord” 
httpjd9.marine.defense.gouv.frindeO.phppostLe-`-For9in-a-en-Li9yeC-fer-de-lance-de-lhopVration-des-'ations-Unies. As of the arrival of the aircraft carrier the 
Charles-de-Gaulle in the zone on the  &arch , the For9in joined the carrier striBe group CSG, which was composed as well 9y tanBer &euse, destroyer upleiO, and frigate 
Aconit. 
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!" -wo US destroyers, the USS Stout and USS arry, as well as three American su9marines USS 
Providence, USS Scranton and USS Florida and another ritish one H&S -riumph, which were 
reported to have fired several -omahawB cruise missiles on  and  &arch . Other US ships 
present in the area include the USS $earsarge, USS Ponce and USS &ount 0hitney.
!" -wo ritish frigates, the H&S 0estminster and H&S Cum9erland.
!" -he "talian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Gari9aldi, which left the port of -aranto on  &arch, the destroyer 
Andrea oria and the frigate Euro. Other "talian naval assets present in the Sicily Channel were the 
auOiliary vessel Etna and patrol 9oat orsini.
!" 0hereas the initial operations to protect civilians occurred in the area south-west of enghasi, the 
enforcement of the no-fly-zone reHuired the firing of missiles all along the 0estern and Central sections 
of the Li9yan coast, from the 9order with -unisia to enghazi anneO .. Another mission assigned 
to those ships in the first days of conflict was to 9locB Li9yan gun9oats in port, preventing them from 
performing coastal patrols and the 9om9ardment of re9el-held positions ashore, as well as the use of 
participating states'A-O surveillance suites “to monitor activities along the Li9yan coast, providing 
vital intelligence for the overall mission”. 0e can therefore assume that naval assets involved in these 
operations were located along this stretch of Li9yan coast from the 9order with -unisia to enghazi.
!" -he naval presence of participating states'A-O forces grew rapidly. At a news 9riefing on  &arch, 
three days 9efore the migranths 9oat left -ripoli, /ice Admiral Gortney of the US epartment of efence 
presented a slide anneO . descri9ing the “maritime laydown, with most ships operating just to the 
north of Li9ya” mentioning  naval assets taBing part in operation at the time. According to 9oth media 
reports and press releases 9y national navies, that the naval presence in the Central &editerranean 
continued to grow in the following days. "n the period 9etween  &arch and  April it was further 
reinforced 9y ships 9elonging to the elgian, GreeB, utch and Spanish 'avies, all of which contri9uted 
at least one military ship each, and the -urBish 'avy which contri9uted at least four ships. 
!" Amongst the  ships mentioned in this document, those involved in the protection of civilian and the 
no-fly zone enforcement and those involved in the arms em9argo enforcement are not differentiated. ut 
if the num9er of ships involved in the latter num9ered 9etween  and  as is eOplained in the following 
su9chapter we can assume that those involved in the former two elements of the operations were liBely 
of a similar num9er, that is 9etween  and . 
... 'A-O 'aval Presence -owards -he Enforcement Of -he Arms Em9argo
According to our understanding, the naval assets patrolling the approaches to Li9yan territorial waters so as to 
monitor the enforcement of the em9argo operated under 'A-O command as of  &arch  in the frame of 
Operation Unified Protector. “-heir mission”, it can 9e read in a fact-sheet provided 9y 'A-O, “is to reduce the 
flow of arms, related material and mercenaries to Li9ya, as called for in U' Security Council Resolution . 
 U.S. epartment of efence, “O 'ews riefing 9y /ice Adm. Gortney on Operation Odyssey awn”,  &arch and  &arch . URL 
httpwww.defense.govtranscriptstranscript.aspOtranscriptid and httpwww.defense.govtranscriptstranscript.aspOtranscriptid 
 Ibid.
 See httpwww.navynews.co.uBnews-royal-navy-9locBade-forces-gaddafis-gun9oats-off-the-ocean.aspO  
 See httpwww.marina.difesa.itConosciamoci'otiziePagine6li9riacrisi.aspO  
 See httpwww.navynews.co.uBnews-royal-navy-9locBade-forces-gaddafis-gun9oats-off-the-ocean.aspO   
 U.S. epartment of efence, “O 'ews riefing with /ice Adm. Gortney from the Pentagon on Li9ya Operation Odyssey awn”,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.defense.govnewsdpptslides.pdf 
 Respectively, the 'S 'arcis, the frigate Limnos, the H'L&S Haarlem and the ESPS &Vndez '[Yez.
 Although the upper limit of shipsh involvement in the arms em9argo has 9een made pu9licly availa9le see 
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf666-factsheet6arms6em9argo.pdf, the lower limit hasnht. -he num9er of  ships refers in fact to Septem9er 
. &ore precise information on the num9er of ships involved in the first phases of the arms em9argo could not 9e found.
163Chapter Four, Report
 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE PARTIES INVOLVED

b 'A-O ships will use surveillance to verify the activity of shipping in the region, separating out legitimate 
commercial and private traffic from suspicious vessels that warrant closer inspection. Suspicious traffic will 
9e hailed 9y radio, and if they cannot give satisfactory information a9out their cargoes, the 'A-O ships are 
authorized to intercept them. As a last resort, the -asB Force is empowered to use force.” "n order to impose the 
em9argo, a wide zone of the Central &editerranean fig.  was turned into a “maritime surveillance area” &SA 
monitored 9y various naval assets and sophisticated surveillance systems centralised 9y 'A-Ohs HeadHuarters 
in 'aples. Ships aiming to transit through the em9argo area were reHuired to notify 'A-O of their cargo and 
destination as detailed in a 'avigation 0arning message.
-he num9er of naval assets specifically involved in monitoring the &SA fluctuated 9ut at the peaB of the arms 
em9argo mission,  naval assets were assigned to 'A-O in support of the operation. On  April , /ice 
Admiral Rinaldo /eri, Commander &aritime Command 'aples, stated “" have 9een entrusted with commanding 
the part of the operation which enforces the arms em9argo in the maritime approaches to Li9ya. b Under my 
command " currently have  ships, su9marines and surveillance aircraft. 'ine nations are contri9uting. -his 
force is destined to grow.” As of  April , eight Allies elgium, Canada, Greece, "taly, 'etherlands, Spain, 
-urBey, and United $ingdom provided  ships and su9marines to monitor and enforce the arms em9argo, 
supported 9y surveillance planes and fighter jets as reHuired. -his important naval presence was necessary 
to monitor one of the most congested waterways in Europe. y  &ay ,  ships had 9een hailed,  
9oarded and five ships turned away. y  Septem9er , a total of  vessels had 9een hailed,  
9oarded and  denied transit to or from Li9yan ports. "n order to most effectively monitor the &SA, each of the 
naval assets under 'A-O command patrolled a specific area of responsi9ility, or “patrol 9oO”, which evolved 
through time. 0hile 'A-O has not provided information as to the delimitation of these areas according to naval 
assets, the coverage was eOtensive. Luca Selva, Operations Officer on 9oard the "talian ship ettica operating 
under 'A-O command, descri9es the  activity of maritime surveillance in a video posted on  April  as 
follows “0hen you have a9out  ships at sea to control such a vast sea portion, o9viously you have to maBe 
sure that every portion of sea is controlled, and that there is nothing passing through and you are not noticing 
it.” 
... Participating States'A-O Aerial Assets
At the  &arch  US epartment of efense 'ews 9riefing on Li9ya Operation Odyssey awn, /ice Admiral 
Gortney from the Pentagon stated “2ou can also get a sense here of the international contri9utions to the no-fly 
zone mission. &ore than  aircraft are involved in some capacity, either enforcing the no-fly zone or protecting 
the civilian populace. Only slightly more than half 9elong to the United States.” etween  and  &arch 
 'A-O Fact sheet, “Operation Unified Protector 'A-O Arms Em9argo against Li9ya”, &arch . URL  
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf66unified-protector-arms-em9argo-factsheet.pdf
 From the rd of &arch to the th of April the area was defined as follows 'orthern limit   ', 0estern limit   '   E, Southern 
limit Li9ya --0 limit -not included-, Eastern limits   '   E and   '  E. As of the th of April the 'orthern limit was reduced to 
  '. For the most recent definition of the area see 'A-O, “Update to 'A-O Em9argo operations in the vicinity of Li9ya”,  April . URL 
httpwww.shipping.nato.intSiteCollectionocuments6Engagement6Em9argo6updatde45.pdf. For the definition of the area prior to  April  see “'A-O Em9argo 
operations in the vicinity of Li9ya”,  &arch , availa9le at httpwww.aegirship9roBers.comimages6Engagement6Em9argo6L2.pdf 
 'A-O Fact Sheet, “Operation Unified Protector 'A-O-led Arms Em9argo against Li9ya”, Octo9er . URL  
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf666-factsheet6arms6em9argo.pdf
 'A-O, “/A& /eri holds Press Conference a9oard "-S Etna”,  April . URL httpwww.jfcnaples.nato.intpage.aspO
 'A-O Fact Sheet, “Operation Unified Protector 'A-O-led Arms Em9argo against Li9ya”, &arch . URL 
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf66unified-protector-arms-em9argo-factsheet.pdf  
 'A-O press conference, “&aritime Em9argo has contri9uted significantly”, 'aples,  &ay . URL httpwww.jfcnaples.nato.intUnified6Protectorpage.aspO
 See “"nternational Operations H&CS /ancouver completes successful &editerranean mission”, #anuary , . URL   httpwww.navy.forces.gc.cacms-a6eng.aspid 
and the video  httpwww.isafnato.comnatocommunitynato-and-li9ya-italian-patrol-ship-9ettica-enforcing-the-arms-em9argo-video6ffde.html
 'atochanneltv, “'A-O Li9ya AR&S E&ARGO -”,  &arch . URL httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchv0aC-aA-B. -he division of the sea into patrol sectors is confirmed 
in yet another video posted on the  April  on natochanneltv, in which we are taBen on9oard the ettica as its manoeuvres towards its patrol area, “near the 9order 9etween 
-unisia and Li9ya.” &iBe &\hle9erger, the 'A-O correspondent a9oard eOplains while descri9ing a monitor on which maritime traffic appears “-he area 'orth of Li9ya as 9een 
divided into patrol sectors assigned to each 'A-O ship.” Availa9le at httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchvfw/PvsgsB 
 U.S. epartment of efence, “O 'ews riefing with /ice Adm. Gortney from the Pentagon on Li9ya Operation Odyssey awn”,  &arch . URL  
httpwww.defense.govtranscriptstranscript.aspOtranscriptid 
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, a total of , sorties had taBen place under the auspices of Operation Odyssey awn.
A num9er of participating states'A-O aerial assets were deployed over the &editerranean Sea. &ost of the 
naval assets patrolling the &SA were eHuipped with helicopters, which were scram9led to verify unidentifia9le 
radar returns. -he a9ove-mentioned H&CS Charlottetown, for eOample, had a Sea $ing helicopter on 9oard. 
-he French aircraft carrier Charles-de-Gaulle was eHuipped with two E-C HawBeye planes that operated from 
its decB. France also deployed an AltantiHue  maritime patrol aircraft, which operated surveillance missions 
towards the maritime em9argo in April. -he Canadian Forces deployed two CP- Aurora maritime patrol 
aircrafts as part of Operation &o9ile as of the  of &arch . "n the frameworB of the intervention in Li9ya, 
the Aurora “9egan conducting maritime surveillance to identify vessels in the em9argo zone and relay that 
information to the 'A-O tasB group patrolling the waters off Li9ya.” Participating states'A-O also deployed 
A0ACS Air9orne 0arning and Control System aircrafts. On  &arch  'A-O reinforced A0ACS presence 
over the &editerranean to . 0hile these first A0ACS were 'A-O assets, several other participating states 
USA, U$, and France su9seHuently provided their own planes in order to monitor the Li9yan land, air, and 
sea. 
... Conclusion On Participating States'A-O 'aval And Aerial Assets Presence
From what precedes, we can estimate that at least  naval assets had 9een in operation in the waters off the 
coast of Li9ya for at least some time 9etween  &arch and  April. Although this data alone does not allow 
us to determine with precision the eOact laydown of naval assets as it evolved day 9y day, it does esta9lish 
the degree of naval presence during the time of events. -he eOtent of participating states'A-Ohs naval asset 
presence was conveyed 9y an "talian official to Senator -ineBe StriB as follows “" eOpect that sailing from Li9ya 
towards "taly should 9e a 9it liBe doing a slalom 9etween military ships”. Furthermore, the maritime space was 
also closely monitored 9y several aircrafts. 
-he image of a congested stretch of sea d populated 9y 9oth military and commercial vessels - is confirmed 9y 
our analysis of Synthetic Aperture Radar SAR data figs.  to . Com9ining the analysis of SAR data with that 
of the drift model, we are a9le to demonstrate that 9oth on  and  &arch  a large num9er of ships were 
located in the area, some of which were at distance of 9etween  and  nautical miles to the migrants 9oat. 
Although we are not currently a9le to identify whether they were military or commercial ships or their nationality, 
the Huestion that presents itself is compelling whohs ships were these Only further investigation and disclosure 
9y participating states'A-O forces will provide the answer to this Huestion. 


 !)rt1+1p)t1n/ #t)te9$  n.or4)t1on  . $he 1/r)ntB9 19tre99
At first, after the “left-to-die 9oat” case was reported in the international press 'A-O denied 9eing involved in any 
way in the incident. Carmen Romero, 'A-O eputy SpoBesperson, stated on  &ay  that
 U.S. epartment of efence, “O 'ews riefing with /ice Adm. Gortney from the Pentagon on Li9ya Operation Odyssey awn”,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.defense.govtranscriptstranscript.aspOtranscriptid 
 'atochannel.tv, “&aritime Helicopter Patrols”,  April . URL www.natochannel.tv or httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchvsj/oGOh/g 
 French &inistry of efence, “Li9ye appareillage du porte-avions Charles de Gaulle”,  &arch . URL  httpwww.defense.gouv.frcontentviewfull 
  French &inistry of efence, “Li9ye arrivVe des AtlantiHue  T la Sude”,  August . URL  
httpwww.defense.gouv.froperationsautres-operationsoperation-harmattan-li9yeactualitesli9ye-arrivee-des-atlantiHue--a-la-sude, see also &er et marine, “La marine franUaise 
dVjoue une opVration de minage devant le port de &israta”,  &ai . URL httpwww.meretmarine.comarticle.cfmid
 Canada 'ational efence and Armed Forces, “Canadian Forces eploy &aritime Patrol Aircraft "n Response -o Situation "n Li9ya”, 'ews Release ., .  &arch . URL 
httpwww.cefcom.forces.gc.capa-apnr-spdoc-eng.aspid
 Canada 'ational efence and Armed Forces, “Auroras fly first mission over Li9ya”,  Octo9er . URL  httpwww.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.capa-apfs-ev-eng.asp 
 'A-O, “'A-O increases air9orne surveillance in the &editerranean”,  &arch  URL 
httpwww.nato.intcpsenS"-A-natolivenews6.htmselectedLocaleen 
 'A-O, “A0ACS 'A-Ohs gEye "n -he SByh, URL httpwww.nato.intcpsenS"-EC-EFAnatolivetopics6.htmselectedLocaleen 
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 Although it was not the first to report the incident, #acB ShenBerhs article “Aircraft carrier left us to die, say migrants” pu9lished in “-he Guardian” newspaper on  &ay  was the 
one that sparBed international criticism. URL httpwww.guardian.co.uBworldmaynato-ship-li9yan-migrants.
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“'A-O has reviewed all relevant information availa9le, so we have already looBed into that, and we can find no 
evidence whatsoever of any 'A-O ships 9eing involved in this tragic incident reported 9y -he Guardian. b "n 
addition to that, 'A-O units at sea neither saw nor heard any trace of distress calls from that area. -his is all we 
have to say a9out this. 0e looBed into this and there is no evidence. asically, 'A-O was not involved 9ecause it 
had no signs.”
A num9er of elements now allow us to say with conviction that participating states'A-O forces were informed of 
the migrantsh distress.
... French &ilitary Aircraft "dentification
As mentioned previously in the “Chain of Events” section of the report, 9oth the testimonies of the survivors and 
the evidence provided to Senator -ineBe StriB 9y Rome &RCC lead to the conclusion that on the afternoon of 
 &arch  the migrantsh vessel was flown over 9y a French aircraft. ecause the aircraft provided GPS 
coordinates as well as a photograph of the migrantsh vessel, a practice consistent with maritime identification 
practices under 'A-O, this leads us to 9elieve that it was a military aircraft involved in participating states'A-O 
operations. As discussed a9ove, France had a num9er of aircrafts operating specifically over the &editerranean 
Sea, some of which might appear to 9e “white”, as stated 9y Girma Halfmon to Senator -ineBe StriB. -his is the 
case for eOample of the AltantiHue  maritime patrol aircraft, which is light grey and was operating off the Li9yan 
coast in April. ased on the information reviewed we cannot confirm that it was already in operation on  &arch 
. -he military aircraft that first sighted the migrantsh vessel descri9ed the small ru99er 9oat and mentioned 
it was carrying a9out  people, a smaller num9er than the  migrants actually on the “left-to-die 9oat” 9ut 
already an o9servation that indicates dangerous overcrowding. 
... FaO And Phone Call
From its initial statement of denial, 'A-O reviewed its position several months later, as detailed in Emiliano os 
and Paul 'icolhs documentary “&are deserto” produced for the RS" and 9roadcasted on  #anuary . "n this 
documentary, the authors Huote a response to their inHuiry provided on  Octo9er  9y &athias Eichenlau9 
Press and &edia Section d &edia Operation Centre, 'A-O HeadHuarters that, as we read, can 9e attri9uted to 
&s Oana Lungescu, 'A-O spoBesperson. "n this communication, &s Oana Lungescu finally admitted receiving a 
“general notice” sent out 9y the "talian Authorities, 9ut that this did not imply a reHuest for assistance 
“'A-O maritime command did not receive a call for assistance in relation to this migrant ship. "nstead, 'A-O 
received a general notice in the evening of the th of &arch from the "talian Authorities to alert them to the 
presence of a vessel in difficulty carrying  people. -he message was not an instruction to 9egin search and 
rescue, nor did it reHuest assistance 4b5. At the time the message was received, the nearest 'A-O vessel was 
 nautical miles away from the aforementioned vessel.” anneO .
-he “general notice” &s Oana Lungescu is referring to is the faO sent 9y &RCC Rome to 'A-O headHuarters 
allied command in 'aples on  &arch  at  G&- and Huoted in Senator -ineBe StriBhs report
“FRO& &RCC RO&A
-O 'A-O HEA*UAR-ER ALL"E CO&&A' d 'APLES
SU#EC- OA- 0"-H APPRO1  P.O.. PROAL2 "' "FF"CUL- "' POS. LA- ].h' d LO'G 
].hE . U-C
 'A-O 'ews conference, “'A-O Allied #oint Force Command”, 'aples,  &ay . URL httpwww.jfcnaples.nato.intUnified6Protectorpage.aspO
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, pp. , .
 'ote that the reference to “ people” comes from the "talian Coast Guard signal sent out on  &arch . -he num9er is inaccurate 9ut reflects their Bnowledge at the time.
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-E1- EAR S"RS&AA&S
FOR A'2 APPROPR"A-E AC-"O', PLEASE E "'FOR&E -HA- -OA2 -H"S &RCC RECE"/E 
-HE "'FOR&A-"O' AOU- A S&ALL OA- 0"-H AOU-  P.O. "' "FF"CUL- "' -HE SOU-H 
&E"-ERRA'EA' SEA. O' OAR -HERE "S -HE -HURA2A SA- PHO'E 0"-H -HE 'U&ER 
.
0E CARR"E OU- SO&E "'/ES-"GA-"O' AOU- -H"S CASE 0"-H -HE PURPOSE -O LOCA-E -HE 
CALLER. “-HURA2A” CO&PA'2 "'FOR&E US -HA- -HE POS"-"O' OF -HE SA-ELL"-E E/"CE A- 
. U-C 0AS LA- ].h' d LO'G ].hE.
PLEASE $EEP US UPA-E "' CASE OF S"GH-"'G OF -HE AO/E &E'-"O'E OA- 2 A'2 
'A-O 'A/AL ASSE-S.”
According to 'A-Ohs latest statement dated  &arch  “despite the imprecise nature of the reHuest for 
information contained in the &RCC faO, which was not a formal reHuest for assistance or `distress calla, it was 
forwarded to 'A-O -asB Force units under its operational control.” anneO .
-he following day,  &arch , 'A-O was also alerted 9y telephone 9y Father 3erai. "n several newspaper 
articles, Father 3erai stated to have informed 'A-O command in 'aples. "n our interview, Father 3erai declared 
“On &onday th " have called the Coast Guard, and when they told me they still didnht have any news " called 
'A-O at 'aples at around -. to asB them to mo9ilize their means to looB for this 9oat as well. 4b5 At 
'A-O, the person who answered first was speaBing English. " asBed for some9ody speaBing "talian. -hey put 
my call through to some9ody who could speaB "talian. " eOplained him that there were these two 9oats missing 
and asBed for 'A-O participation in the search. He told me that he would warn the appropriate authorities”. 
 However, in a response to Senator -ineBe StriBhs inHuiry, Richard Froh, eputy Assistant Secretary General 
Operations, states that 'A-O operational headHuarters in 'aples does not have “any record of a phone call from 
Father 3erai on  &arch”.  
... istress Signals
"n addition to the faO and phone call received directly 9y 'A-O allied command in 'aples, all participating states
'A-O naval assets present in the area received the distress signals sent out 9y Rome &RCC.
-he first signal was an ECG message sent at  G&- through the Safety'E- international safety service. 
According to Admiral Lo Sardo, interviewed 9y journalist Emiliano os, this distress signal was sent “to all ships 
in transit and to anyone in the area”. -he message provided the coordinates of the migrantsh 9oat and stated 
that it was “pro9a9ly in difficulty” fig. . "t demanded that “all ships transiting in the Sicily Channel” “Beep a 
sharp looB out and reporting any sighting at &RCC Rome”. -he distress signal, whose status will 9e discussed in 
more detail in the following section, was emitted again every four hours for ten days. 
On  &arch  at  G&- the initial warning was also circulated 9y the 0orld 0ide 'avigational 0arning 
Service 00'0S as a Hydrolant 'avigational 0arning fig. . "t further specified “/essels in vicinity 
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 "nterview conducted and filmed 9y Charles Heller in Geneva on  'ovem9er  our translation from "talian to English.
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Safety'E- uses the "mmarsat EGC Enhanced Group Call service to allow authorised maritime safety information providers, such as &aritime Rescue Coordination 
Centres, to 9roadcast messages to all ships in certain geographical areas in accordance with Glo9al &aritime istress and Safety System G&SS procedures. See 
httpwww.inmarsat.comSupport"nmarsat6CFA*sdefault.aspOlanguageE'teOtonlyFalse 
 "nterview conducted and filmed 9y Emiliano os at Rome &RCC Comando Generale del Corpo delle Capitanerie di Porto on  Septem9er  our translation from "talian to 
English.
 “"n support of the Glo9al &aritime istress and Safety System G&SS, roadcast 0arnings are promulgated 9y the 0orldwide 'avigational 0arnings Service 4b5 to provide rapid 
dissemination of information critical to navigation and the safety of life at sea. 'avigational 0arnings are issued regularly and contain information a9out persons in distress, or o9jects 
and events that pose an immediate hazard to navigation. -he four types of 'avigational 0arnings - 'A/AREA "/, H2ROLA'-, 'A/AREA 1"", and H2ROPAC - are categorized 9y 
their location”. URL httpmsi.nga.mil'GAPortal&S".portal6nfp9true6pageLa9elmsi6portal6page6 
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reHuested to Beep a sharp looBout, assist if possi9le. Report to &RCC Rome.” -his second message was sent in 
a perimeter including the Sicily Channel and 9eyond the Hydrolant 9roadcast zones , and  indicated in 
fig. .
0hile a spoBesman of the Spanish ministry of defence has denied that the Spanish asset operating in the area 
received this message, according to Senator -ineBe StriB “all maritime vessels, 9e they private, commercial or 
military, are supposed to 9e eHuipped to receive these messages”.  All participating states'A-O naval assets 
present in the area should thus have received the successive distress signals. 
-he a9ove suggests that 9oth 'A-O maritime command in 'aples and participating states'A-O naval assets 
present in the area were directly informed of the presence of a vessel in distress, respectively 9y faO and 
telephone and via maritime distress signals. 

 !)rt1+1p)t1n/ #t)te9$  Re9pon9e $o $he 19tre99 #1/n)3
0e must now discuss the participating states'A-O response to the information of the migrantsh distressed 9oat, 
which was received through multiple channels and 'A-Ohs understanding of “distress” more generally. 
-he first element that needs to 9e discussed is 'A-Ohs understanding of what Bind of situation constitutes 
“distress”. "n the a9ove mentioned response to Emiliano os, 'A-O spoBesperson &s Oana Lungescu 
acBnowledges that 'A-O maritime command was alerted “to the presence of a vessel in difficulty” 9ut states 
that “the message was not an instruction to 9egin search and rescue, nor did it reHuest assistance”. "f the a9ove-
mentioned faO sent 9y &RCC Rome to 'A-O headHuarters allied command in 'aples on  &arch indicating 
the presence of a 9oat “in difficulty” did not reHuire immediate and eOplicit intervention, participating states
'A-O naval assets should have received the ECG signal sent out 9y the "talian Coast Guard. -his message 
had a priority code marBed as “distress”, the highest possi9le in a scale that includes, in decreasing order of 
urgency, “distress, urgency, safety, and routine”. -he  SAR Convention defines distress as “a situation 
wherein there is a reasona9le certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened 9y grave and imminent 
danger and reHuires immediate assistance.” According to this definition then, the EGC sent out 9y the "talian 
Coast Guard would have reHuired “immediate assistance”. &oreover, all participating states'A-O assets in the 
Central &editerranean should have received the Hydrolant message demanding that they “assist if possi9le”. 
Finally, it should 9e reminded that on  April  - only a few days after the message was received and while 
the migrantsh vessel was still drifting at sea, the U'HCRhs Assistant High Commissioner for Protection EriBa Feller 
stated that “any overcrowded 9oat leaving Li9ya these days should 9e considered to 9e in distress.” 
From the a9ove it follows that if participating states'A-O forces did not deem the distress signals urgent 
enough to prompt their intervention, they failed to correctly assess the degree of distress of the passengers. 
However, the Huestion “how did 'A-O and participating states assets act upon the information of the vessels 
distress” remains entirely open. "n a letter sent on  Fe9ruary  in response to Senator -ineBe StriBhs 
enHuiry, 'A-O specified that “there is no record of any aircraft or ship under 'A-O command having seen 
 Jack Shenker and Giles Tremlett, “Migrant boat disaster: Spain challenges NATO over distress call claim”,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.guardian.co.uBworldmarmigrant-9oat-disaster-spain-nato
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. 
 AnneO to the "nternational Convention on &aritime Search and Rescue SAR Convention, adopted on  April , entered into force on  #une , para. ... "t should also 
9e noted that the very definition of “distress” has 9een a contested term in the frame of assistance to migrants at sea in the &editerranean, and in the Sicily Channel in particular. 
For instance, &altese Armed Forces, the agency responsi9le for SAR operations in &alta, have at times applied a more narrow definition. According to a senior officer of the Armed 
Forces of &alta, distress is defined as ”the imminent danger of loss of lives, so if they are sinBing it is distress. "f they are not sinBing it is not distress”. *uoted in Silja $lepp, “"llegal 
migration and migrant fatalities in &alta”, in -he human cost of 9order control in the conteOt of EU maritime migration systems, /reije Universiteit Amsterdam, , p.. On this 
issue see also -homas Gammeltoft-Hansen and -anja E. Aal9erts, “Sovereignty at sea the law and politics of saving lives in the &are Li9erum”, ""S 0orBing Paper, , p.  
and &ichael Pugh, “rowning not waving 9oat people and humanitarianism at sea”, , #ournal of Refugee Studies,  , pp. -. 
 U'HCR, “U'HCR calls on States to uphold principles of rescue-at-sea and 9urden sharing”, Press Releases,  April . URL 
httpwww.unhcr.org.mtindeO.phpnews-and-viewsnews-unhcr-calls-on-states-to-uphold-principles-of-rescue-at-sea-and-9urden-sharing 
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or made contact with the small 9oat in Huestion”. However in several different statements, 'A-O has 
progressively admitted that several assets were in the area. "n the email of  Octo9er , 'A-O stated “the 
nearest 'A-O vessel was  nautical miles away from the aforementioned vessel”. Senator -ineBe StriBhs report 
has revealed that the Spanish &Vndez 'uYez “was located around  miles away from the 9oat in distress”. "n 
'A-Ohs latest response dated  &arch  it further conceded that, according to information from the "talian 
authorities, the "talian orsini was “ miles away” and the Etna “ nautical miles from the position reported 
9y the &RCC faO” see anneO .. 'o further information has 9een disclosed as to the position of other 
participating states'A-O naval assets present at the time.
0e will now provide a hypothesis of what the participating states'A-Ohs response may have 9een 9ased 
on prior practices of assistance 9y 'A-O and 9y discussing the migrantsh testimonies descri9ing their two 
encounters with military helicopters.
... 'A-O Prior Assistance Practice
As stated in the “9acBground” section of 'A-Ohs  Octo9er  statement concerning the “left-to-die 9oat” 
Huoted a9ove, “issues of migration do not fall within the mandate of the mission aimed at preventing the flow of 
arms, related material, and mercenaries to Li9ya. However all ships under 'A-O command are fully aware of 
their responsi9ilities with regards to the "nternational &aritime Law regarding Safety of Life at Sea SOLAS. As 
such 'A-O ships do everything they can to respond to distress calls and provide help when necessary, which 
they did on several occasions” anneO .. "n 'A-Ohs Fact Sheet “Operation Unified Protector 'A-O-led 
Arms Em9argo against Li9ya” dated Octo9er , 'A-O states that during the operation, “'A-O ships have 
directly assisted in the rescue of more than  people in distress at sea and through coordination with national 
authorities and coast guards, 'A-O has facilitated the rescue of many hundreds more”. 0e may note here 
that the num9er of people rescued 9y 'A-O is relatively small if compared to the , people who arrived in 
"taly after fleeing Li9ya in unseaworthy 9oats and that at least , people lost their lives at sea during the same 
period.  -his might 9e considered an indication of 'A-Ohs minimal assistance practice. One particular case of 
rescue that occurred the day 9efore the “left-to-die 9oat” left the port of -ripoli provides further insight into the 
way 'A-O conducted its assistance to migrants. 
etween  and  &arch , one day prior to the departure of the “left-to-die 9oat”, a migrant vessel was 
initially assisted 9y the Canadian frigate H&CS Charlottetown. -he episode is descri9ed on the Canadian 'avy 
journal “Crowsnest” as follows “Shortly 9efore noon on &arch , an order from the commander of Com9ined 
-asB Group . 4'ato &aritime Command5 directed H&CS Charlottetown to investigate a vessel off the 
coast of 'orth Africa that had 9een reported as “adrift” to authorities ashore. -he frigate scram9led her Sea 
$ing helicopter, which 9ecame the first 'A-O aircraft to reach the vessel. g0e located the vessel, tracBed it 9y 
radar, and confirmed visually it was maBing good headway,h said pilot Captain Gerritt Sie9ring. gAs soon as 
Charlottetown came into visual distance, however, the vessel stopped dead in the water.h 0hen contacted 9y 
radio, the crew of the migrant vessel claimed that they were adrift 9ecause their engine was seized and they 
were out of fuel. A 9oarding party set off from the frigate to investigate. Once a9oard the migrant vessel, the 
9oarding party mem9ers saw that the actual situation was rather different. g" was surprised to see the engine was 
running,h said engineer Petty Officer nd Class Serge Grondin. g" checBed the sump and the oil was pure 9lacB 
 Letter sent on  Fe9ruary  to Senator -ineBe StriB 9y Richard Froh, eputy Assistant Secretary General, Operations irectorate, 'A-O, Huoted in Senator -ineBe StriBhs “Lives 
lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p. .
 Ibid., p.
 'A-O Fact sheet, “Operation U'"F"E PRO-EC-OR 'A-O Arms Em9argo against Li9ya”, Octo9er   
httpwww.nato.intnato6staticassetspdfpdf666-factsheet6arms6em9argo.pdf .
 "O& “Response to the Li9yan Crisis”, EOternal  Situation  Report,  Octo9er  . URL 
httpwww.iom.intjahiawe9davsharedsharedmainsitemediadocsreports"O&-sitrep-&E'A.pdf 
 U'HCR, “&ore than , drown or go missing trying to cross the &editerranean in ”,  #anuary , httpwww.unhcr.orgf.html
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there was no water contamination as they said. 0hen " checBed their fuel, there was easily  litres in their 
tanBs.h -he 9oat also had an efficient 9ilge pump, powered 9y the main engine. After a minor adjustment to the 
rudimentary steering system, the migrant vessel was deemed seaworthy. &eanwhile, Charlottetown provided 
food, water and 9lanBets for the passengers, and a mem9er of the warshiphs medical team checBed their general 
health. -he final determination was that, although crowded, everyone a9oard was in good health and in no 
immediate danger. gOnce we provided aid and met our o9ligations 9y assuring their health, a9ility to navigate 
and safely operate their vessel, our options 9ecame limited,h said Commander Craig SBjerpen, commanding 
officer of Charlottetown. g0e opened our distance and resumed our patrol, 9ut stayed close enough to monitor 
the situation and respond if reHuired.h -he warship monitored the migrant vessel all night as the 'A-O Com9ined 
-asB Group 9egan managing the situation in coordination with "talian national authorities. -he "talian Coast 
Guard tooB charge of the vessel and its occupants the following day.”
uring a press 9riefing held on  &ay , 'A-O reported that the following day, on  &arch , the "talian 
military ship Etna also provided assistance to what seems to have 9een the same vessel. -he statement reads 
as follow “On the th &arch, the "talian ship E-'A, under 'A-O command in support of the arms em9argo, 
assisted a vessel with around  people on 9oard, including women and children. -he vessel had earlier 9een 
given food and water 9y another 'A-O ship, 9ut after the vessel came into distress, with no power, the E-'A 
sent teams including medical professionals to assess the passengers. -he Etna then provided sicB9ay care 
for a new9orn 9a9y and mother 9efore flying them to Lampedusa for transfer to hospital. -he Etna remained 
alongside the vessel as all passengers were evacuated from the vessel 9y the Coast Guard. -he helicopter 
returned to Etna 9efore taBing a second woman, undergoing contractions, to the Lampedusa for transfer to the 
same hospital”.
'owhere in 'A-Ohs official sources could we find a confirmation of the fact that these two cases of rescue refer 
to the same migrantsh 9oat. However, and although some inconsistencies remain in particular, different articles 
in the press refer to - migrants, whereas 'A-O talBs of  migrants in the case involving the Etna, 
several elements of evidence points to this. "n particular, the images provided in relation to the rescue carried out 
9y the Charlottetown and 9y the Etna depict a 9oat that, although shot from two different sides figs. , , , 
portray the same migrantsh 9oat, leaving little space for dou9t a9out the identity of the rescued 9oat. &oreover, 
the reconstruction of the facts provided 9y "talian journalist Francesco /iviano, who had 9een directly in touch via 
satellite phone with the migrants involved in these two cases of rescue, is consistent with this version.
"n the a9ove-mentioned case, when informed of the presence of a vessel that was reported as “adrift”, 'A-O 
did send out an order to a vessel, the Canadian Charlottetown under its command, to investigate the case. -he 
commander of the ship, after assessing the condition of the 9oat through the shiphs helicopter and later via 
radio, sent a 9oarding team to provide assistance in the form of water, food, and 9lanBets, and also checBed the 
general health of the people on-9oard although the superficiality of this health checB is reflected 9y the fact that 
only a few hours later two women gave 9irth. "t further assessed the condition of the vessel. 'A-O seems to 
have then monitored the migrantsh vessel until it was taBen charge of 9y the "talian Coast Guard. 
 Lieutenant 'avy &ichael &c0hinnie, “H&CS Charlottetown assists drifting migrant vessel”, in Crowsnest /ol. , 'o.  Summer , p. . URL  
www.navy.forces.gc.ca...crowsnest6v-i.pdf
  'A-O Press 9riefing on Li9ya 9y the 'A-O eputy SpoBesperson, Carmen Romero rigadier General Claudio Ga9ellini, Chief Operations Officer, Operation Unified Protector 
Commander Peter ClarBe.  &ay . URL httpwww.nato.intcpsennatoliveopinions6.htm 
 See AFP, “First migrant 9oat from Li9ya nears "talian shores”,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.google.comhostednewsafparticleALeH&ifFSOArBhjPzvSEHe/w#"LAdoc"dC'G.acea9c9df99adc. 
 La Stampa, “Odissea sul 9arcone alla deriva recento disperati e un parto”,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.lastampa.itcronachesezioniarticololstp "l Fatto *uotidiano, “Storie di disperazione a Lampedusa nella notte  arrivi. Ed W emergenza sanitaria”,  &arch 
. URL httpwww.ilfattoHuotidiano.itstorie-di-disperazione-a-lampedusa-nella-notte--arrivi-ed-e-emergenza-sanitaria   
 Francesco /ivano, “Sul 9arcone alla deriva nasce 2ea9sera. "n salvo il 9am9ino della speranza”, La Repu99lica,  &arch . Accessi9le at 
httpgiovannitaurasi.wordpress.comsul-9arcone-alla-deriva-nasce-yea9sera-in-salvo-il-9am9ino-della-speranza-di-francesco-viviano
 Lieutenant 'avy &ichael &c0hinnie, “H&CS Charlottetown assists drifting migrant vessel”.
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'A-Ohs understanding of assistance thus seems to have 9een limited to a few elements of relief that would 
provide the minimal conditions for the 9oat to carry on its journey. -his limited practice of assistance may 9e 
related to 'A-Ohs operational priorities as stated a9ove “issues of migration do not fall within the mandate of 
the mission” as well as to the potentials of 9ecoming involved in the legal-political conflicts 9etween coastal 
states descri9ed in su9-chapter ... -his was the case when on  #uly  the Spanish Almirante #uan de 
or9Zn operating under 'A-O command assisted a migrantsh vessel in distress 9ut was una9le to disem9arB the 
rescued migrants for several days. 
... "dentification Elements Of -he -wo Helicopters Encountered y -he &igrants
0e will now provide all the elements in our possession that might contri9ute to the identification of the helicopter 
that the migrantsh claim visited them twice during the afternoon and evening of  &arch .
an Haile Ge9re descri9es the first encounter with the helicopter as follows “"t circled around us - times and 
came closer. "t was maBing a lot of wind, and we almost lost our 9alance” HG, . A9u $urBe $e9ato adds 
“-he helicopter came very close to us down, we showed him our 9a9ies, we showed them we finished oil, we tell 
them gPlease help us.h” A$$,  
All testimonies confirm that the helicopter was “military” A$$,  A$$,  &A",  F0-, - and eHuipped 
with a machine gun HG, . -he helicopter ca9in door was open and at least two people, who according to 
some of the survivors were wearing military uniforms and carrying arms, could 9e seen HG,  E&$,  
A$$,  A$$,  F0-,  &A", . Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegergis remem9ers the colour of their uniform 
as 9eing green F0-, , while A9u $urBe says they were green and a sand-liBe colour A$$, -. -he 
colour of the helicopter is descri9ed as light green 2",  or green and grey F0-, . All these elements 
eOclude the possi9ility of the helicopter 9elonging to the "talian Coast Guard, which uses civilian white and red 
helicopters.
A9u $urBe continues “" thinB " saw them taBe our picture. " thinB " saw a photo camera or something liBe that” 
A$$, . &ohamed Ahmed "9rahim confirms this particular point &A", , which is in fact consistent with 
protocols for vessel identification missions in the frame of 'A-Ohs monitoring of the em9argo over Li9ya during 
Operation Odyssey awn.
Furthermore, an important element revealed 9y witnesses is that the helicopter 9ore the English writing 
“AR&2” A$$,  2", - or “RESCU AR&2” HG,  F0-,  on its side fig. . &ost military ships 
contri9uting to the participating states'A-O operations off Li9ya were eHuipped with a helicopter 9ut normally 
such a helicopter would 9elong to the 'avy and would therefore 9ear the writing “'A/2” on its sides. "t is Bnown 
that Army helicopters were on-9oard ships taBing part in the military intervention, 9ut those mentioned in official 
sources were com9at helicopters liBe the ritish Army Apache AttacB Helicopters which could not have 
performed SAR operations, and would 9e considera9ly different from those descri9ed 9y the migrants. &oreover, 
 See a series of detailed posts on the 9log migrantsatsea.wordpress.com as well as the Statement 9y the Spanish &inistry of efence “La Armada entrega a -[nez a los inmigrantes 
rescatados el pasado dXa ”,  #uly . URL httpwww.defensa.go9.esga9inetenotasPrensaGC66Entrega6inmigrantes6-unez6.html. "n summary,  
migrants were rescued on  #uly  9y the Spanish Almirante #uan de ordon, operating under 'A-O command. Shortly after the initial rescue of the migrant 9oat,  migrants 
were evacuated and turned over to -unisian authorities.  On orders from 'A-O command, the #uan de or9Zn sailed to &alta and tooB a position  miles off the coast of that 
country, hoping to 9e a9le to disem9arB the migrants on the "sland since their vessel was rescued within &altahs SAR. However, once again due to the legal-political conflict 9etween 
coastal states in the Sicily Channel, &altese authorities criticised the attempt to 9ring the rescued migrants to &alta given that the migrants should have 9een taBen to -unisia or "taly 
9ecause 9oth locations were closer to the original point of rescue. Only five of the migrants were airlifted to &alta for medical reasons on the th. On the th, instructed 9y the 
command of 'A-O, the Spanish frigate headed for the coast of -unisia to start the transfer of the  immigrants who were still on 9oard to the -unisian 'avy patrol 9oat Carthage.
 Filmon -eBlegerBis F0-,  agrees with an Haile Ge9re HG,  that it was the same helicopter that visited them twice, while Elias &ohamed E&,  and &ohamed 
Ahmed "9rahim &A",  says there were two different helicopters. &ohamed Ahmed "9rahim also adds that he cannot remem9er differences 9ecause there were very little. A9u 
$urBe $e9ato does not mention neither a second visit nor a second helicopter.
 -his practice is illustrated in a video showing the H&CS Charlottetownhs Sea $ing helicopter on a reconnaissance mission during which the military taBe photographs of the ships 
they encounter for identification. 'atochannel.tv, “&aritime Helicopter Patrols”,  April . URL www.natochannel.tv or httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchvsj/oGOh/g 
 ritish &inistry of efence, “Apaches get ready to help protect Li9yan civilians”,  &ay . URL 
httpwww.mod.uBefence"nternetefence'ews&ilitaryOperationsApachesGetReady-oHelpProtectLi9yanCivilians.htm   
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
according to the sourced reviewed, these types of helicopters were not deployed in military operations in Li9ya 
until  #une  onwards. 
'evertheless, the 0estland LynO, a 9attlefield utility helicopter of the ritish Army which does 9ear the writing 
“AR&2” on its side and can 9e used for SAR operations, was spotted in #une  in &alta on-9oard the H&S 
Ocean, a landing platform docB ship that tooB part to the military operation in Li9ya fig. . uring our interview 
with an Haile Ge9re, we presented him with several photographs of different helicopters in operation at the time 
of events and when we showed the image of the 0estland LynO helicopter of the ritish Army, he immediately 
said it was “eOactly liBe this” HG,  fig. . -he aspect of this particular helicopter seems in fact very 
similar to that descri9ed 9y the migrants, not only 9ecause of the “AR&2” writing, 9ut also in terms of its colour 
and typology. However, according to the sources we have consulted, the H&S Ocean only joined the operations 
in the &editerranean in #une. -his specific ship and its helicopters cannot therefore have 9een involved in 
the “left-to-die 9oat” case 9ut we cannot eOclude the possi9ility that similar ships, ritish or 9elonging to other 
national navies, could have carried army helicopters.
"f the particularities of the o9served writing of the word “AR&2” are correct, this would narrow down the 
nationality of the helicopter as 9elonging to an English speaBing country either taBing part in the military 
operations the US, the U$ and Canada or geographically located within an helicopterhs operative range &alta. 
oth the US and the U$ had at the time a 9road military presence deployed in the &editerranean, among which 
helicopters of the typology descri9ed are therefore more liBely to 9e found. On the contrary, the only Canadian 
ship present at the time of the events in the Central &editerranean was the H&SC Charlottetown, which carried 
one Sea $ing helicopter. -his aircraft only 9ears num9ers written on its side and 9elongs to the 'avy fig. . 
&oreover, it has a profile dissimilar to an Haile Ge9rehs description. All of these factors maBe it very unliBely that 
this was the helicopter descri9ed 9y the migrants. Finally, &altahs Armed Forces involvement also has to 9e ruled 
out, 9ecause the helicopters at their disposal, although 9eing used in SAR operations, are not a9le to travel such 
long distances according to &alta &RCC.
ConseHuently, while we are una9le to identify the helicopter in Huestion, the convergent testimonies are very 
precise in their description of particulars that point to the involvement of a military helicopter. Although the word 
“AR&2” written on the helicopter as identified 9y the testimonies points to an US or U$ asset, the involvement of 
other national armies in this episode cannot 9e eOcluded.
... Hypothesis Concerning Participating States'A-O Response
ased on the previously mentioned case of assistance 9y 'A-O as well as on the survivorsh testimonies, the 
possi9ility that participating states'A-O did not respond to the distress signal has to 9e considered unliBely. 
According to the elements in our possession, we provide the following hypothesis as to the action participating 
states'A-O tooB in response to the reception of the distress signal
!" Following the reception of the information concerning the distress of the migrants sent out 9y Rome 
&RCC, 'A-O maritime command instructed its closest naval asset to identify the vessel and assess its 
condition. "t should 9e noted that the distance indicated 9y the 'A-O spoBesperson,  nautical miles 
 'A-O, “'A-O attacB helicopters increase pressure on *adhafi regime”,  #une . URL httpwww.nato.intcpsennatolivenews6.htm   
 For a technical description of the helicopter, see httpwww.army.mod.uBeHuipmentaircraft.aspO 
 ritish &inistry of efence, “U$ and French ships rendezvous off Li9yan coast”,  Septem9er . URL 
httpwww.mod.uBefence"nternetefence'ews&ilitaryOperationsUBAndFrenchShipsRendezvousOffLi9yanCoast.htm
 -o our Bnowledge, these helicopters would more liBely 9e found on Landing Platform ocBs, which usually carry amphi9ious assets. 
 an Haile Ge9re even mentions at a certain point that the writing on the side of the helicopter might have 9een “US RESCUE AR&2”, 9ut hehs not sure a9out this particular detail 
HG, -.
 Senator -ineBe StriB, “Lives lost in the &editerranean Sea who is responsi9le”, p.
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can 9e covered 9y most 'A-O ships present in the area in around one hour and in around  minutes 
9y a military helicopter of the type found on-9oard those same ships. -he distance of  nautical miles 
indicated in Senator -ineBe StriBhs report in relation to the Spanish frigate &endez '[Yez can 9e covered 
9y this ship in less than half an hour at its top speed.
!" Alternatively it is possi9le that participating statesh naval assets were even closer and could send a 
helicopter.
!" -he 'A-Ohs or participating statesh helicopter conducted a first assessment and deemed the condition of 
the migrants and of the vessel good enough not to demand its assistance.
!" As was the 'A-O practice in the precedent analysed a9ove, the helicopter left 9ut the participating 
states'A-Ohs closest naval asset did however continue to tracB the migrantsh ship. 
!" 0ithin less than five hours, the same helicopter was sent 9acB to provide a few pacBets of 9iscuits and 
9ottles of water.
!" -he migrant 9oat continued for - hours 9efore running out of fuel and starting to drift. 
-he a9ove hypothesis however cannot 9e proven with the elements in our possession and demands further 
disclosure on the part of participating states'A-O forces to prove or disprove, as well as to identify the 
helicopter in Huestion.

 !)rt1+1p)t1n/ 9t)te9$  ete+t1on  . $he 1/r)nt9B &e99e3 ;r1n/ t9 	 )?9  . r1.t
0e have esta9lished that 'A-O and participating statesh naval assets were informed of the migrantsh distress. 
However, and whether or not participating states'A-Ohs closest naval asset did send a helicopter to assess the 
migrantsh condition and provide food and water which we consider highly pro9a9le as discussed a9ove, the 
passengers were not provided with a form of assistance that could avert their tragic fate. 'evertheless, given the 
on-going military intervention and in particular the operation aiming at monitoring the &SA involving  naval 
assets on  April  and mo9ilising eOtremely sophisticated sensing eHuipment, could participating states
'A-O not have detected a 3odiac 9oat approOimately  metres in length drifting very slowly during  days,  
of which within 'A-Ohs &SA and the remaining three within the highly surveilled Li9yan territorial waters 
0hile 'A-O and participating states have so far not disclosed precise information a9out the surveillance 
eHuipment mo9ilised 9y 'aples &aritime command and participating states'A-O naval assets to monitor the 
area, we may nonetheless offer general indications of the high degree of surveillance present at the time of 
events in this area. -hese were well summarized 9y /ice Admiral Rinaldo /eri, Commander &aritime Command 
'aplesh words of warning on  April  “Anyone who 9elieves they can sail through 'A-Ohs layers of 
surveillance and interdiction needs to thinB again.” 
... Surveillance &eans eployed Prior -o -he  "ntervention Operation Active Endeavour
"n order to assess 'A-Ohs maritime surveillance capacity in the frame of its intervention in Li9ya, it is important 
to understand that it relied on an already eOisting system deployed within the Operation Active Endeavour 
 -he top speed of the ships present in the area as of the  &arch  discussed in section ... ranges 9etween  and  Bnots  and  Bmh.  nautical miles nm 
corresponds to around  Bilometres Bm.
 -he speed of the CH- Sea $ing helicopter on 9oard of the H&SC Charlottetown is  Bmh. See httpwww.navy.forces.gc.cacms-a6eng.asp 
 'A-O, “/A& /eri holds Press Conference a9oard "-S Etna”,  April . URL httpwww.jfcnaples.nato.intpage.aspO 
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OAE. OAE was first launched after the  attacBs to provide a deterrent presence and protect civilian traffic 
in the 0estern &editerranean from the threat of terrorism. "t progressively evolved to encompass the entire 
&editerranean and provide detailed surveillance and analysis of all traffic. "n order to detect threats it produces a 
multisensor, semi-automated Recognised &aritime Picture R&P. 
"n his contri9ution to the &ay  'A-O Review online magazine, Commander rian Finman, the EOpeditionary 
0arfare ranch Head in the Operations ivision of 'A-O maritime command in 'aples, provides a good 
overview of how the R&P was produced
“0atchstanders in the &aritime Operations Centre can process vast amounts of raw data received from shored-
9ased, sea-9ased, and air9orne sensors. Some of this data comes in the form of Automated "dentification 
System A"S signals, which all commercial vessels greater than  tons are legally o9liged to transmit. 0ith 
an eOpanding array of networBed sensors 9ased in over  countries around the &editerranean and lacB Sea, 
this information system provides real-time data on a daily average of , contacts. -odayhs networB represents 
a Huantum leap in surveillance capacity over just a few years ago. 0ith so much raw information availa9le, the 
trend in &SA is to develop technological tools that can compare in real-time the transmitted data to data9ase 
information in order to validate the contactsh names, registry num9ers, cargo, owners, recent and upcoming 
ports of call, etc. -hese tools ena9le watchstanders to focus on anomalous contacts and concentrate intelligence 
and maritime analyst resources on irregular 9ehaviour, such as uneOplained loitering or course deviations”. 
"n summary, OAE had developed an eOtremely sophisticated system that relied on land 9ased sensors such 
as coastal radar stations sensing capacity on 9oard naval assets deployed on a permanent 9asis such as 
the two Standing 'A-O &aritime Groups S'&Gs as well as that provided 9y naval assets temporarily in the 
area air9orne sensors provided 9y &aritime Patrol Aircraft from a variety of 'A-O contri9uting nations as well 
as A0ACS. 'A-O maritime command has also increasingly turned to the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar 
imagery to monitor maritime traffic. -hese multiple sources of data were 9rought together in 'A-Ohs 'aplesh 
HeadHuarters &aritime Command H* &C. -hese were first analysed in an automated manner to detect 
anomalous 9ehaviour, which the watchstanders in the &aritime Operations Center could further inHuire into. "t is 
worth noting that the Bey anomalies mentioned 9y Commander rian Finman - “uneOplained loitering or course 
deviations ” - could descri9e the migrantsh vessel trajectory during its  days of aimless drifting.
-he surveillance system developed in the frame of OAE was mo9ilised towards monitoring the em9argo on Li9ya 
in . "t is from the very same maritime operational centre used for OAE that 'A-O monitored all shipping 
activity in the &SA  and directed its naval activities to impose the arms em9argo on Li9ya. "n this conteOt, 
the eOisting sensors and the data management system already in place were further supplemented 9y all the 
sensors on 9oard participating states'A-O naval and air assets, of which the following eOamples illustrate the 
capacity. 
... Participating States'A-O etection Capa9ilities "n 
As an eOample, we will 9riefly review the detection capa9ilities of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, 
which was in operation during the time of events of the Li9yan coast in the Golf of Syrte. espite its position 
 'A-O Allied &aritime Command 'aples, 'ews Release, “-en years of Operation Active Endeavour”,  Octo9er . URL 
httpwww.manp.nato.intnews6releasesmcnaplespressreleases'R66.html 
 Commander rian Finman, “$eeping the &ed safe - how iths done”, in 'A-O review,  &ay , httpwww.nato.intdocureview&aritime6SecurityE'indeO.htm. Sea also 
the video “-he Godhs eye view Operation Active Endeavour” in the same edition of 'A-O review,  &ay .
 "9id. See also the summary of OAE provided 9y the French &inistry of efence httpwww.defense.gouv.frenglishcontentviewfull 
 R. Grasso, #. Horstmann, P. Ranelli, $. ryan, C. Carthel, S. Coraluppi, A. aldacci, “Performance assessment of sensors for maritime surveillance using sea trial data”, presentation 
at ESA SeaSAR Frascati - #anuary . URL httpearth.eo.esa.intcgi-9inconfsea.pla9stract 
 'atochanneltv, “'A-O and Li9ya - Operation Unified Protector -he Command”,  April . URL httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchvjOuj*A-*featureplayer6em9edded
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“a9ove  Bm” from the Li9yan coast,Rear Admiral Philippe Coindreau, Commander of the French tasB force, 
declared in an article dated  &arch  that “0e Bnow eOactly where the Li9yan ships are and what they 
are doing.” -his was ena9led 9y the vesselhs electromagnetic detection systems. According to the description 
provided on the we9site of the French &inistry of defence, the CG operated, amongst others sensing 
eHuipment, the R#   long-range  radar developed 9y -hales,  that ena9les detection up to Bm and 
allows to measure with precision the spatial coordinates of any mo9ile detected. Participating states'A-O 
naval assets sensing capacities varied in terms of specific technologies, 9ut they all mo9ilised very sophisticated 
means of surveillance. 
-he surveillance capacity of the &SA was further eOtended 9y mo9ilising participating states'A-O air assets 
descri9ed in su9-chapter .... "n particular, the intelligence produced 9y A0ACS Air9orne 0arning and 
Control System aircrafts provided 9oth 9y 'A-O as well as 9y several other participating states USA, U$ and 
France offers an eOample of the sensing capacity of their air assets. According to Lieutenant-colonel Arnaud 
, Chief of &ission on-9oard the French E-F A0ACS fig.  which had 9een in operation a9ove Li9ya since 
the th of &arch “the rotodome on the aircrafths roof contains two radars that allow us to gseeh everything 
flying and sailing in a radius of  Bm.”  -he A0ACS detection capacity is a9le to identify ru99er 9oats 
similar to that used 9y the migrants. On  #une, 'A-O reported that “'A-O assets including "ntelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance "SR aircraft and Air9orne 0arning and Control System A0ACS aircraft 
identified and tracBed rigid-hulled inflata9le 9oat RH" activity off the Li9yan coast west of &israta near 
3litan”. -his intelligence allowed AttacB helicopters to 9e deployed and destroy two RH"s operated 9y pro-
Gaddafi forces that posed a threat to maritime traffic in the area.
All detection capacities on-9oard participating states'A-Ohs naval and air assets were assem9led in 'aples 
&aritime command and made availa9le to all other assets in operation. Commander Craig SBjerpen, Captain of 
H&CS Charlottetown, detailed this process as follows in a video posted on natochannel.tv on  April  “0hat 
we do is linB up all our radar images together, all the ships, and from that we create sort of a map of all contacts 
in the area. 0e are also worBing with aircrafts that are tracBing vessels. And from that we have a full picture of all 
vessels in the area”.
"n another video posted on natochannel.tv on  April , we are taBen on-9oard the ettica as it manoeuvres 
towards its patrol sector, “near the 9order 9etween -unisia and Li9ya.” &iBe &\hle9erger, -he 'A-O 
correspondent on-9oard descri9es a monitor presenting maritime traffic and sHuares delimiting large areas “-he 
area 'orth of Li9ya has 9een divided into patrol sectors assigned to each 'A-O ship. y sharing information 
they can 9e more effective, and ensure that vessels are continuously tracBed as they pass from one sector 
to another” fig. . -hese com9ined sensing capa9ilities provided an eOtremely precise overall picture. 
Commander Fa9rizio Falzi, on-9oard the "talian ettica, eOplains “-o 9e an asset amongst others assets part of 
'A-O, means that you can have a complete overall situation of everything that is flying or sailing all around you, 
and not only in the immediate vicinity of your ship. $nowing whaths going on, also far away from you, helps you 
 Romain Rosso, “Le Charles-de-Gaulle accusV dhavoir laissV mourir  migrants”, Lh EOpress,  &ai . URL 
httpwww.leOpress.fractualitemondele-charles-de-gaulle-accuse-d-avoir-laisse-mourir--migrants6.html
 Romain Rosso, “Li9ye la marine pro-$adhafi sous surveillance”, Lh EOpress,  &arch . URL 
httpwww.leOpress.fractualitemondeli9ye-la-marine-pro-Badhafi-sous-surveillance6.html    
 For a technical description of the Charles de Gaulle, see httpwww.defense.gouv.frdgaeHuipementnavalle-porte-avions-charles-de-gaulle
 eputy FranUois Cornut-Gentille, “Vfense - EHuippement des forces - issuasion”, “Avis” presented to the French 'ational Assem9ly on  Octo9er , p. . URL 
httpwww.assem9lee-nationale.fr9udgetplfa-tvii.asp 
 'A-O, “A0ACS 'A-Ohs gEye "n -he SByh, URL httpwww.nato.intcpsenS"-EC-EFAnatolivetopics6.htmselectedLocaleen 
 French &inistry of efence, “A 9ord dhun E-F au dessus de la Li9ye”,  #une . URL 
httpwww.defense.gouv.frairmediatheHuecarnet-de-vola-9ord-d-un-e-f-au-dessus-de-la-li9ye 
 French &inistry of efence, “Unified Protector &ission en Awacs dans le ciel li9yen”,  #une . URL 
httpwww.defense.gouv.fractualitesarticlesunified-protector-mission-en-awacs-dans-le-ciel-li9yen
 'A-O, “'A-O attacB helicopters destroy pro-*adhafi military eHuipment”,  #une . URL httpwww.nato.intcpsennatolivenews6.htm 
 'atochanneltv, “'A-O and Li9ya - Operation Unified Protector -he Arms Em9argo”,  April . URL 
httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchv6dRHzRvvg2featureplayer6em9edded 
 'atochanneltv, “'A-O and Li9ya - "talian patrol ship ettica enforcing the arms em9argo”,  April . URL httpwww.youtu9e.comwatchvfw/PvsgsB
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taBe the right decision in the right moment”. 
From these Binds of statements, it would appear that participating states'A-O naval and air assets were 
eHuipped with technologies that offered an eOtremely high sensing capacity geared 9oth towards com9at 
operations and to monitoring the &SA. "t is highly pro9a9le that some of the sensing capa9ilities mentioned 
a9ove were sufficient to identify a 3odiac-style ru99er 9oat approOimately  metres long carrying  people. 
"n addition to their own surveillance systems, participating states'A-O assets 9enefited from sensors already 
in place in the frameworB of Operation Active Endeavour as well as from 'A-O &aritime commandhs capacity 
for data fusion and analysis. -he later was specifically designed to detect o9jects that appeared anomalous, 
such as a vessel drifting aimlessly for  days. "t thus appears highly impro9a9le that the migrantsh vessel went 
undetected for so long within one of the most highly patrolled areas in the world. &oreover the survivors claim 
that on  or  April  they encountered a military ship with one or two helicopters on-9oard that, despite 
clearly witnessing their distress, failed to assist them. 0e now turn to discussing the identification of this vessel.
... "dentification Elements Of -he &ilitary Ship Encountered y -he &igrants
As we have descri9ed in the “Chain of Events” section, the migrants claim to have encountered a military vessel 
after several days of drift. 0e assessed this time to 9e 9etween  and  April, towards the end of the afternoon. 
an Haile Ge9re descri9es its approach in the following way “At first the ship was very far. &ay9e  m. they 
then circled around us, three times, until they came very close, m. 0e are watching them, they are watching 
us. 0e are showing them the dead 9odies. 0e dranB water from the sea to show them we were thirsty. -he 
people on the 9oat tooB pictures, nothing else.” HG, -, E&$ is consistent, see . According to 
survivors then, a military vessel approached intentionally the migrantsh vessel until it came close enough to 
witness, and photograph, the evident distress of the migrants on 9oard and yet failed to assist them. 
-he first attempt at identifying the military vessel the migrants claim to have encountered was led 9y the journalist 
#acB ShenBer in his article for the Guardian. He mainly 9ased his assessment on A9u $urBe $e9atohs testimony, 
in which he claimed to have encountered an aircraft carrier with jets taBing off. After failing to receive any 
information from 'A-O, and following “eOtensive inHuiries to ascertain the identity of the aircraft carrier”, -he 
Guardian “concluded that it is liBely to have 9een the French ship Charles de Gaulle, which was operating in the 
&editerranean on those dates”. -his version was immediately contested 9y the French military, who claimed 
that at the time of events the Charles de Gaulle was operating in the Gulf of Sirte, faraway from the migrantsh 
vessel trajectory, and none of its other naval assets was involved in the case. "t later appeared that at the time 
news media had mostly 9een relying on A9u $urBe $e9atohs testimony, pro9a9ly 9ecause his eloHuence and 
eOcellent English gave him a role of “representation” in relation to the other survivors. His testimony though, 
while altogether very relia9le, was to our Bnowledge the only one to recall an aircraft carrier with jets taBing off 
A$$, -. Several other testimonies, such as those of an Haile Ge9re and Elias &ohamed $adi, mentioned 
a smaller military ship carrying two helicopters HG,  E&$, . -his version seems more plausi9le since 
there were many vessels corresponding to this description operating at the time of events. 
uring our interview with an Haile Ge9re, we presented him with several photographs of different naval assets 
in operation at the time of events. 0hen shown photographs of large aircraft carriers, he dismissed them as “too 
9ig”. ut he recognised the "talian vessel “orsini”, one of the “Commandante Class” ships in the "talian fleet, as 
 Ibid.
 #acB ShenBer, “Aircraft carrier left us to die, say migrants”,  &ay . URL httpwww.guardian.co.uBworldmaynato-ship-li9yan-migrants
 Ibid.
 Romain Rosso, “Le Charles-de-Gaulle accusV dhavoir laissV mourir  migrants”, Lh EOpresse,  &ai . URL 
httpwww.leOpress.fractualitemondele-charles-de-gaulle-accuse-d-avoir-laisse-mourir--migrants6.html
 -his was also the case for Emiliano oshs initial report on the case. “*uellhelicottero che non W tornato a salvarci”, RS",  April . URL 
httpinfo.rsi.chhomechannelsinformazioneinfo6on6line--Lelicottero-che-non--tornato-a-
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similar to the 9oat they sighted. He said “-he front section was very small, with only room for one helicopter, and 
one helicopter in the 9acB. b. 2es, eOactly liBe this, liBe two steps.” HG,  0hile an Ge9re Haile did not 
identify this specific ship, his testimony leads us to 9elieve that the military vessel the migrants encountered was 
within a similar class of vessels.
-here were many participating states'A-O naval assets operating at in the &SA at the time of events in this 
category that could correspond to the “two step” structure recognised 9y an Haile Ge9re. Amongst them are in 
particular frigates that incorporate in their design stealth features as, for instance, those in the "talian and French 
“Horizon” class, the “Andrea oria” and “For9in” those in the French “La Fayette” class, as the “Aconit” or those 
in the "talian “Comandante” class, as the already mentioned “orsini” and the “ettica” or those with a rather 
sHuared-off design as, for instance, those in the "talian “&aestrale” class, as the “Li9eccio” those in the Spanish 
“ilvaro de azSn” class, as the “&Vndez 'uYez. 
an Haile Ge9re provides further elements that 9ring us closer to identification. He claims that the vessel 9ore 
writing on the front side, which he recalled in fragments while writing it on paper “g&Fhbthere is a gh then " thinB 
gh and then " am not sure of the following num9ers. g&Fh is sure, gh is sure, may9e g&F bh” HG, -. 
Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegerBis remem9ers to have read a similar identification code on the side of the ship 
“-here was written &F   or something similar. "hm sure a9out the g&Fh acronym. -here was g&Fh written 
on it” F0-, -. 0e have not found any ship 9aring such writing on its side, although the structure of the 
writing an Haile Ge9re descri9es does correspond to that of an identification code for a military vessel.
an Haile Ge9re claims to have recognized a French flag floating on the top of the vesselhs centre tower HG, 
. He also 9elieves he saw French flags on the shoulder pads of the uniforms of some of the militaries on 
decB, as well as a rooster insignia at the level of a heart HG, . -his is a detail for which we have found no 
additional confirmation. However, amongst the “over one hundred people on decB” he recalls that those wearing 
what he recognised as military uniforms were a minority. Others were dressed in what he descri9es as a civil 
dress, and others still in a grey overall, liBe that of a mechanic HG,  and . 0hile it is common for sailors 
in the navy to wear overalls during naval operations see for eOample the French and "talian 'avy we have not 
found additional confirmation of the grey colour descri9ed. 
an descri9es the reaction of the “captain”, who he 9elieves was from a Francophone country, to these French 
em9lems “0hen the 9oat was circling around us, at the second circle the driver said g-hese are French, they 
are going to save us.h 0e asBed gHow do you Bnowh He replied g-he flag is French, the name is French, 
everything is Frenchh HG, . Filmon 0eldemichail -eBlegerBis also remem9ers to have read on the ship 
some words “which might have 9een French” and that other passengers claimed it was a French ship F0-, -
.
As we have noted a9ove, the migrantsh individual testimonies are remarBa9ly consistent with one another. 
Furthermore at least  naval assets were operating in the &SA 9oth in com9at operations and in patrolling the 
em9argo zone, and several amongst them were of the shape and size descri9ed 9y an Haile Ge9re and carried 
at least one helicopter. "t thus seems highly plausi9le that the migrants did encounter a military ship of the Bind 
descri9ed 9y the survivors, however we have not 9een a9le to further verify the particulars they mentioned so as 
to lead to the identification of the naval asset in Huestion. 
A further Huestion that remains unresolved is “0hy did the military vessel fail to assist the migrants despite 
witnessing evident signs of distress” According to an Haile Ge9rehs account, the military ship progressively 
came closer to the migrantsh vessel circling around the migrantsh vessel three times, and seemed to have 
had the intention to identify it andor assist it. 0hy did it not do so 0e have no plausi9le hypothesis to offer in 
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answer to this Huestion, which also left an Haile Ge9re deeply puzzled
“" have thought a9out this often, any human 9eing should have rescued us, and at least given us some food 
and water Even criminals should not 9e treated in this way. 0e had adults and children dying, we were drinBing 
water, asBing for help, 9ut they didnht give us anything, only taBing pictures. So its difficult for me to understand 
how the people on the ship could 9ehave this way. b -he helicopter also has a responsi9ility, 9ut when it left 
us we were still strong. ut when we met this ship  people or so had died, some were dying right then and 
there, on our laps. After that we lost hope. 0e Bnew that we would die little 9y little.” HG,  -
  %#    $ & &$   !R$!$ #$$#$   R#
"nitial evidence provided 9y the survivorsh testimonies mentioned encounters with military aerial and naval 
assets. Furthermore our drift model indicated that their vessel remained adrift for  days within 'A-Ohs maritime 
surveillance area and for the remaining three days within Li9yan territorial waters. -his entire zone was populated 
9y a large num9er of aerial and maritime assets deployed in support of the multi-state military operations in 
Li9ya. -aBen together these materials prompted our enHuiry into 'A-Ocollation involvement in the incident of 
the “left-to-die 9oat”.
0e can now say with certainty that
. -he migrantsh vessel remained for its entire  day trajectory within 'A-Ohs maritime surveillance area 
and Li9yan territorial waters. "t was 'A-Ohs mission within the frameworB of Operation Unified Protector 
to monitor all traffic in this area so as to prevent the flow of arms and mercenaries and prevent attacBs, 
9ut also, more generally, to protect civilians as per U'SCR 
. -his area was populated 9y at least  maritime assets as well as many additional aerial assets during 
the time of the event. -heir eOact maritime laydown is difficult to ascertain, 9ut we may say that the ships 
involved in monitoring the em9argo area were deployed throughout the entire &SA according to patrol 
sectors, while the naval assets involved in com9at operations were pro9a9ly concentrated along the 
Li9yan coast. 
. 'A-O maritime command in 'aples and participating states'A-O naval assets were informed of the 
presence of a vessel in distress, respectively 9y telephone, faO, and via maritime distress signals. -he 
information received clearly indicated the situation of distress and the necessity to assist the migrants
. Participating states'A-O had the detection capa9ility to detect the migrantsh vessel during its  days of 
drift 9acB towards the coast of 'orth Africa.
A high degree of involvement on the part of participating states'A-O forces in the “left-to-die 9oat” case 
emerges from these four Bey points. Participating states'A-O forces had the information and the a9ility to assist 
the migrants 9ut failed to do so in a way that would have prevented the deaths of  people. 
0ith the elements of evidence in our possession, we attempted to corro9orate the migrantsh statement claiming 
that they had encountered military aerial and naval assets that failed to assist them. 0e may now say that they 
are eOtremely convincing for the following reasons 
!" -he consistency of testimony 9etween the survivors.
!" Prior practices of assistance and vessel identification within 'A-Ohs maritime surveillance area 
corro9orates the migrant claims to having seen such ships.
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!" -he num9er and type of air and naval assets in operation in the area at that time suggest that the 
liBelihood of such sightings was entirely plausi9le.
0e have argued that the survivorsh claim that they encountered a military helicopter and a military ship that failed 
to assist them in a way that would have prevented their tragic fate, is highly pro9a9le given all the facts that we 
have gathered in the generation of this report. However further investigation and disclosure 9y the participating 
states'A-O will 9e reHuired to arrive at a definitive conclusion. 
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-his report has led us to inHuire into the events that led to death of  passengers of the “left-to-die 9oat” 
case, one important case amongst the over , migrants who lost their life in the &editerranean while fleeing 
Li9ya in . All these losses occurred despite the significant naval and aerial presence in the area due to 
Participating states'A-O operations in Li9ya.
"n attempting to answer the Huestion “what happened to the “left-to-die 9oat” and who was involved in the 
events leading to the deaths of  migrants”, we employed novel forms of visualisations and spatial analysis, 
which allowed us to cross-reference the testimonies of the survivors 9etween each other and with other verifia9le 
sources of data., such as GPS coordinates of the vessel provided for different moments of its trajectory and 
a drift model calculated specifically for this report. y com9ining these different sources we arrived at the 
conclusion that the account of the survivors was highly accurate and credi9le and we were a9le to produce a 
coherent and precise picture of the how the events unfolded through space and time.
Several actors were involved in the events leading to the tragic fate of the “left-to-die 9oat”. -he Gaddafi regime 
made the crossing of the &editerranean eOtremely dangerous for hundreds of people leaving Li9ya, and in the 
case of the “left-to-die-9oat” specifically. Secondly, according to the testimonies of the survivors, fishermen 
failed to assist the migrants they encountered in the open sea. -hirdly, "taly and &alta, although informed of 
the distress of the migrants and while the migrantsh vessel was on the threshold of the &altese SAR zone, did 
not intervene to rescue them or ensure that a rescue was coordinated. Finally, at least one patrol aircraft, one 
helicopter and a military ship, whose identities still remain unBnown, had direct contact with the 9oat. All these 
parties, although they were informed of the migrantsh distress and while they had the technical and logistical 
a9ility to assist the migrants, did not intervene in a way that could have averted the tragic fate of the passengers. 
-he migrantsh vessel drifted slowly, during  days, within one of the most surveilled maritime areas in the world, 
populated 9y at least  naval assets.
Reviewing the different degrees of involvement on the part of all the actors involved in the “left-to-die 9oat” case, 
what emerges 9eyond individual acts or modes of inaction is a generalised reluctance on the part of all parties 











idd-he account of 
events we have provided should serve as a first contri9ution to answering these Huestions, however only through 
further inHuiry and disclosure 9y all parties involved will they receive the definite answers they deserve.
 U'HCR, “&editerranean taBes record as most deadly stretch of water for refugees and migrants in ”, riefing 'otes,  #anuary . URL httpwww.unhcr.orgfef.html  
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For the purposes of this report, the duration of the Li9ya conflict is identified as spanning from  Fe9ruary , 
when pu9lic protests first 9egan against the Gaddafi regime in enghazi, to  Octo9er , the date when the 
'ational -ransitional Council officially declared an end to the conflict.  y  Octo9er, , people had arrived in 
"taly and , in &alta after fleeing Li9ya.  -he highlighted section on the map 9elow shows the central area of 
migration from Li9ya to "taly.  -he area contains national 9oundaries that 9elong to Li9ya, -unisia, "taly and &alta.
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$E2 E/E'-S
-he following is a summary of Bey events the migrantsh vessel left the Port of -ripoli 9etween  and  
G&- on  &arch  with  migrants on 9oard.  -he vessel was pro9a9ly sighted 9y a French aircraft which 
transmitted its coordinates to Rome &RCC.   After proceeding in the direction of Lampedusa for  -  hours, 
the migrants placed a distress call 9y satellite phone to an Eritrean priest 9ased in "taly.  -he priest, in turn, called 
the &RCC in Rome to alert them to the fact that there was a vessel in distress.  Shortly following this call, the 
&RCC in Rome pu9lished an Enhanced Group Call message and alerted 9oth &alta &RCC and 'A-O H* allied 
command in 'aples that a vessel was in distress. "t also provided them with the vesselhs geographic coordinates 
in latitude and longitude at  G&-. Following the 9roadcast of the vesselhs position, a helicopter arrived, o9-
served the 9oat and left. After this visit 9y the helicopter, the position of the 9oat was determined a second time 
as  nautical miles ''0 of the earlier position. -he migrants then waited  -  hours in the same area, where 
their reHuests for help from some fishermen went unheeded. Still in the same position, the vessel was visited for 
a second time 9y a military helicopter that dropped 9iscuits and water 9efore leaving. -he vessel then continued 
''0 towards Lampedusa for  d  hours 9efore running out of fuel at approOimately  G&- on  &arch, at 
which time the 9oat 9egan to drift.  -he 9oat drifted SS0 for  -  days 9efore it encountered a military ship.  On 




 eparture point at Port of -ripoli 9etween  and  U-C on  &arch.  oat first spotted 9y a French aircraft at  G&- on  &arch at position 
LA- ]h ', - LO' ]h E . GPS location of vessel  at  G&- on  &arch   at position LA-  . ' d LO'  . E as determined 9y the 
&RCC 9ased on locations esta9lished 9y the satellite phone provider -huraya. -he GPS position of the 9oat was determined a second time  at  G&- on 
 &arch at position LA-  . ' d LO'  . E, again 9ased on information provided 9y -huraya.  -he vessel 9egan to drift  within a . nm radius of 
position  . ' d  . E at approOimately  G&- on  &arch.  etween  and  April the migrants encounter a military ship   On  April the 



















1/  -he Port of -ripoli in the &edina area where the vessel in Huestion departed from  is one of two ports from which migrants were leaving during the 
conflict in Li9ya.  -he other site of departure, approOimately  Bilometers to the west, is the Sidi ilal port in #anzur   1/  Lorenzo Pezzani interviewing 
survivor aniel Haile Ge9re on  ecem9er .  -he image shows Pezzani and Haile Ge9rehs drawing of the migrantsh 3odiac style 9oat.  1/  Plan and 
Elevation of AS"S RH" model 0 .  1/  Specification sheet for AS"S 0 .  'ote Figs.  and  are provided as references for an RH" vessel type of 
approOimate length and do not provide the eOact manufacturer or model of vessel used 9y the migrants.  
F"GURES
/ESSEL
-he vessel used 9y the migrants was provided 9y the Li9yan military.  -he eOact manufacturer and model of the 
migranths vessel has not 9een esta9lished however, the survivorsh testimonies are consistent with a 3odiac-style 
inflata9le 9oat approOimately  meters in length.  From the information in our possession, it is unclear if it was 
a completely inflata9le vessel or rather a Rigid-Hulled "nflata9le oat RH" vessels are constructed of a solid 
formed hull mounted with inflata9le collars to maintain 9uoyancy. For the purpose of this report, and 9ased 
upon the dimensions provided 9y survivorsh testimonies, specifications from the AS"S 0  have 9een used as 
a guideline.  -he vessel used 9y the migrants left the Port of -ripoli with twelve -litre containers of fuel. 
COMMERCIAL BOATS
ASIS WB 12
Technical Specifications - Page 1/2
This material contains proprietary data belonging to ASIS Boats LLC. Unauthorized disclosure, use or reproduction will result in liability. ASIS reserves the right to change 
the specifications of this technical data sheet without prior notice. For more information, logon to www.asisboats.com
Dimensions
Overall length 11900 mm
Overall Beam 3770 mm
Internal Length 9600 mm
Internal Beam 2600 mm
Weight Empty 2500 Kg
Buoyancy Collar diameter 550mm
Capacity
Max No. of Persons* 25 Persons
Max Payload incl. Fuel* 3720 Kg
Floor Board Usable Area 22.2 m2
Buoyancy Volume 3758 L
* ISO 6185
Safety / Inflation
Number of Air Chambers 9 No.
Inflation Pressure 0.24 bar / 3.4 PSI
Intercommunication / Inflation Valves 9 No.
Pressure Release Valves 9 No.
Design Category (EC 94/25) --
Dimensions
Overall length 11900 mm
Overall Beam 3770 mm
Internal Length 9600 mm
Internal Beam 2600 mm
Weight Empty 2500 Kg
Buoyancy Collar diameter 550mm
Capacity
Max No. of Persons 25 Persons
MaxPayload incl. fuel* 3720 Kg
Floor Board Usable Area 22.2 m2
Buoyancy Volume 3758 L
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A"RCRAF- S"GH-"'G
On  &arch at  G&-, a French aircraft informed Rome &RCC of the sighting of a 9oat with a9out fifty per-
sons on-9oard. -he aircraft esta9lished the position of the 9oat and tooB a picture of the vessel that was sent to 
Rome &CRR.

1/  Picture taBen 9y the French aircraft and sent to Rome &RCC.
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POS"-"O'"'G A' ALER-
-he vesselhs location was esta9lished at three points during the migranths journey. After the first position was 
determined 9y the French aircraft, the second one was esta9lished using GPS coordinates 9y -huraya, the satel-
lite phone provider used 9y the migrants. -his location was pu9lished 9y the "talian Coast Guard in geographic 
coordinates latitude and longitude in an Enhanced Group Call EGC distress signal intended to alert other 
crafts in the area. A second alert containing the same information was 9roadcast in the form of a H2ROLA'- 
alert, which called for all vessels in the vicinity of the Sicily Straight H2ROLA'- areas ,  and  to Beep a 
“sharp looB out” for a “vessel in need of assistance.” A third position was esta9lished a9out  hours later ap-
proOimately nm ''0 of the previous one, again 9y -huraya.


1/ , -he "talian Coast Guard issued an "nmarsat-C EGCat  G&- on  &arch . -he "talian Coast Guard 9ased coordinates on the migrantsh satellite 
phone calls. All -huraya satellite phones are eHuipped with a GPS receiver that periodically transmits their locations to the -huraya gateway, and are accurate 
within  meters. 1/  A second H2ROLA'- 9roadcast warning was issued at  G&- on  &arch  communicating the same information.  1/ 	 
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HEL"COP-ER "E'-"F"CA-"O'
-he migrants claim that on  &arch their vessel was overflown 9y at least one military helicopter. espite the 
migrantsh reHuests for help, the aircraft only provided  9ottles of water and a few pacBets of 9iscuits 9efore leav-
ing.  ased on survivorsh descriptions, we have tried to identify the helicopter in Huestion among those that were 
participating to the military operations off the coast of Li9ya.
1/ 		 aniel Haile Ge9re writes the teOt that he saw on the side of the helicopter.  "t reads “RESCUE AR&2,” although he is not sure a9out the presence of the 
first word “RESCUE”.  1/ 	
  Haile Ge9re, when shown the image of an United $ingdom Army Air Corps 0estland LynO, recognizes that it has a similar color 
to the helicopter that hovered over the migrantsh 9oat. He says “LiBe this, it was mimetic with grey and light green” HG, .  1/ 	, A United $ingdom Army 
Air Corps 0estland LynO AH. photographed on9oard the H&S Ocean while maBing its port call in &alta Grand Har9our on  #une .  1/ 	 An air9orne 
United $ingdom Army Air Corps 0estland LynO. -he writing “AR&2” is visi9le on the initial portion of the tail.  1/ 	 -he air9orne Canadian 'avy CH- Sea 
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From the last position provided 9y the -huraya Satellite phonehs GPS signal, the vessel proceeded due ''0 for 
another  -  hours at a speed of approOimately  Bt 9efore running out of fuel.  From this point on until landing at 
3litan  days later, the vessel floated without any use of its motor. Richard Lime9urner, Senior Research Special-
ist in the epartment of Physical Oceanography at the 0oods Hole Oceanographic "nstitution, created a drift 
model for this report to simulate the path of the migrantsh vessel over this  days period.  Lime9urnerhs model 
tracBs the path of the vessel on the 9asis of ocean current data and wind data. -idal currents, which can influ-
ence drift tracB, were ignored for this mode as they are relatively small within the area in Huestion, and only occur 
periodically within a  hour cycle. 
A complete summary of Lime9urnerhs findings, methodology and data sources are included at the end of this 
report AnneO A.
1/ 	 -he difference 9etween the distance traveled over  hours and  hours at a speed of  Bt provides an area of  '& within which the vessel 9egan to drift.  
-his area 9ecomes the initial error in the drift model .  1/ 	, Over time, the margin of error in the drifting vesselhs tracB linearly decreases to an area of less 
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 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE
R"F- &OEL -"&EL"'E
-he model provides hourly positions of the vessel from  &arch at  G&- until  April at  G&-.
1/ 	 Hourly positions of the drifting vessel were calculated using daily 'ucleus for European &odelling of the Ocean 'E&O surface current data and hourly 
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 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE
&"L"-AR2 SH"P E'COU'-ER
-he vessel encountered a military ship approOimately midway 9etween its departure and landing dates.  Survivor 
testimony suggests that this encounter occurred at some point 9etween  and  April.   uring this  hour pe-
riod, the drift model shows that the vessel traveled . Bm . '&, the shortest distance covered during any 
two day period 9etween  &arch and  April.   uring this period the wind decreased and the ''0 current 
9egan to dominate drift, and the vessel remained in a relatively small area.  Late on  April the winds strength-
ened and the vessel continued to drift SE again. -he survivors descri9e an encounter that happened 9etween  
and  April during which a two-tiered military vessel eHuipped with  or  helicopters came within  meters of 
the migrantsh 9oat.  Personnel on the military vessel tooB photographs of the migrants 9efore leaving. 


1/ 	 rift path for dates  and  April.  1/ 
 Lorenzo Pezzani interviewing survivor aniel Haile Ge9re on  ecem9er .   Haile Ge9re writes down 
the num9ers he remem9ers on the shiphs sides “"t had a num9er written on the front side g&Fhbthere is a gh then " thinB gh and then " am not sure of the 
following num9ers. g&Fh is sure, gh is sure, may9e g&F bh” HG, .   0hen shown the image of the "talian ship orsini, he recognizes the same shape 
of the ship that the migrants encountered  “-he front section was very small, with only room for  helicopter, and  helicopter in the 9acB, liBe thisbyes, eOactly 
liBe this, liBe two steps” HG, . 
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SAR CO/ERAGE
&oderate to fine resolution satellite resources, such as optical satellite imagery, are not normally collected over 
the open ocean.  However, Synthetic Aperture Radar SAR data is routinely collected over the &editerranean 
Sea.  As part of this report, a survey of availa9le SAR data was taBen for all availa9le coverage within the Straight 
of Sicily for the period of  &arch d  April. -he following SAR providers all have varying amounts and types 
of coverage over this area during the time frame i-erraSAR-1, Palsar, COS&O SBy-&ed, Radarsat , Radarsat 
 and Envisat-.  For the purposes of this report, Envisat data was acHuired for  &arch and  &arch which 
provides a snapshot of maritime activity in the area. 

1/ 













 ata displayed Envisat- Sensor ASAR0S,Product ASA60S66P,Swath 0S, Start -- ., Stop -- . 
1/ 
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SAR /ESSEL E-EC-"O'
-he SAR returns appear as 9right piOels against the surrounding sea surface eight times the 9rightness on aver-
age in the data analyzed for this report.  "n the case of the Envisat data, low varia9ility of the 9acBground sea 
piOels means that even moderately 9right returns indicate the presence of vessels.  
1/ 
, Overview of ship detections from  &arch  Envisat data  with enlargements of  and .  -he 9rightness of  is due to an interference pattern 
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 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE
SAR A'AL2S"S -  &ARCH
For this report, Lawrence FoO """, Hum9oldt State University Emeritus Professor of Remote Sensing and consult-
ant, provided analysis of the  and  &arch Envisat- data.  FoOhs analysis provides estimates of ship length 
and Huantification of confidence for all returns considered pro9a9le vessels.  Envisat- radar returns considered 
pro9a9le vessels for this report appear, on average,  times the signal strength of the surrounding sea surface.  
-he resolution of the Envisat- data allows for high confidence detection of ships  meters and longer.  On  
&arch the U.S. epartment of efense disclosed that  'A-O ships were 9eing deployed in the frame of the 
 military intervention in Li9ya.  of  ships were a9ove  meters in length. Return 6 was 9etween  
and  '& away from the shiphs drift, while return 6 was 9etween  and  '& away and return 6 was 
9etween  and  '& away.
1/ 
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 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE
SAR A'AL2S"S -  &ARCH
Return 6 was 9etween  and  '& away from the shiphs drift, while return 6 was 9etween  and  
'& away and return 6 was 9etween  and  '& away. 
1/ 
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SEARCH A' RESCUE 3O'ES
-he area in Huestion is divided into "talian, &altese and -unisian Search and Rescue Regions SRR. SRR have 
9een internationally esta9lished for the eOpress purpose of coordinating rescue operations and optimizing their 
effectiveness, efficiency and safety.  States are o9ligated to eOercise SRR services in the area under their respon-
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'A-O &AR"-"&E SUR/E"LLA'CE AREA &SA
uring the months of &arch and April , a 'A-O led arms em9argo was implemented in the waters off of Li9-
ya. -he stated mission of the em9argo, titled Operation Unified Protector, was to prevent the flow of arms, related 
material and mercenaries to Li9ya.  -welve nations provided naval assets to enforce the em9argo elgium, ul-
garia, Canada, France, Greece, "taly, 'etherlands, Spain, Romania, -urBey, United $ingdom and United States.  
Ships transiting through the em9argo area were reHuired to notify 'A-O of their cargo and destination.  Using a 
synthesis of Automatic Ship "dentification systems as well as surveillance and intelligence means, 'A-O verified 
shipping activity in the region to separate legitimate commercial, humanitarian and private traffic from suspicious 
vessels that warranted closer inspection. -he &aritime Surveillance Area &SA encompassed 9y the Em9argo 
3one was esta9lished first on  &arch  and was enforced within the following 9oundaries 'orthern Limit 
  ', 0estern Limit   '   E, Southern Limit Li9ya -erritorial 0aters, Eastern Limits   '   
E and   '  E. -his area was revised on  April  at which point the 'orthern Limit was changed  
'.
1/ 
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PAR-"C"PA-"'G S-A-ES'A-OhS SE'S"'G CAPA"L"-"ES
'A-Ocoalition naval and aerial assets were eHuipped with technologies that offered an eOtremely high sensing 
capacity geared 9oth towards com9at operations and to the monitoring of the &aritime Surveillance Area. -he 
different sensing capa9ilities were shared 9etween naval and aerial assets, as eOplained 9y Commander Craig 
SBjerpen, Captain of H&CS Charlottetown, in a video posted on natochannel.tv on  April   “0hat we do 
is linB up all our radar images together, all the ships, and from that we create sort of a map of all contacts in the 
area. 0e are also worBing with aircrafts that are tracBing vessels. And from that we have a full picture of all ves-
sels in the area.”
1/ 
 "nside French E-F A0ACS aircraft. 1/  "nside the Operations Room of H&CS Charlottestown Canada. 1/ 	 "nside 'A-Ohs 'aples &aritime 
Command. Still from the 'A-O video “Operation Unified Protector.” 1/ 
 "nside the operations room of "talian frigate ettica, as it sails towards its patrol area, 
“near the 9order 9etween -unisia and Li9ya.”  &iBe &\hle9erger, 'A-O correspondent on9oard, eOplains while descri9ing a monitor presenting maritime traffic 
and sHuares delimiting large areas “-he area north of Li9ya has 9een divided into patrol sectors assigned to each 'A-O ship. y sharing information they can 
9e more effective, and ensure that vessels are continuously tracBed as they pass from one sector to another.” Still from the 'A-O video “"talian patrol ship ettica 






 FORENSIC OCEANOGRAPHY: LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT CASE
'A-O ASS"S-A'CE A- SEA
'A-O has stated that during the military operations, “'A-O ships have directly assisted in the rescue of more 
than  people in distress at sea and through coordination with national authorities and coast guards, 'A-O 
has facilitated the rescue of many hundreds more.”  -he review of a particular case of rescue that occurred 
9etween  and  &arch  and saw the involvement of the Canadian H&CS Charlottetown and the "talian 
E-'A, provides important insight into the way 'A-O conducted its assistance to migrants.
1/  Picture used in the Canadian 'avy magazine  Lieutenant &ichael &c0hinnie, “H&CS Charlottetown assists drifting migrant vessel”, 
, /ol. , 'o.  Summer , p.  to illustrate a rescue operation performed 9y the H&CS Charlottetown on  &arch .  "n the 9acBground it is 
possi9le to see the H&CS Charlottetown itself, recogniza9le from its characteristic chimney openings.  1/  Picture presented at a 'A-O press 9riefing in 
russels on  &ay . -he original caption of the picture reads “On  &arch  E-'A rescued a stricBen 9oat off the Li9ya coast with  migrants, and 
carried out  medvac to Lampedusa,  the first to taBe ashore a mother with her just 9orn children and the second for a pregnant young woman that unfortunately 
lost her children.”  1/  Picture presented at the same press 9riefing mentioned in the caption of Fig. , with the same original caption.  "n this image it is 
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1. Introduction 
On March 27, 2011 a ~10 m rubber boat overloaded with 72 migrants departed the port 
of Gargash adjacent to the Medina of Tripoli, Libya. This vessel was bound for 
Lampedusa Island, Italy 160 nm (nautical miles) to the north northwest. Approximately 
30 hours after departure the fuel was depleted and the vessel began drifting for 14 days 
under the influence of the wind and current. On April 10 the vessel came ashore on a 
beach near Zlitan, Libya with only 11 survivors. Other vessels near the drifting refugee 
vessel during the 14 day drift did not render any assistance. This report describes an 
effort to model the trajectory of the refugee vessel over the 14 days from when the drift 
began to the vessel’s final grounding on the beach at Zlitan. The objective of this drift 
model is to help identify other vessels near the refugee vessel and inquire why they did 
not give assistance. 
2. Chronology of Events 
Note: all times in this report will be GMT. Distances will be reported in nm (1 nautical 
mile = 1.85 km). Speeds at sea are given in kt (knots = nautical miles/hour) 
27.03.2011, between 0000 and 0200: vessel departs Tripoli 
27.03.2011, 1652 Tel/GPS position #1 - 33º 58.2’ N  12!º 55.8’ E, 66.6nm/15hrs = 4.43kt  
27.03.2011, 19.08 GMT: Tel/GPS position #2 - 34º 07.11’ N - 12!º 53.24’ E, after which 
they waited 4-5hrs 
28.03.2011, around 0100 the vessel starts to navigate again in the approximate direction 
of Lampedusa 
28.03.2011, between 0600 and 0800: fuel runs out, adrift begins. Two time/position 
possibilities for the start of the drift could be calculated:  
- if the vessel started to drift at 0600 (after 5hrs navigation) 22.2 nm north northwest of 




- if the vessel started to drift at 0800 (after 7hrs navigation) 31.1 nm north northwest of 
last GPS position 
10.04.2011: ashore at Zlitan 32° 29.935' N  14° 33.926' E 
3. Model Description 
The track of the vessel is assumed to be due to the influence of ocean currents and the 
wind. Tidal currents also influence the vessel’s track, but are ignored in this model since 
these currents are relatively small and mainly periodic every 24 hours in the sea just north 
of Tripoli and Zlitan.  
Ocean currents were obtained from the MyOcean website    
http://www.myocean.eu.org/index.php/products-services/catalogue.   MyOcean provides 
data mainly from EuroGOOS Regional alliances which have deeply contributed to 
structure the European Operational Oceanography community. The ocean currents were 
actually provided by the Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia (INGV) in Italy. 
INGV uses NEMO (Nucleus for European Modeling of the Ocean), a state-of-the-art 
modeling framework for oceanographic research, operational oceanography, seasonal 
forecasts and climate studies. See http://www.nemo-ocean.eu/
Wind data at the Lampedusa Island airport was obtained from EuroWeather 
http://www.eurometeo.com/english/home. Weather data at Libyan meteorological 
stations was unreliable in early 2011. 
The refugee vessel was estimated to begin drifting at 0700 March 28, 2011 from 34° 
24.792'N  12° 48.576'E after motoring at 4.4 kt toward Lampedusa Island for 6 hours 
from the last GPS position #2. 
Hourly positions of the drifting vessel were calculated using the daily NEMO model 
surface current data and the hourly Lampedusa airport wind data. Vessels at sea usually 
drift at 3-5% times the wind speed depending on the cross sectional area of the vessel 
above and below the waterline. For the refugee rubber boat similar to a Zodiac we 
initially choose 4% of the wind speed for the vessels drift. Then we adjusted the windage 
to 4.8% for the estimated trajectory to end at Zlitan on April 10, 2011. 
4. Results 
The estimated track of the refugee vessel is shown as a red line in Figs. 1-3. Labeled in 
Fig. 1 are Tripoli where the vessel departed, GPS1 and GPS2 where the vessel’s time and 
location were known, Adrift - the location where the vessel ran out of fuel and the drift 
began at 0700 on March 28, 2011, and Zlitan, Libya where the vessel finally came 
ashore. Lampedusa Island is the large island near the northern edge of Fig. 1. Also shown 




model. Yellow arrows indicating surface current speed and direction are shown every 
6.25 km. A 25 cm/sec (0.5 kt) scale arrow is shown in the upper portion of the image. 




Fig. 2 Estimated track (red) of the refugee vessel adrift during 2011 with lat/lon. 




The error in the model’s estimated drift track was initially due to the uncertainty of the 
time and position where the vessel ran out of fuel and began to drift. An estimated error 
of +/- 2 hours to the time when fuel ran out and a speed of 4.0 kt implies the initial error 
around the Adrift position shown in Figs. 1-3 was a circle with a 8 nm radius. 
Since the final location of the drifting vessel was known we can assume the error in the 
drifting vessel’s track linearly decreases in time to a circle with less than 2.2 nm after 
April 5, 2011 and less than 1 nm after April 8. 
5. Summary 
The estimated vessel drift was more strongly dominated by the southeastward winds than 
the surface currents by a factor of 2:1. The surface currents were predominantly south 
westward except near the coast of Libya where they were east southeastward parallel to 
the coast. The wind was generally east southeastward to southward during March/April 
2011. 
One limitation of the model estimated refugee vessel drift was the use of Lampedusa 
Airport wind data to represent the wind for the entire region being modeled. The 
Lampedusa meteorological data included atmosphere pressure, wind speed and direction, 
air temperature, humidity, visibility, rainfall and was reported regularly and appeared to 
be of good quality. Other meteorological data from Libya and Tunis for March/April 
2011 had large time gaps and was limited in parameters recorded. Probably the wind data 
from Lampedusa was good over the open ocean but less representative within 10 km of 
the coast of Libya.  
See the file named “model_track_animation.kml” for a Google Earth animation of the 
estimated refuge vessel’s drift. When this file opens in Google Earth and a time slider 
appears at the top. Two pointers on the time slider can be separated to control the time 
stamp labeling of the animation. Try sliding the right slider closer to the left slider. On 
the top right above the time slider a play/pause button can be toggled to control the 
animation.  
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Two years ago, we published a report1 on what came to be known as the “left-to-die” 
boat case. Co-authored with the architectural office SITU Studio, the report used imaging, 
mapping, and modelling technologies in order to produce a visual and spatial picture2 of 
how, in March 2011, sixty-three migrants lost their lives in the Central Mediterranean 
while attempting to reach the small Italian island of Lampedusa from the coast of Libya.
 The passengers of the “left-to-die” boat were amongst the over 27,000 people who 
fled Libya towards European shores (over 1,000,000 people3 fled to neighbouring countries 
in North Africa) after the beginning of the uprising against Gaddafi and the following 
international military intervention. These crossings occurred in particularly precarious 
conditions – with the Gaddafi regime playing an active role in forcing migrants onto boats 
without regard for even the minimal safety measures. As a result, over 1.500 deaths were 
recorded4 among them, one of the all-time highs. These deaths however occurred at a 
time when the militarization and surveillance of the EU’s maritime frontier was at its 
apex. The usual assets of national border police from both sides of the Mediterranean, 
were reinforced by over forty military ships and many patrol aircrafts deployed by western 
states off the Libyan coast in support of the NATO-led international military intervention. 
This placed these deaths squarely in the most highly surveyed waters in the entire world, 
and there were strong indications that military forces were failing5 in their obligation 
to rescue migrants in distress, despite possessing the requisite means of surveillance to 
witness their plight.
 The initial testimonies of the nine survivors of the “left-to-die” boat case provided 
a devastating indictment of this deadly inaction: they claimed that they were left to drift 
for 14 days in the area monitored by NATO, despite sending a distress call as well as 
encountering at least one military helicopter and a military ship. With the aim of identifying 
direct responsibility for these deaths, a loosely associated network of journalists, NGOs6 
and institutions such as the Council of Europe7 launched parallel investigations on the 
case.
 In support of this endeavour, our report corroborated the survivors testimonies 
with a wide range of digital mapping and remote sensing technologies – from drift 
modelling to determine the trajectory of the drifting migrants’ boat to satellite radar 
imagery to detect military vessels in proximity.
 As narrated in a video animation that we have recently produced8, by using 
AFTERMATH
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surveillance technologies against the grain, we were able to read the traces left on the 
surface of the sea. Turning the ocean itself into a witness for interrogation, we reconstructed 
and mapped as accurately as possible what happened to this vessel.
 While none of the parallel investigations on this case was able to determine the 
identity of the helicopter and vessels that entered into direct contact with the migrants 
in distress, they all concurred that the account of the survivors was highly accurate. In 
our report, we established with certainty that the Italian and Maltese Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centres, as well as NATO command, were informed of the location and 
distress of the migrants, and that there were several naval assets in the vicinity of the boat 
that had the ability to detect and assist it, but that none of these actors intervened in a 
way that could have averted the 63 deaths. The collective failure to assist the passengers 
amounted to murdering them without touching their bodies, turning the winds and 
currents into a deadly weapon.
 On the basis of our report and the other investigations, a coalition of NGOs has 
filed legal cases9 against several of the states participating in the military operations in 
Libya, including Italy, France, Spain and Belgium, and submitted Freedom of Information 
requests in Canada, the US, and the UK. The Dutch Senator Tineke Strik also sent, on 
behalf of the Council of Europe, official demands to all actors involved to ask for further 
details about their (in)actions.
 In the process, no element either of our or the other reconstructions has been 
disproved. No public statement, no journalistic investigation, no legal inquiry has even 
tried to challenge the facts as we have reconstructed them. On the contrary, a French judge 
reviewing the case lauded the, “exhaustive investigations by prestigious international 
bodies”, before using the rigour of our inquiry to justify her refusal to investigate the case 
any further, claiming, on the unique basis of the (non)answer by the French military (i.e., 
the accused), that French assets were not deployed in the area.
This pattern has repeated itself in all the different procedures. As Strik summarizes in her 
recent follow up report10:
 “I received denials, referrals back to NATO and/or the member states, or, in some 
cases, no answer at all. (…) Legal cases and Freedom of Information applications 
are being pursued in a number of the member states implicated but seemingly in 
vain.”
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In tortuous diplomatic non-answers (of which the correspondence contained in Strik’s 
follow up report provides a striking example), NATO and participating states have failed 
to provide exhaustive answers to simple questions such as the location of their assets 
during the time of the events (which are certainly meticulously recorded in their assets’ 
log books) or justify their (non) response to the distress call. Neither have they sought to 
disprove the allegation of the survivors that they were visited twice by a military helicopter 
and encountered a large military ship. It is as if the huge military surveillance apparatus 
that refused to see and react to the slow death of the 63 passengers over a period of 15 
days had now itself become invisible to public scrutiny. While fully visible to the public, 
the collective crime of which the passengers have been the victims has remained invisible 
to the law.
 As a result of the lack of response and legal inquiry, not a single actor has been 
made responsible for the deaths of the 63 passengers. The indifference which led to their 
being abandoned to the winds and currents, continues to plague the demand for justice of 
the survivors, perpetuating their drift even on firm land. Such a continued impunity sends 
out the message to all actors operating at sea that migrants can be abandoned to their 
deaths with no consequence. And in effect, similar incidents have repeated this since.
THE MECHANISM OF DEATH BY POLICY: ILLEGALISATION, MILITARISATION 
AND NON-ASSISTANCE
In her June 2014 follow-up report, Strik notes importantly that several recent incidents – 
including two of them that occurred near Lampedusa on October 3 and 11,11 causing the 
death of more than 550 people - demonstrate not only that justice has not been dellivered to 
the survivors of the left-to-die boat case, but that no lessons have been learned from it. The 
October 11, 2013 shipwreck, which we have jointly documented with the WatchTheMed 
network, effectively seems in many ways the tragic repetition of the left-to-die case: a boat 
carrying more than 400 people started taking in water after it was shot by a Libyan vessel. 
Despite the Italian and Maltese coast guard being warned of the imminent distress of the 
passengers, rescue was delayed for over 5 hours and patrol vessels arrived only 1h after the 
boat had sunk and more than 200 people had died.
 If this is the last case of migrants’ death being caused by the failure to assist them 
when in distress, several other incidents related to different causes have continued to 
prolong the list of close to 15.000 documented deaths at the EU’s maritime borders over 
the last 20 years. As the very periodiziation of these deaths makes evident – the count 
starts at the end of the 80s, when visa restrictions were imposed by EU states towards 
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the non-Europeans and the first bodies of migrants washed away on European shores – 
these are less “tragedies” than deaths by policy, produced by the combined mechanisms of 
illegalisation, militarisation and refusal to assist. 
 The initial denial of visas to access the EU’s territory produces ripple effects 
throughout global space, with bordering practices enforced by or on behalf of the EU 
extending ever further within and without EU territory, thereby precaritizing non-
European migrants’ entire trajectory. As they arrive on the southern Mediterranean shore, 
they are forced to resort to dangerous means of crossing and rely on smuggling networks, 
which usually provide boats in poor condition, overload them to maximize their profit, 
and offer only minimal - if any - security measures. While one should not deny the 
responsibility of smugglers and authorities that allow them to operate - without the EU’s 
policy of illegalisation, migrants would not resort to them.
 Secondly, in order to detect and intercept illegalized migrants, border patrols and 
surveillance means were deployed by EU member states. Frontex (the European border 
agency), as well as states located on the southern shore of the Mediterranean were put 
under pressure by the EU, thus effectively turning the Mediterranean into a vast frontier 
zone. This militarization on the one hand leads to repeated acts of direct physical violence 
by border guards – such as shootings, collisions12, and punctured boats13, but also push-
backs - which are not only illegal according to international law but may involve the use 
of violence as has recently14 been the case in Greece recently. But the most deadly effect 
of militarisation is less direct. In the attempt to evade border guards and avoid being 
intercepted, deported and violated, migrants use longer and more perilous routes, which 
cost more lives. Over the last 20 years, the militarisation of the EU’s maritime frontier 
has thus not succeeded in stopping illegalised crossings, but has caused the splintering of 
trajectories to more dangerous routes.
 Finally, as a consequence of the very precarious condition that migrants are forced 
to resort to, they regularly encounter situations of distress – with failing motors, water 
entering the boat or loss of direction - and call on the rescue agencies operating in the 
area or the many vessels transiting in the Mediterranean for help. Nevertheless, because 
rescuing migrants at sea entails taking responsibility for the processing of the asylum 
requests or for their deportation, coastal states have grown increasingly reluctant to assist 
migrants in distress. While international conventions on the Laws of the Sea have sought 
to ensure the responsibility to rescue passengers in distress regardless of nationality or 
status, coastal states use overlapping Search and Rescue areas, conflicting conventions and 
differing interpretation of international law to evade their responsibility.
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 Furthermore, the criminalisation of assistance by states – fisherman for example 
have been put on trial for “assisting clandestine migration” after rescuing migrants – has 
also been a disincentive for seafarers to comply with their obligation to provide assistance. 
Here too then, while one should in no way diminish the responsibility of specific actors 
for practices of non-assistance – fishermen, commercial ships, or, as we have seen in the 
left-to-die boat case, the military and coast guard itself - it is clear that their behaviour is 
framed by the EU’s migration policy of generalised reluctance to accept non-European 
migrants and refugees on its territory. As such, cases of non-assistance are not “accidents” 
or simply the product of malevolent actors, but rather occur on a structural basis.
 Governed by a partial and deterritorialised sovereignty regime which enables 
EU states and agencies to selectively expand their elastic bordering practices or retract 
from their responsibility to assist passengers in distress, the Mediterranean Sea has thus 
become a space of deeply hierarchised and segmented mobility: speedy and secure for 
certain goods and privileged passengers, slow and deadly for the unwanted. This regime 
produces deaths on a large scale far from any civilian gaze. This loss of life remains largely 
unaccounted for and – with most bodies remaining unidentified in their liquid grave – 
unmournable.
POST OCTOBER 3: INTENSIFIED MILITARISATION UNDER A HUMANTITARIAN 
VARNISH
The public outcry that followed the death of more than 550 people in two successive 
shipwrecks in early October 2013 seemed, for a fleeting moment, to indicate that suddenly 
a realisation of the deadly effects of the EU’s migration policy was emerging, and that a 
window of opportunity to rethink another policy had been opened at the cost of these 
lives.
 However, instead of questioning the very migration policies which had produced 
those and the previous deaths, the EU took what it called a “tragedy” as an opportunity 
to increase surveillance and militarisation, albeit under a humanitarian varnish: North 
African states were urged once again to prevent migrants from leaving their shores; 
Frontex, the European border agency, was called upon to extend its operations to the 
whole Mediterranean and received extra funding to this effect; a new surveillance tool 
which had long been in development - Eurosur, the European Border Surveillance 
System  – was launched with the claim15 that it would help prevent deaths; finally, a 
large scale operation – Mare Nostrum – , defined by the Italian Ministry of Defence16 as 
a “humanitarian operation, […] as well as a security one”, was launched by the Italian 
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government. However, the claims of these “new” initiatives to save lives are dubious at best 
and rather show how humanitarian arguments have themselves been enlisted within the 
same logic of closure and militarisation that, as we have argued, is the root cause of death 
and violence at the border.
 The claim of the proponents of Eurosur that while current surveillance technologies 
have difficulty detecting small boats used by migrants, Eurosur will be able to do so through 
cutting-edge remote sensing technologies – such as drones, radars, and satellites – does 
not withstand the test. On the one hand, the cases of the left-to-die boat and of the 11 
October 2013 blatantly demonstrate that it is not enough to detect boats in distress to save 
lives. On the contrary, migrants are regularly abandoned in all knowledge of their fate. 
Furthermore, although Eurosur was launched in December 2013, concurring with many 
critical assessments including our own17, Frontex has recently admitted18 that Eurosur 
does not have the capacity to date to detect migrants’ numerous small boats in such as vast 
maritime area.
 As for the operation Mare Nostrum, it has not been able to put an end to deaths at sea, 
despite the deployment of 6 Navy ships as well as several aerial assets, including unmanned 
drones. Since the start of the operation, the number of crossings have intensified. While 
over 50.000 people19 have been saved since the beginning of the year, (among which are 
many Syrians families fleeing the civil war) several shipwrecks20 happened in the last weeks 
costing the lives21 of tens of people have shown once again that no surveillance apparatus 
will ever be able to avoid these deaths. Instead, what Mare Nostrum has achieved, has been 
to transform rescue at sea into border enforcement operations that expedite deportation 
of certain migrants, while slowing down the mobility of others who are stranded in the 
camps of southern Italy with no further assistance.22
 As such, we see that the new operational measures implemented by the EU in 
the aftermath of the October 2013 “tragedies” are far from offering an alternative the 
continuing deaths of migrants at sea, and rather represent a continuation of the very 
practices that have caused them in the first place.
 On the policy level, the response so far leaves little more hope. A “Mediterranean 
Task Force”23 was created by the EU Commission, which made a number of proposals 
to the December 2013 EU Council meeting. These were already mostly geared towards 
strengthening border controls, but the little humanitarian provisions they contained – 
such as increasing resettlement of refugees and opening further possibilities for asylum 
applications to EU member states from outside the EU - were thrown out24 by the Council 
in December and would in any case have been insufficient to put an end to the death of 
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migrants at sea. Neither further strengthening border controls, nor even the desirable 
guarantee of further compliance with human rights will bring the death of migrants to an 
end, for these deaths have, as their root cause, the denial of legal access to non-European 
migrants. Short of lifting this ban, these deaths will continue.
CHALLENGING THE CLOSURE OF THE BORDERS
In the month prior to the EU Council’s meeting of the 26-27 June which will address 
long term European migration policy21 groups of activists have been performing collective 
acts of transgression of the EU borders. A transnational Refugee March,25 composed to a 
large extent by asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants has been travelling 
from Strasbourg to Brussels, ignoring the restrictions on movements imposed on them, 
to demand an end to the policies of border closure. It has been joined by caravans of 
migrants and activists from Italy who, on board of a no border train26 have been following 
the routes that migrants rescued in the Mediterranean are usually forced to take in hiding 
on their way to other European countries. European nationals, migrants, refugees have 
challenged together the rhetoric of Europe as a space of “free circulation” and questioned 
their very division into different categories of people, some of which can move, some who 
cannot. They demand not only freedom but also equality of movement.
 In performing collectively and publicly the transgression of the EU’s internal 
borders, they also echo the every-day clandestine crossings of all the other extended external 
borders of the EU – which, in practice, extend from the Sahara to the Mediterranean, 
passing by the fences of Ceuta and Melilla. Together, they remind us that human beings 
are essentially free in their spatial mobility, which persists independently of any attempt to 
govern them.
 Despite this daily reality of movement across borders, demands for freedom of 
movement and the right to a safe, legal access to European territory have often been 
portrayed as a distant, unrealistic utopia imagined by a handful of dreamers. But don’t 
more than 20 years of continued illegalised migration and deaths at the EU’s borders amply 
demonstrate that what is utterly unrealistic is in fact the banning of non-EU migrants and 
the attempt to stem their mobility? The reality is that the number of deaths at the borders 
of Europe has augmented under the effects of militarization and will continue to rise short 
of anything less than a radical opening of our political imagination towards freedom of 
movement.
 The actual movement of migrants point towards such a horizon, as do the collective 
demands of migrants’ rights organisations recently expressed in the Lampedusa Charter27 
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or through the joint call of the Migreurop network.28 Scholars have also explored what the 
recognition of a Right to Mobility29 might entail.
 Certainly, a first incentive for such a reorientation to take place would be to make 
EU states and policymakers accountable for their (in)actions and the consequences of 
their practices that produce deaths on a large scale. Rather than an exceptional event, 
the story of the “left-to-die” boat narrated in our video is just one of the many examples 
of deaths by policy. This is why, beyond individual responsibilities, bringing justice to 



















































FROM TACTICS TO STRATEGY, AND BACK AGAIN: 
RETHINKING RESEARCH AS INTERVENTION
233Postscript
 “Conflicts create a sense of postponement. […] But ours is an endless struggle.”1
 DAAR – Architecture after revolution
The Forensic Oceanography project has involved me in the complex terrain between 
political activism, academic research and critical practice, confronting me not only with a 
vast tradition of political struggle but also with a series of dilemmas and difficult decisions. 
Facing these challenges has meant constantly renegotiating my own position and that 
of our collective project within and against the European border regime. This chapter, 
more self-reflexive in nature, aims to offer some considerations on the process of working 
through these pitfalls and on the thinking that has oriented it. Rather than providing an 
overall overview, however, it will follow my personal trajectory across these issues, using 
as guide the work of some of the people I have had the good fortune of working with. In 
what follows, I will first position Forensic Oceanography within a wider set of practices 
that have attempted to rethink the relation between research and political practice. Then 
I will discuss the temporality of its political engagement as a reversal of the traditional 
relation between short-term tactical objective and long-term strategic vision, finding in 
(a qualified) freedom of movement a yardstick in relation to which to rethink its modes 
of operation. Finally, I will discuss how this reversal has informed some of the project’s 
recent developments.
CRITICAL PROXIMITIES   
Forensic Oceanography stems from my direct, subjective encounter with the people, 
practices, discourses and geographies that constitute the sea as frontier as a material field 
of struggle. As a practice-based project, it has not engaged with its subject matter from 
afar, nor has it tried to keep the critical distance often deemed necessary for unbiased – 
and therefore academically valid – research, but as rather tried to use intervention as a 
heuristic device. 
 The imperative for a direct engagement with one’s own object of research could in 
part be understood as a response to the crisis of critical thought and its growing inability to 
“fulfil its transformative promises”.2 Critique, as “the primary mode of practicing theory”, 
has been increasingly accused of lacking “the capacity both to transform the existing 
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structures of power and to create alternative social arrangements”.3 This has spurred several 
scholars to rethink the relationship between theory and (political) practice beyond the 
capacity to produce critical judgements. Michel Foucault is, of course, a crucial reference 
here. His attempt to redefine the role of critique shaped not only his writings but also his 
own personal trajectory towards a more active political involvement in the last stages of 
his life, as already recalled in chapter 2 in the discussion of the “Bateau pour le Vietnam” 
initiative and his work with the Groupe d’Information sur les prisons. Foucault saw the task 
of the critic as that of diagnosing the present, and always searching for the limits imposed 
on life, as well as for the potentialities for transforming it by transgressing those limits. He 
describes this task beautifully in 1984 from a reading of Kant. While for Kant the question 
was to know what limits knowledge must give up the attempt of crossing, Foucault argued 
that the critical question must be turned around. The critic should ask: in what is given 
to us as universal and necessary, what is the part which is contingent and arbitrary? His 
understanding of critique thus involved a reversal from a critique of necessary limitations 
to a practical critique of possible transgression.4
 Foucault’s position has inspired, in more or less direct ways, a whole series of 
authors, to the point that the “critique of critique” has become almost a genre in its own 
right. Michael Hardt, for instance, has contributed to this area by referring to the late 
writings of the French philosopher on truth-telling in ancient Greece, and in particular in 
Cynic philosophy. The militant life of the Cynics comes to represent for Hardt/Foucault 
an alternative form of theoretical engagement insofar as it “does not stand above the life 
of others […] as a vanguard organization, but rather seeks to change social life while 
being a part of it, exposed to others”.5 Importantly, what is at stake here is “not merely a 
matter of registering or even evaluating the present, but acting on and transforming it.”6 
From a more epistemological perspective, Latour also famously indicates the limits of 
critique and its “debunking impetus”, which makes it increasingly unable to get closer to 
and assemble around what he calls “matters of concern”.7 Jacques Rancière, finally, takes 
dissensus as a crucial process of subjectivisation that can break the vicious and endless task 
of “unmasking fetishes” that critique feeds upon and “reconfigure the landscape of what 
can be seen and what can be thought”.8
 None of these thinkers, however, seems to suggest how an alternative to critique 
might appear in practice. In the search for an answer, I have turned to the work of spatial 
and visual practitioners and militant researchers who have tried to re-imagine a different 
relationship between theoretical elaboration and political action based on what could 
be called critical proximity. By “proximity” I do not mean here a condition in which all 
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distance between oneself and one’s object of study is magically abolished: proximity here 
does not mean identification. Rather, critical proximity refers to a mode of operation that 
foregrounds the fact that that distance has been produced and therefore attempts to work 
through it and create alliances across it.9 The residency I did in Palestine in early 2010, at the 
beginning of my PhD, with DAAR (Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency) provided 
me with a good example of how that process might look.10 The attempt of the DAAR 
members to move from a predominantly scholarly investigation to an understanding of 
spatial practice as intervention – “to become part of the constellation of forces that shapes 
our environment”, as they put it – has been a constant source of inspiration.11
 Another important reference has been the different practices usually grouped under 
the label of “militant research”. From the Italian Workerist tradition of “conricerca” to the 
“investigation militante” of Latin American and Spanish collectives, all these methods of 
enquiry have been based on the idea of overcoming “the distance between the researcher 
and the target of the research” and thus of making “certain knowledges part of, and tools 
for, social and political struggle”.12 Finally, the necessity of contesting and challenging the 
mechanical division between theory and practice has been a leading theme in the ongoing 
discussions with the architects, filmmakers, writers and artists who have been members 
(as I have) of the Centre for Research Architecture. As Eyal Weizman has explained in 
relation of the overall scope of the Forensic Architecture project, which has involved the 
majority of the Centre’s members, “rather than seeing the tension between practice and 
critique as a problem that needs to be resolved by choosing one or the other, we found in 
this problematization a productive resource that intensified our research process.”13 
 In keeping with this spirit, Forensic Oceanography has operated as “something 
akin to a ‘critical forensic practice’ that includes both the production of evidence and the 
querying of the practices of evidence making.”14 It has attempted to use spatial and visual 
practices as a form of political intervention, unsettling the traditional relationship between 
theory and practice, research and intervention, and knowledge and action. Practice is 
here neither the supposedly logical outcome of a previous theoretical analysis on a given 
context (as mainstream architectural theory would have it), nor “a field of confirmation for 
laboratory hypotheses” (as social sciences might claim instead).15 Rather, the production 
of visual and spatial evidence and its circulation across different legal and political forums 
has been used “to provoke politics to reveal itself and act upon it”.16 Theoretical elaboration, 
in contrast, becomes an organisational tool that helps orientate one’s practice within a 
complex and historically stratified force field, in this case the European border regime. 
It often “comes into play from within particular struggles, as a ‘what to do’ question that 
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attends to the challenge to elude, resist, or interrupt a particular capture in struggle”,17 
forming “a body of practical knowledges of counter power”.18 In this sense, this knowledge 
does not only derive from (and feed back into) what could be labelled as “high theory”, but 
includes as well, for instance, all the mundane organisational tactics employed on a daily 
basis by migrants to overcome the limitations imposed on their mobility. 
 However, as soon as one leaves the supposedly isolated ivory tower of academic 
scholarship (the isolation of academia being of course an already widely contested 
myth), a series of problems, dilemmas and paradoxes starts to emerge. “Indeed”, as Eyal 
Weizman acknowledges, “acts of political and legal activism must negotiate a complicated 
terrain between compromise, complicity, resistance, and evasion.”19 The line that divides 
emancipation from oppression is often tenuous and never stable. This is particularly clear 
in a border regime, where the knowledge produced by critical researchers and by border 
controllers often dangerously overlaps. Information on patterns of migration, tactics and 
points of border crossing, and surveillance systems, etc. is fundamental not only for activists 
willing to document and denounce the violence of the border, but also for all agencies 
aiming at controlling or managing migration. This question is particularly pressing at a 
time when “we have witnessed a proliferation of scholarly interest in migration. In this 
process of ‘becoming a discipline’, migration knowledge has undergone a ‘disciplining 
effect’,” becoming one of the most effective tools in making the phenomenon of migration 
more knowable, predictable and ultimately governable.20 Activists and researchers alike 
are then at risk of participating in a production of knowledge that immediately becomes 
part of the governmental machine that regulates mobility. 
 In this scenario, how is it possible to act critically and propositionally at the same 
time? Or, to put it otherwise: “How can knowledge about migration produce transformative 
[and emancipatory] effects in the politics of migration – understood as the contentious 
force field constituted by the practices and knowledges of multiple actors who together 
determine who can move and in what condition?”21
AIMS AND MEANS
Working through these issues has involved, first and foremost, rethinking the temporality 
of our engagement. “A militant investigation”, writes Sandro Mezzadra, “should always 
aim at identifying the conditions under which the very experience of time – time of 
domination as well as time of struggle – becomes a fundamental stake of political and 
social conflict.”22
 Traditionally, political practices that aspire to be emancipatory have relied on 
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two main temporal models, both drawn from the history of socialism. At one end of 
the spectrum, there has been reformism, grounded on the idea of gradual reforms that 
would progressively ameliorate the conditions of the working class. At the other end is 
the messianism of revolution: the promise of a singular event that will institute once and 
forever a radically new social order. The alternative between reforms and revolution has 
often been presented as a choice between two opposite and irreconcilable tendencies, 
spurring fierce debates that have engulfed the critical left. 
 Yet some amongst the most renowned socialist thinkers from early on rejected 
the framing of this discussion in terms of an outright dichotomy, pointing rather to the 
necessity of articulating these two perspectives.23 The most eloquent proposer of this 
vision was perhaps Rosa Luxembourg. In a pamphlet originally published in 1900 and 
entitled “Reform or Revolution”, she famously accused Eduard Bernstein, the “father” of 
revisionism, to have introduced for the first time “the opposition of the two factors of the 
labour movement”.24 She, on the contrary, insisted on the necessity of social reforms as a 
means to achieve social revolution. “The daily struggle for reforms, for the amelioration 
of the condition of the workers within the framework of the existing social order, and for 
democratic institutions”, she wrote, “offers to the Social-Democracy an indissoluble tie. 
The struggle for reforms is its means; the social revolution, its aim.”25 For Luxembourg, 
then, it was only in the articulation of the daily struggles of social reforms with the long-
term goal of overthrowing capitalism that a truly revolutionary perspective could emerge.
 This debate has been recently retraced in telling terms by legal scholar Robert 
Knox, who has effectively framed it as a question of tactics and strategy.26 In his schema, 
“we might say that strategic interventions are ‘revolutionary’, inasmuch as they address 
critiquing or abolishing the basic logic of the system,” while tactics, which are “are concerned 
with conjunctural moments […], those transitory conflicts and battles that occur in the 
political sphere, […] would be more concerned with ‘reform’ than with revolution”.27 As 
he rightly points out, however, the problem in many fields of political activity today is that 
long-term strategic goals seem to have been consistently neglected in favour of short-term 
tactical victories, including by those who would define themselves as progressive. While 
Knox’s text focuses on legal arguments, the same diagnosis has been shared by Gene Ray 
and Gregory Sholette in their “reflective assessment” of tactical media, the activist media 
practice that grew out of a “de facto refusal of strategy”.28 While praising tactical media 
for its achievements, Ray and Sholette question the continued viability of this approach 
at a time when “a group of radicals with no […] inhibitions [towards “strategic thinking, 
institutionalisation, categorical hierarchies and grand narratives”] are busy imposing their 
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ultra-conservative vision on the world”.29
 A prevalent focus on conjunctural goals over strategic objectives is clearly 
visible also in the field that opposes the violence of maritime borders. In the age of the 
“humanitarian border”, most international organisations, NGOs and critical media 
have often protested against the death of migrants at sea and other violent practices by 
demanding border controllers’ compliance with human rights and international law 
standards. When disconnected from a deeper critique of the migration regime, however, 
tactical criticism of the “failures” of the border regime – the failure to rescue people of 
distress at sea, the failure to comply with the principle of non-refoulement, the failure to 
bring rescued migrants to a safe port of disembarkation – tends to overshadow the political 
violence that borders produce because of the very fact of instituting differential rights of 
mobility.30 Focusing mainly on redressing the most heinous aspects of the border regime, 
these initiatives have not only left its structural basis (the existence of territorially bound 
entities claiming a sovereign right to decide who can move and under which condition) 
substantially unchallenged,31 they have even ended up underpinning the very mechanisms 
of surveillance and militarisation that cause death in the first place, as the official responses 
to the 3 October 2013 shipwreck have shown (see this thesis’ introduction).
 These risks became readily apparent to me in the course of the Forensic 
Oceanography project. The articulation between, on the one hand, the tactical choice 
to bring the “left-to-die boat” case to a court of law and, on the other, the strategic 
commitment to fight the “the political violence of the border regime which structurally 
produces precarity, exploitation and deaths as its outcome” raised from the beginning a 
whole series of challenges and questions.32 From the perspective that Robert Knox has 
called “principled opportunism”,33 filing a contentious legal case has undoubtedly had the 
merit of “inserting ‘grains of sand’ into the migration regime’s mechanisms, blocking it 
temporarily, forcing it to change slightly”.34 In this way it has become “a tool in a practical 
critique of the ‘governmentality of migration’, which, while not giving up the aim of 
completely abolishing the control of mobility, adopts the critical attitude consisting in 
‘the art of not being governed like that’ that Foucault saw emerging as consubstantial to 
governmentality practices.”35
 However, while a legal victory in the “left-to-die boat” case might, for instance, 
send the important message to all actors operating at sea that similar events will not go 
unpunished, it is highly questionable that it would manage to address the structural violence 
of maritime borders. This failure has to do with the specific characteristics of this type of 
violence, which kills without touching and is exercised by several actors simultaneously, 
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thus remaining largely elusive to the law. But it also depends more generally on the 
fact that, as Robert Knox has written, “legal arguments can never address systemic or 
structural causes”.36 “Even if the argument is won,” he writes, “the victory is likely to be a 
very particular one – inasmuch as it will foreclose any wider consideration of the structural 
or systemic causes of any particular ‘violation’ of the law.”37 Even if the helicopters and the 
military boat that did not rescue the passengers of the “left-to-die boat” are identified, 
tried and condemned, it would be utterly unrealistic to think that this might challenge the 
foundations of the border regime. Much more probable is that the responsible individuals 
will be singled out as “bad apples” who did not comply with the existing legal framework 
that already establishes rescue at sea as an obligation. What would be sanctioned, then, 
would be the excessive violence that intervenes to fill the gap between the fantasy of the 
soft power of migration management – which “can be easily ‘converted’ into accepted 
technologies of bordering, political statements and humanitarian-securitarian measures” 
– and the structural violence of bordering.38 “Mobilizing a legal discourse thus runs the 
risk of depoliticization, turning the quest for bringing an end to violations at sea into a 
purely technical question and making the migration regime appear ‘more humane’.”39
 It was clear to us from the beginning of the project that our work could not be 
geared exclusively – or even primarily, perhaps – to the legal context. The lack of an 
existing legal forum that would be able to address the structural violence of borders has 
in this sense become a possibility rather than a limitation. Aware that “diffused fields 
of causality […] require a diffused form of political action”,40 Forensic Oceanography’s 
work has in fact been mobilised across a multiplicity of different forums, political and 
juridical, formal and informal, in the attempt “to dismantle or fundamentally reconfigure 
the political field, as opposed to the standard tendency of international justice to isolate 
a few culpable individuals while leaving the social and economic hierarchies of a society 
intact”.41
 To anyone who shares a critical perspective on the contemporary border regime, 
it is clear that this “reconfiguration of the political field” in which a border’s structural 
violence takes place needs necessarily to address the very violence that is implicit in the 
institution of differential rights to mobility. And yet perspectives that have attempted to 
question the structural basis of the migration regime have been consistently dismissed as 
unrealistic and confined to a distant, inaccessible future. The ongoing death of migrants at 
sea is, we have been told, too complex a problem and requires extraordinary diplomatic, 
political and economic “solutions” (long and costly negotiations with “third countries”, 
exceptional military deployments, draconian measures of detention and deportation, etc.). 
240Postscript
The struggle against the structural violence of maritime borders seems therefore to be 
caught in an impossible deadlock. On the hand, as explained, tactical manoeuvres seem 
to lack the strategic vision needed to address the structural causes of violence. On the 
other, strategic claims cannot find the tactical tools through which they could bring 
about effective change and are therefore readily dismissed as utopian. In brief, what we 
are left with is, once again, a choice between tactics without a strategy and a strategy 
without tactics. As Robert Knox argues, recalling Rosa Luxembourg’s position, however, 
the opposition between reforms/revolution and tactics/strategy is a “false dilemma, since 
actualising strategic concerns does not necessarily mean jettisoning practical interventions 
in everyday […] struggles, but rather framing these struggles in terms of the overall 
strategic goal”.42 In order to break away from this misleading choice, we need to tackle the 
problem from a different perspective, which is what I would like to do in the remainder 
of this text.
A SPLIT TEMPORALITY  
The concept of “split temporality”, which was put forward by Sandro Mezzadra in a 
recent interview, can provide, I think, a useful starting point to consider another possible 
articulation of strategy and tactics.43 Mezzadra briefly outlines this notion in relation to the 
struggle against detention centres carried out for many years by several activist groups and 
NGOs in Italy and in particular in relation to the tension that exists between, on the one 
hand, the demands for more transparency and improvements of detention conditions and, 
on the other, calls for these centres’ outright closure. These two demands, he argues, can 
be either articulated according to a principle of “double temporality”, i.e. as two successive 
steps of the same process (“let’s first reform the detention centres and then, at a later time, 
we’ll close them”), or as one of “split temporality” (“in the sense that you are yourself split 
in the moment in which you negotiate with the municipality […] about the conditions of 
detention in the centre and in the very same moment you are struggling for the abolition 
of detention”).44
 While this might seem at first sight just a nominal difference, it expresses, I think, 
a much deeper and important distinction. Reframing the question along the lines of the 
strategy vs. tactics debate outlined above, we might say that while both perspectives share 
the strategic, long-term goal of closing the camps and not simply of ameliorating the 
conditions of detention, there is an important difference in the temporal articulation of 
tactical and strategic goals. What Mezzadra highlights is not only the need for strategic 
objectives to guide daily political activity, but also the need for a radical simultaneity 
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between these two moments. His call seems in this sense to echo Foucault’s remark 
that “there is not a time for criticism and a time for transformation; there are not those 
who need to do criticism and those who have to transform […]. [T]he work of a deep 
transformation can be done then in the opened and always turbulent atmosphere of a 
continuous criticism’.”45
 Thinking about a form of political practice that would be capable of keeping 
together tactical interventions and strategic goals in the same moment – and not one as 
the succession of the other – might seem, at first, counterintuitive, and certainly not an 
easy task. A possible suggestion of how such a practice might look like comes, I think, 
from the work of DAAR in Palestine, and in particular from the project dealing with the 
“right of return” of Palestinian refugees. The call for the “right of return” to the villages 
from where Palestinians were expelled in the aftermath of the Nakba, as is well known, 
has been one of the defining legal and political categories of the Palestinian conflict. In 
official negotiations, return is usually depicted as a messianic (or apocalyptic, depending 
from the perspective from which one looks at it) event that would redress once and for 
all the sufferings of the Palestinians. DAAR’s members, instead, propose a completely 
different vision. Starting “from what exists – the present state of affairs and its material 
manifestation, from the rubble ‘unceasingly piled before our feet’,”46 they imagine return 
as “a category that organizes the lives of refugees in the present […] and grounds the 
right of return in daily material practices”.47 From this perspective, return stops being 
a utopian strategy “abused and traded in the context of futile political negotiations” 
and becomes instead an operative tactic that aspires to unlock its own transformative 
potential.48 It is in this strategy-becoming-tactic that, I think, we might get a glimpse of 
how a split temporality might look. While a double temporality implies accepting the 
idea that change in politics happens chiefly at an institutional level that remains largely 
inaccessible to “radical” politics (whose role would be only to react to abuses, waiting for 
“real” improvements to be eventually granted by dominant powers), thinking through a 
split temporality encourages us to shift our gaze onto already existing practices of struggle 
and to think ahead of institutional decisions. This shift of perspective liberates politics 
from the moment of suspension to which it has been confined by “official” negotiations 
and opens up the political imagination to a whole new set of practices.
RE-JOINING MOVEMENT AND MOVEMENT
Coming back to the politics of migration, an analogy with DAAR’s practice can be 
drawn with a similar shift of perspective that has taken place in relation to the politics 
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of migration. Theoretical perspectives that are usually gathered around the label of the 
“autonomy of migration” have for a long time considered struggles against the migration 
regimes as an heterogeneous field which include not only those experiences “in which 
migrants openly challenge, defeat, escape or trouble the dominant politics of mobility” 
but also “the daily strategies, refusals, and resistances through which migrants enact their 
(contested) presence – even if they are not expressed or manifested as ‘political’ battles 
demanding something in particular”.49
 From this point of view, the most important demand of a vast field of struggles 
usually grouped under the “No Border” slogan, i.e. freedom of movement, is not considered 
an “utopia of ultimate satisfaction”, but a daily reality of unauthorised movements.50 This 
“creative force” upsets the government of mobility imposed by the border regime not only 
by means of explicit claims but also through “an everyday practice of refusing the border 
[that] has existed as long as borders have”.51 This fact is most clearly demonstrated by the 
presence of large numbers of illegalised migrants across Europe. People are already here, 
and, as the slogan of one of the most active self-organised group of migrants who have 
arrived in Europe by sea goes, “are here to stay”.52 Insisting on migrants’ “incorrigible” 
presence highlights the political value of migration-as-social-movement.53 At the same 
time, it does not constitute yet another apology of the present, as it does not describe 
a state of affairs that already comfortably exists out there but rather a condition that is 
brought into being through acts of refusal, non-compliance and protest that happen in 
difficult, ambiguous and sometimes violent conditions. Moreover, this perspective does 
not suggest that any practice of mobility is inherently subversive. As is especially clear 
now, the softer, post-control spirit of migration management has made the possibility 
of moving a means of government in its own right,54 thus underlining the key role that 
migration plays “in the routine operation of reproduction of capitalism”.55 And yet, in 
practices of unauthorised mobility there is always something in excess of those structures 
of power, insofar as they hold the potential of an escape from established social orders. 
While “escape is frequently considered to be a passive, weak and irresponsible way to deal 
with an unfolding social conflict or one’s own situation”, it is understood here as “a form 
of creative subversion capable of challenging and transforming the conditions of power”.56 
It is in this sense that movement can become a tool for imagining a radical “reshaping of 
economies and societies in a way that is not compatible with capitalism, nationalism, or 
the mode of state-controlled belonging that is citizenship.”57
 This perspective opens up the field of struggles for freedom of movement to a whole 
series of “imperceptible” practices that would otherwise not be included in the political 
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field, modifying the very borders of what we understand as political.58 Brett Neilson and 
Angela Mitropoulos have tellingly made this point:
In the case of struggles surrounding undocumented migration, the very notion 
of movement fractures along a biopolitical or racialised axis: between movement 
understood in a political register (as political actors and/or forces more or less 
representable) and movement undertaken in a kinetic sense (as a passage between 
points on the globe or from one point to an unknown or unreachable destination). 
To keep these two senses of movement separate not only denies political meaning 
to the passages of migration but, also, fails to think through the complexities 
of political movement as such, not simply as the incompleteness and risk of 
every politics but, more crucially, as the necessarily kinetic aspects of political 
movements that might be something more, or indeed other, than representational. 
[…] It is in this nexus of “movement as politics” and “movement as motion” that 
the non-governmental struggles over undocumented migration take shape as 
challenges to the demarcations that define politics as always, inexorably, national 
and/or sovereign.59
It is in this re-joining of the two meanings of movement, I would add, that freedom of 
movement (like the notion of return for DAAR) stops being a strategy confined to an 
inaccessible future and starts being a tactical tool that animates the present. 
INFRASTRUCTURES OF MOVEMENT
This detour into the temporality of politics in the context of the struggle for freedom 
of movement was necessary to explain the ways in which freedom of movement can be 
understood not only as a strategic goal, as it is usually conceived, but also as a tactical 
tool. This conceptual reversal, however, makes sense only insofar as it does not remain 
a purely theoretical project but informs concrete political initiatives. This has happened 
in a number of ways. While migration control is increasingly exercised as the control 
of migrants’ trajectories and routes, about which it seeks to acquire more and more 
information,60 several activist groups have recently been more or less explicitly framing 
their activities as a form of support for migrants on the road. Explicitly recalling the 
experience of the “underground railway”, the abolitionist network of secret routes and 
safe houses used by black slaves to escape slavery,61 the Welcome to Europe Network 
has, for instance, provided practical information to a growing number of migrants and 
refugees on their journey to and through Europe. Through an internet website,62 printed 
“info-guides”63 and the regular presence of its members at the borders of the EU, this self-
organised grassroots group has provided crucial information about asylum legislation, 
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work conditions, detention and deportation procedure, and the contacts of local NGOs 
providing assistance and legal help in various European countries, etc. 
 This sharing of information is, of course, not a prerogative of solidarity groups but 
the very condition for every migration. Moving across the dangerous and intensely policed 
borders of the EU generates a specific knowledge of the crossing that is shared by migrants 
through family ties, “ethnic” communities, friendship bonds, etc. For if the decision to 
migrate may be more or less an individual choice, circulating quickly becomes a collective 
social practice. As Mehdi Alioua and Charles Heller write, the social network that is 
progressively constituted through the experience of migration “is what allows [migrants] 
to make the link between the stages, obtaining information about the spaces they intend 
to traverse and the ways to enter into contact with the collectives there who might be of 
help to them. Knowing how to cross borders,” they continue, “is a know-how that is built 
up gradually and tried out collectively at the different stages of the trip.”64 In this sense, 
the mobility of migrants constitutes an infrastructure of sorts, one that includes not only 
the footpaths, highways, train lines, airports, etc., through which they move; not only the 
wireless networks that transmit their information, the internet café where they chat with 
relatives and friends, the mobile phones with which they alert the Coast Guards and the 
satellite phone which locates their GPS position; it includes, more generally, all the shared 
information and connections that transform migration into a social movement. Vassilis 
Tsianos and Dimitris Papadopoulos call this infrastructure “mobile commons”, thereby 
referring to all “the information about routes, possibilities for survival and […] tactics of 
existence”, all “knowledge and affective reservoir that offers vital resources and energies to 
migrants on the road or when they arrive in a new place”.65 This field comprises, of course, 
all mundane organisational tactics, orientation devices and tools that are used in the very 
act of moving from one place to the other; but it might also be productively expanded 
to include other tools and knowledge that, more or less directly, foster the movement of 
people, such as the information distributed by the Welcome to Europe Network. 
 These examples have been a constant source of inspiration for Forensic 
Oceanography. One of the motivations leading us to start the Watch The Med project 
(WTM) was precisely the idea of collectivising some of the tools and knowledge that we 
had developed during the “left-to-die boat” investigation. We have understood them as part 
of these “mobile commons” in a double sense – both as a source of information for future 
travels; and as a pool of resources that could be used to document past cases of deaths and 
violations at sea – in the belief that this, in its turn, would make practices such as pushbacks 
and non-rescue more difficult and hence travel “easier”. The images and maps that have 
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been produced in the frame of this project, then, do not remain simple representations 
but have the potential of enabling movement in a quite literal sense, of “creat[ing] possible 
worlds”.66 From this perspective the struggle against the death of migrants at sea stops 
being simply a claim for greater compliance with international human rights standards, 
and becomes a tool to alter the very conditions of movement in favour of those on their 
way and to sustain these continuously shifting infrastructures of mobility. In the light of 
this, the “efficacy” of a project like Forensic Oceanography could not be assessed “simply” 
in terms of how much it can alleviate the tragic effects of the current border regime, but 
also in relation to how it can foster (im-)mobility (a very important consequence of this is, 
of course, that fewer lives would be lost if people could move more freely).
 In the past few months, we have dedicated increasing efforts to a series of 
initiatives that seek to strengthen this perspective. One of them has been the creation, in 
the framework of the WTM project, of a series of leaflets that contain information as to 
risk, rights and safety measure at sea.67 Three versions of this leaflet exist, each referring to 
a specific geographical area: the Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean. Compiled 
with a large number of activists and migrants who have often themselves arrived in 
Europe by sea, they include legal information on how to avoid unlawful practices such 
as pushbacks, basic technical information on how to locate one’s position with GPS 
instruments, how to send a distress signal and what to do in case of a damaged boat, and 
maps that indicate the extent of Search and Rescue Zones, etc. They are available online 
and have been distributed in the area from where so-called “transit migrants” pass before 
embarking on a trip by boat to Europe. In this way, they seek to operate as a counterpoint 
to the “information campaigns” that international organisation such as the International 
Organisation for Migration undertake to deter people from attempting to reach Europe.68 
Against the paternalistic tone of these campaigns, which implicitly conceive of migrants as 
less-than-autonomous subjects who might eventually be turned into rational individuals 
if removed from the darkness of ignorance, these leaflets are written from the perspective 
that, on the one hand, migrants are often already quite well informed about the trip they 
are going to undertake and that, on the other, in many situations no amount of information 
will make the trip safer. As such, they do not aim to take decisions for anybody, but rather 
to facilitate an already existing circulation and sharing of information.
 Another one of these initiatives has been the Watch The Med Alarm Phone, an 
emergency phone hotline for those in immediate distress at sea. While the idea of mapping 
and spreading information about people in distress at sea in real time (so as to put pressure 
on authorities to carry out rescue operations) has been one of the aim of the WTM project 
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from its very beginnings in 2012, what was only an hypothesis was turned into a concrete 
project by a coalition of migrant activist groups and individuals in the aftermath of the 
shipwreck of 11 October 2013.69 This tragedy, in which 266 people drowned while Italy’s 
and Malta’s rescue agencies were disputing their obligation to intervene, made it once 
again painfully clear that an “independent” monitoring group, even without rescue 
means, might have at least the possibility of putting pressure on the authorities by raising 
public alarm. As we came to learn during the “left-to-die boat” investigation in relation 
to the figure of Father Zerai, the Eritrean priest who had received the first call from the 
boat,70 several individuals have over recent years operated as reference points for vast 
groups of migrants, who have exchanged their phone numbers and contacted them in 
case of distress at sea.71 The Alarm Phone was created to support and strengthen this 
already existing network in several ways: by providing a phone number that, thanks to 
a management software, can re-route distress calls to a vast number of volunteers, thus 
ensuring that every call is attended to; by training a growing group of people on how to 
use the vessel tracking and mapping technologies used by WTM to monitor the border 
control and rescue activities in the Mediterranean; and by sharing numerous other skills 
and knowledge about migration at sea provided by the many people participating in the 
project. As Maurice Steirl, one of the participants in this initiative has written:
it took the collectivisation of various transnational (migrant) activist struggles 
that a gaze documenting human rights violations after the fact would turn into 
a disobedient intervention supporting, in real-time, human movements in the 
Mediterranean Sea. […]In months of preparation before its launch, distress 
scenarios in the Western and Central Mediterranean Sea as well as the Aegean 
Sea were played out in emergency rehearsals. A wealth of technical-legal 
knowledges and regional expertise was collected, brought together, and fed into 
detailed handbooks and step-by-step emergency instructions, offering insights 
into the complex and fast-changing materialities, infrastructures and socio-
political conditions decisively shaping and impacting on processes of bordering 
in the Mediterranean Sea. Uncountable questions were raised and sought to be 
answered: In what ways do sea journeys between Turkey and Greece, Morocco and 
Spain, Libya and Italy differ? How do varying weather conditions, winds, waves 
and currents impact on the movements of vessels? And what types of vessels are 
commonly used? How far does mobile phone reception and coastal radars stretch 
into maritime spaces, and where do SAR zones and territorial waters begin and 
end? What are the languages needed to communicate with refugees on board? 
How can satellite phones provide us with the position of the vessel? Who are the 
responsible authorities to alert and what have been prior experiences of engaging 
with them? What agreements exist between the EU and third-countries and what 
are the many forms of human rights abuse that occur in these borderspaces?72
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Since October 2014, the Alarm Phone is operated day and night by volunteer shift teams 
located all over Europe, Northern Africa and North America, who can offer advice, 
information and the possibility of raising public alarm. 
 These few examples exemplify the way in which Forensic Oceanography has 
gradually shifted its activities. In this process, mapping and documenting violence have 
become more and more part of a larger project to sustain infrastructures of mobility. It 
is here, perhaps, that alliances between the non-reciprocal position of “undocumented 
migrants who are out of the ‘social contract’ of citizenship, and others, including critical 
researchers”,73 as well as between “traditional” forms of activism and the “imperceptible” 
politics of unauthorised migration can be formed, however tenuous and unequal these 
might be. This thesis can be also read as a diary of the search for those alliances. It testifies 
to my attempts to think through the possibilities they open up and the pitfalls they create. 
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The report provides a spatio-temporal reconstruction of 
the so called “left-to-die boat” case, in which sixty-three 
migrants lost their lives in the Central Mediterranean 
while drifting in the maritime zone at the time tightly 
monitored by the NATO-led coalition intervening in 
Libya of March 2011. Combining together disparate data 
(geospatial, meteorological, testimonial, military, and 
other), the report uses imaging, mapping, and modelling 
technologies to assemble a coherent spatial narrative 
of the chain of events. Because of the complex legal 
structure of the Mediterranean and the high number of 
actors operating there during the time of the event in 
question, creating a coherent spatial picture was critical 
for determining the degree of involvement of each of 
these parties. The ultimate destination of this report 
has been a series of legal cases (in France, Spain, Italy, 
Belgium) and FOIA requests (in the US, UK and Canada) 
regarding non-assistance to people in distress at sea led 
by a coalition of NGOs.
REPORT ON THE “LEFT-TO-DIE BOAT” 
Human Rights Report
11 April 2012, 66 pages, 35 figures
Full report available at: www.forensic-architecture.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FO-report.pdf
Produced in the frame of the ERC-funded “Forensic Ar-
chitecture” project at the Centre for Research Architecture, 
Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. With Charles Hel-
ler and SITU Research
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Liquid Traces offers a synthetic reconstruction of the 
events concerning what is known as the “left-to-die boat” 
case. In producing this reconstruction, our research has 
used against the grain the “sensorium of the sea” – the 
multiple remote sensing devises used to record and 
read the sea’s depth and surface. Contrary to the vision 
of the sea as a non-signifying space in which any event 
immediately dissolves into moving currents, with our 
investigation we demonstrated that traces are indeed 
left in water, and that by reading them carefully the sea 
itself can be turned into a witness for interrogation. As 
a time-based media, the animation also gives form to 
the Mediterranean’s differential rhythms of mobility that 
have emerged through the progressive restriction of 
legal means of access to the EU for certain categories of 




2014, HD video, 17 minutes
Watch at: www.vimeo.com/89790770
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“From tracing fingerprints to tracking Internet 
activities, forensics is central to the ways by which 
states police and govern their subjects. Through its 
media representations it has also become a defining 
feature of contemporary culture. Forensis seeks to 
invert the direction of the forensic gaze and designate 
the emergence of new aesthetic-political practices 
by which individuals and independent organisations 
use new technologies aesthetic practices, and 
architectural methodologies to bear upon a range of 
issues from political struggle to violent conflict and 
climate change. [...] Forensis raises fundamental 
questions about the conditions under which spatial 
and material evidence is recorded and presented, 
and tests the potential of new types of evidence to 
expand our juridical imagination, open up forums 
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Berlin, Haus der Kulturen der Welt
Group show curated by Eyal Weizman and Anselm Franke
See: www.hkw.de/en/programm/projekte/2014/forensis/
start_forensis.php
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Through the transnational cooperation with 
migrants’ rights organisations, activists, 
researchers, migrants, seafarers and the use of 
new mapping technologies, WatchTheMed monitors 
the deaths and violations of migrants’ rights at the 
maritime borders of the EU. The online platform 
allows to spatialise incidents across the complex 
legal and political geography of the Mediterranean 
Sea. Through the accounts of survivors and 
witnesses, but also the analysis of ocean currents, 
winds, mobile phone data and satellite imagery, it 
provides a spatio-temporal reconstruction of deaths 
and episodes of violence against migrants at sea. 
The documentation generated by WatchTheMed 
seeks to support the work of organisations that 
defend migrants’ rights, inform migrants of their 
rights and security at sea, pressure authorities into 
respecting their obligations at sea and support the 






The WatchTheMed network was initiated in the frame of 
the Boats4People coalition and now further includes the 
Forschungsgesellschaft Flucht & Migration, afrique-eu-
rope-interact and Welcome2Europe. 4
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“BOAT/PEOPLE: a Liquid Atlas” (working title) is a 
curatorial research project leading to a collective 
exhibition, a publication and a series of events. 
This project will seek to re-read the visual archive 
of migration at sea, re-positioning the current 
imaginary of contemporary migration across the 
Mediterranean in a broader context of human mobility 
and its government. By juxtaposing contemporary 
and historical artworks with documents pertaining to 
specific episodes of this wider history and geography; 
and by mixing visual imagery with other forms of 
representation (e.g., mapping, statistical analysis, 
literary works and technical documents), the project 
seeks to challenge simplistic representations 
of boat-people in the media. Inserting itself in a 
tradition that spans from John Berger’s and Jean 
Mohr’s seminal book “The Seventh Man” to Ursula 
Biemann’s “The Maghreb Connection”, it further 
seeks to put the politics of mobility in relation  >
BOAT/PEOPLE: a Liquid Atlas 
Curatorial and research 
project  (2015-2017)
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> to larger flows of resources, information, images 
and capital through a combined analysis of its 
technical means (BOATS, understood here as spatial 
diagrams of wider power relations) and its historical 
subjects (PEOPLES, in the ambiguous quasi-
subject/quasi-object position they occupy in history 
of migration at sea). As in a Warburghian archive, it 
creates unexpected connections by re- positioning 
on the same timeline different forms of (free/unfree) 
mobility at sea that are normally kept separated 
(such as slave trade across the Black Atlantic, Indian 
and Chinese indentured migration, transatlantic 
migration from Europe to the New World, 
contemporary boat-people “crises” in Vietnam, 
Haiti and Australia), thereby undoing the conceptual 
boundaries that served to hinder particular peoples 
from participation in the “modern” world. More 
generally, this visual research project strives to 
develop what we might call, after Fredric Jameson, 
a new “cognitive mapping” of migration, charting 
the “nebulous geographies of globalization” by 
depicting the turbulence of migration in its “vaster 
and properly unrepresentable totality”.
Image above: One of the two models of the slave ship 
“Brookes” commissioned by the abolitionist Thomas 
Clarkson during the campaign to abolish the slave trade. 
William Wilberforce used this model as a visual aid to 
highlight the brutality of the Middle Passage during a 
presentation to Members of the House of Commons
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